The relatively small T.U.U.L. affiliated Auto Workers Union had tried for several years, with some success, to organize Detroit’s sprawling auto industry and divided workers, The high point of those efforts, and a milestone strike in auto organizing were the 1933 Briggs and Hudson walkouts that quickly spread to 15,000 workers. This detailed report from the Communist Party’s theoretical journal gives the history of those struggles, tactics used, the role of the A.F. of L. bureaucrats, city officials, and Socialist activists, among other issues. These important fights helped to pave the way for the breakthroughs a few years later. Not long after this, the T.U.U.L. ‘dual union’ practice would be abandoned both because of the shift to the Popular Front and the rise of the C.I.O., which would take the lead in organizing the industry.

‘Some Lessons of the Strike Struggles In Detroit’ from The Communist. Vol. 12 No. 3. March, 1933.

Throughout the whole period of the crisis, there have been severe attacks on the living standards of the workers in the auto industry; the wages were cut severely, and yet we were unable to develop any struggles. There were no spontaneous struggles—in fact, no organized resistance of any kind, although now and then there was some grumbling and protest in this or that department. The present strike movement in Detroit is not only the result of the ripening of the objective situation. A decisive question and the determining factor in the strike movement is that our Party took things in its hands, adopted a correct orientation towards the factories and partial struggles, carried through a definite program of concentration, and through this was able to give at this moment leadership to the masses who were beginning to come into motion.

Only when the Party orientated towards the factories and concretely to the development of partial struggles in the factories, where the Party became conscious of the fact that struggles can take place in this industry and broke down the feeling that we could not have struggles, only then were we able to develop this strike movement. This change in the work of the Party in this district is only recent. It is no doubt true that the work conducted for all these years was also an important factor in developing the struggles at the present time. But the actual real organizational work in the factories began only very recently.

The reason why it is necessary to stress this point is that it enables us to understand many of our problems at this time facing us in Detroit. We have not yet entrenched ourselves very strongly in the shops, and in most of the shops we have not yet established reliable, tested leadership. The Party was discussing questions, as to where to concentrate, and there was some unclarity and difference of opinion in the preceding months. The general conclusion reached was that the main concentration must be the Ford plant, and this is still the main orientation. Simultaneously with this the Party adopted a position to concentrate also on the weakest link, to develop struggles in the Briggs Body plants. To a certain extent Briggs was the weakest link. The workers there are among the most exploited in the entire auto industry of Detroit and the company is closely allied with the whole of the Ford production process. During 1930 there were some small strikes in Briggs.

The first strike, which developed in the Briggs Waterloo plant this year, was successfully concluded with a victory for the workers. The wage cut was defeated, but without official recognition of the shop committee. Nevertheless, in reality the shop committee is recognized; the company is compelled to take up the grievances through the shop committee. As a result of this policy a large portion of the workers joined the union and organized their shop committee.

The second strike broke out in the Motors Products plant, which, on the basis of the first victory, was a victory in every respect, a victory in securing a substantial wage increase, and also winning recognition of the shop committee. Some 1,200 out of about 1,500 in the shop joined the union.

Up to this time, the auto manufacturers were taken by surprise. The one mostly worried was Ford, where as yet there is no strike. The first few days, therefore, when these strikes began, and the united front movement was developing, the enemies had not yet worked out a policy. All the reformist organizations were not yet brought to the surface, although they were there all the time. To a certain extent, the first two victories were a result of the fact that we caught them unawares. The spirit of the workers was very high, and the bosses tried to check the movement. The bosses sensed the new feature in these struggles—that they bore definite elements of a counter-offensive, which they hoped to check by bringing the first strikes to a close through partial concessions.

About ten days later the big strike in the Briggs Mack plants broke out, which immediately became a general strike in all Briggs plants, involving about 8,000 workers. We were for the first time confronted with the real problems of the strike. The bosses unfolded their whole policy. They realized especially the danger of the workers building their organization. The bosses therefore brought forward their whole policy. On the one hand a policy of terror, and on the other hand a policy of demagogy, not only on the part of the social reformists, but also on the part of the bourgeois organizations, the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. The president of the Briggs organization, Connelly, is also the head of the Democratic Party in the State of Michigan. This explains to an extent how quickly Comstock, the new “liberal” Democratic governor, immediately sent in the state troopers, despite the fact that one of his chief campaign promises was the abolition of the state troopers.

They brought all the coercive forces of the government into play in this strike, as well as all demagogic forces. We did not sufficiently expose this demagogy, the relation of Comstock and Connelly, and all other forces involved in impeding the strike movement.

The biggest problem we are facing in this strike movement is the struggle against the social reformists. This was brought out sharply in the task of establishing the leadership of the Auto Workers’ Union in the strike struggles, and the developing strike movement. Why is it that this becomes such a serious problem now? This is because our Party and the Auto Workers’ Union, despite the fact that it is known to the workers and has tradition among them, for a long time did not realize that social reformism is a power in Detroit, and so neglected fighting them in all these past years.

Since there were no outstanding leaders, and little organization, the comrades did not see the Socialist Party. As far as the I.W.W. were concerned, everybody thought they were just a bunch of hobos, but we discovered they are in the factories and among some of the skilled workers, too. Our big problem, therefore, in this growing strike movement is to recognize that we cannot make any advances without a sharp struggle against and the defeat of the social reformists.

In the question of the struggle against social fascism, we therefore made very many mistakes. The Party had a correct policy. There was some resistance on the part of the comrades in the union in carrying through this policy. The comrades thought that by soft-pedaling on this question they will eliminate the social fascists as a factor in the strike. That is the road to defeat. Many of the comrades, including some very good comrades in the leadership of the strike, emphasized the fact that they discovered what they did not know before—how backward the workers are. Here is the root of the mistake in our struggle against social reformism. The comrades felt they cannot fight against social reformism because the workers are backward. What these comrades meant was that the workers still have strong bourgeois prejudices. That they discovered this in the strike of course merely signifies our sectarian isolation from these masses. But surely this is not the new feature of the situation. What they should have discovered is the fact that the workers are not backward, but that the workers are moving forward. This is the new feature of the situation the comrades should emphasize at this time.

The correct fight against the social fascists, the correct application of the tactic of the united front from below, is now the central question in Detroit on which will depend the outcome of the present strikes, and our leadership of the developing strike movement, and the extent to which we consolidate our influence.

As a result of our weakness in conducting a relentless struggle against the social fascists and exposing them before the workers, the strike committee, and then a mass meeting of the strikers—not enthusiastically, but influenced by the pressure of the agents of the bosses—approved the policy of ousting Raymond of the Auto Workers’ Union from the Briggs Mack Avenue strike. It was not a decisive action on the part of the workers. The workers felt there was no action in the strike. The Highland Park strike was over. The agents of the bosses promised them they will get negotiations if they put out Raymond, and they used this as a last straw. Many workers abstained; a good number voted against. It is important to emphasize this.

Our comrades did not force the issue of the Auto Workers’ Union to a vote when it was raised by the enemies, and then withdrawn by them. Our comrades were satisfied that the bosses’ agents withdrew. There was a tendency on the part of some of the comrades to say we were defeated this week, and that this proves that we would have been defeated before if we had placed the matter to a vote. Just the opposite is the case. When the strike spirit was high, the misleaders did not bring it to the mass meeting; they were afraid to bring it. And that was the time we should have brought it to the workers, educated the workers, and mobilized them for our policy.

The Highland Park strike of the Briggs plant was practically over at an early date. Here the whole of the armed forces were concentrated, and the workers retreated. But these workers did not go back to work defeated. They went back with higher wages, which were granted by the company in the first days of the strike. But the strike was continued for all demands, including the recognition of the shop committee. The company withdrew the main issue of the strike. The workers demanded to be paid a flat rate, and this was granted. The strikers continued in spite of that for their own demands. That is, they won their point for which the strike was precipitated. Now, as for the Briggs Mack Avenue strike, there is no definite settlement of the situation as yet. This in spite of the fact that after the ousting of Raymond the agents of the bosses, who remained in the leadership of the strike, issued a statement pleading with the bosses—now we have thrown out Raymond, now will you settle with us. In this statement they did not dare attack the Auto Workers’ Union. They did not dare attack even Raymond. This shows that the prestige of the Union among the workers is great.

What is the policy at present with regard to the Briggs workers? We know from the past that we have to be very careful in overcoming the conceptions that because we are not in control of the strike therefore the strike is not our business. Therefore the main emphasis must be that this is our strike, and not to separate ourselves from the strikers. First of all, our task is to raise the issues of the strike in the strike committee and to strengthen our leadership there. Secondly, to call a meeting of the strikers and of the members who joined the union, many of whom are now withdrawing from the union. The union still has a substantial membership. It is necessary to call these workers together, to activize them and to make them the backbone for the fight on the floor at the strike meetings. One of the main reasons why we could not carry through our policy in Briggs is because the workers recruited were never until recently called together and organized. We had very little organization at the beginning of the strike. During the strike the most militant joined, and if they had been brought together they could have been a powerful force in the struggle and outcome of the strike.

With regard to the Hudson strike, how did the strike develop? There was a rumor that the Hudson company is going to give some increases. Monday morning, when the workers came to work, they found posted on the walls an announcement of increases in wages and an increase in the bonus. The increase was five cents per hour. The demand of the union was twice that much. Of course, the union had eight or nine other demands, good demands. But the main issue the company met half way. However, the company fired two of the leading workers on Monday, and on Tuesday morning the workers were enraged and the strike was called. The motor department was also out, shutting down the whole plant. The Hudson company immediately announced they were willing to negotiate with the workers’ committee. A committee was elected. The company furnished a bus to take the workers from one plant to the main office of the company for negotiations. When the workers got into negotiations, the company said they were willing to negotiate, providing the workers went back to work first. This the committee refused. It is clear, however, that the company gave quite a concession on the wages, five cents an hour, which means $2.50 a week. What is more, immediately following the victory in the first Briggs strike (Waterloo plant) the Hudson company withdrew a notice of a 15 per cent wage cut.

In the meantime the various representatives of the auto manufacturers got busy flying to Washington. Edsel Ford went to Washington. The U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Chapin, is the former secretary-treasurer of the Hudson Motor Company. Representative Wideman, the new Democratic Congressman-elect, an ally of the underworld and of the Detroit Federation of Labor, dispatched a letter to Doak. It was clear, therefore, that between the first announcement of the Hudson company and the time the actual negotiations took place, they worked out a policy not to grant the demands, and not to recognize the committees.

The correct strike strategy of the leadership of the strike, the enthusiasm of the workers, finally compelled the Hudson Motor Company to grant all the demands of the workers. The strike ended in a smashing victory for the workers.

Before the first strike in the Briggs plant, all the auto manufacturers were about to launch a wage slashing offensive. However, the growing strike struggles and strike sentiment in all the auto plants in Detroit stopped the wage cutting offensive. Almost every plant with the exception of Ford either withdrew a contemplated wage cut or gave the workers a wage increase. Here one can see the elements of a counter offensive of the workers. Not only in auto but in many industries, especially in steel, the Detroit struggles have already checked the wage-cutting drive.

The perspective is that we will have continuous strikes in Detroit. The bosses have at no stage in any of the struggles yet defeated the workers. On the contrary, the workers have gained sometimes small concessions and other times bigger concessions. And this shows that the movement is on the rise and will continue to be on the rise.

What is the status of the union and the Party? The union recruited not only during the strike, but from the beginning of the work for its conference, between 2,500 and 2,800 members. We cannot consider this, as yet, mass recruitment. About 15,000 workers were on strike. There were strikes in Hudson, Murray Body, Briggs, Motor Products—all big plants. The problem for the union now is in the first place to increase its leadership in the growing strike movement and to consolidate and further strengthen the union.

The Auto Workers’ Union should explain to the workers its program and policy. It must be clear that the union cannot force everything in its policy upon the workers without convincing them. The main problem is not to wait until the workers raise problems, but these problems should be raised by the union. The union must pursue a conscious policy of educating the workers.

The Party has recruited very little during the strike so far. There is no mass recruitment policy. The Party shall hold mass meetings and to these mass meetings workers who participated in these strikes should be invited. These general meetings should be followed by meetings on a neighborhood basis and as much as possible on the basis of shops, by bringing together 10, 20, 30 or 40 sympathetic workers to a meeting, and from these active elements recruit to the Party.

The Auto Workers’ Union is issuing leaflets to explain to the workers the meaning of these victories. It is necessary to state that we did not in previous struggles, nor sufficiently in Detroit, develop our agitation in the strike to explain to the workers the meaning of the victories, the lessons of the strike struggles, and especially to expose the demagogy of the social reformists. The lessons of the Detroit struggles must be made known to all the workers throughout the country. Undoubtedly, these struggles of the Detroit workers are arousing the moods of the workers to struggle in various sections of the country.

There are a number of journals with this name in the history of the movement. This ‘Communist’ was the main theoretical journal of the Communist Party from 1927 until 1944. Its origins lie with the folding of The Liberator, Soviet Russia Pictorial, and Labor Herald together into Workers Monthly as the new unified Communist Party’s official cultural and discussion magazine in November, 1924. Workers Monthly became The Communist in March ,1927 and was also published monthly. The Communist contains the most thorough archive of the Communist Party’s positions and thinking during its run. The New Masses became the main cultural vehicle for the CP and the Communist, though it began with with more vibrancy and discussion, became increasingly an organ of Comintern and CP program. Over its run the tagline went from “A Theoretical Magazine for the Discussion of Revolutionary Problems” to “A Magazine of the Theory and Practice of Marxism-Leninism” to “A Marxist Magazine Devoted to Advancement of Democratic Thought and Action.” The aesthetic of the journal also changed dramatically over its years. Editors included Earl Browder, Alex Bittelman, Max Bedacht, and Bertram D. Wolfe.

PDF of full issue: https://www.marxists.org/history/usa/pubs/communist/v12n03-mar-1933-communist.pdf