While the Trotskyist role in the Minneapolis Teamsters’ strike of 1934, the C.P. was also active. Here is an internal Party report, including a critique, of the role played by the Party in the struggle through June of 1934.

‘The Role of the Party In the Truck Drivers Strike In Minneapolis’ from The Party Organizer. Vol. 7 No. 7. July, 1934.

The resolution adopted by the Eighth National Convention of our Party points out that, “The resistance of the masses of toilers to capitalist attack is growing in volume and intensity,” and “Still imbued with considerable illusions as to Roosevelt, which are being dissipated by the course of the struggle, the workers are developing towards conscious fight against the Capitalist way out of the crisis. The magnitude of the struggle shows that the masses are accumulating enormous revolutionary energy and that big class battles are maturing.

The strike of the truck drivers in Minneapolis has proven the correctness of this analysis. The truck drivers’ strike which started with several hundred members of local 574, rapidly embraced over 7,000 drivers, and practically tied up all commercial transportation in the city. In spite of the official policy of the leadership of the strike to hold back the militancy of the workers and prevent mass picketing and action, the strike from the very beginning resulted in clashes with the police and the formation of mass picket lines embracing tens of thousands of workers. The police attack upon the workers aroused the indignation of Minneapolis workers who either joined in sympathy strike, (building trades workers) or massed on the picket lines and in the strike headquarters. The sentiment for a general strike in Minneapolis became so widespread amongst the workers, that the A. F. of L. Central Labor Union was forced to make gestures in this direction.

The accumulation of revolutionary energy among the Minneapolis workers was sharply manifested in the workers’ struggle against the armed forces of the employers and the city on Tuesday, when the deputized police were beaten and driven out of the market. On this day the militancy of the workers and their victory was so great, that Olson was forced to drop the Farmer-Labor mask (he had previously stated that as long as he is governor, no troops will move against strikers in Minnesota). Three companies of National Guard moved into Minneapolis, while the entire militia force was mobilized under arms as a reserve.

Role of C. P. in Developing Militancy of Strike

From the very beginning, the Communist Party succeeded in becoming the organizer and leader of the militancy of the workers on the picket lines:

1. In spite of the planned and organized attempts on the part of the A. F. of L. leaders and the Trotzkyites to keep the Party out of the strike and to slander the Party leadership as disrupters, we succeeded in forcing our way through these misleaders by establishing united action with the strikers from below.

2. Our Party membership and the workers influenced by the Party, the Unemployment Council, Y.C.L., I.L.D were in the front ranks of the picket line leading the workers in the struggle against the police and the deputized thugs.

3. The mass solidarity meeting called by the Party and the mass revolutionary organizations, brought together the strikers and our forces, and the line of the Party was accepted and put into life in the next two days of the strike.

4. Finally, the militant struggles of the unemployed under our leadership especially the CWA fight on “Tear Gas Friday” gave tremendous impetus and enthusiasm to the strikers and set a precedent for the workers defeating the armed forces of the city.

Mistakes of Party in the Strike

1. The general underestimation of work within the A. F. of L., which resulted in our failure to place our forces in the drivers’ local, placed us as an outside force in the strike, this in spite of the fact that the Party was aware of the approaching of the strike and the work of the Trotzkyites in this local union.

2. Our failure to take advantage of our favorable position of leadership on the picket line and our influence over the workers, to become a factor in the leadership of the strike. Our comrades were not bold enough to appear before the workers at the strike headquarters and speak in spite of the decision of the strike leadership against it. In some instances where our comrades did get the floor at strike meetings, they failed to expose the maneuvers of the leadership, call upon the workers to dismiss this leadership and to elect rank-and-file militant workers to the strike committee and strike leadership. The Party correctly advanced the slogan of General Strike, but failed to make it clear to the workers how a general strike could have materialized. The Party itself was not in a position to bring about a general strike of the Minneapolis workers and should have proposed concretely how to bring together all labor unions and workers organizations, to call the general strike, to call upon all workers to put pressure on their leadership in the locals for such action. Instead the Party leaflet, printed in 15,000 copies, gives the impression that the Party calls the general strike.

3. While the face of the Party was brought forward in the strike, no energetic recruiting took place and only very few strikers were brought into the Party. Our fraction in the local of the drivers is yet very small. This is greatly due to our failure to activize the two new Section Committees and place sharply enough the question of recruiting.

4. We failed to help the Young Communist League and to guide them correctly in their activities in the strike. So that while the Y.C.L. members were active on the picket lines, the face of the Y.C.L. was not shown. Not a single leaflet was issued by the Y.C.L. to the strikers, and no special youth demands were presented, while a great number of strikers were young workers.

Tasks of the Party

The possibilities of our Party amongst the drivers is great. The dissatisfaction of the truck drivers with the way the strike was ended is growing. There are thousands of blacklisted strikers. The Party must increase its activities amongst these workers and its opposition work in all other A. F. of L. unions. Our fraction in the drivers’ local must become the champion of the grievances of the drivers in the local and on the job, and on this basis mobilize hundreds of workers in a conscious opposition to the present leadership, with the aim of developing struggle around the following issues;

1. For a struggle to reinstate all blacklisted workers.

2. To fight for the original demands of $27.00 minimum for the drivers, unconditional recognition of the union, for a closed shop.

3. For the immediate release of all jailed pickets.

4. To develop the struggle for unemployment insurance, lower dues, trade union democracy, and the other demands we raised in our opposition work within the A. F. of L.

We must steadily expose the role of Olson and the Farmer-Labor Party in the strike, (calling of the National Guard against the strikers) and win the drivers to support the Communist Party election campaign and vote Communist.

We have to carry on a systematic campaign to recruit drivers into the Party, by bringing forward the revolutionary program of our Party The District Euro shall undertake a constant check-up on the detailed plan of work adopted by the fraction in the local and make the work in the drivers local an example in our revolutionary opposition work within the A. F. of L.

The Party Organizer was the internal bulletin of the Communist Party published by its Central Committee beginning in 1927. First published irregularly, than bi-monthly, and then monthly, the Organizer was primarily meant for the Party’s unit, district, and shop organizers. The Organizer offers a much different view of the CP than the Daily Worker, including a much higher proportion of women writers than almost any other CP publication. Its pages are often full of the mundane problems of Party organizing, complaints about resources, debates over policy and personalities, as well as official numbers and information on Party campaigns, locals, organizations, and periodicals making the Party Organizer an important resource for the study and understanding of the Party in its most important years.

PDF of issue (large file): https://files.libcom.org/files/Party%20Organizer%207.pdf