A valuable report on the work of the Communist Party in Chicago during the early Great Depression. Boleslaw ‘Bill’ Gebert, a future official of the Polish People’s Republic, was a long-time editor of the Polish language Socialist and Communist Press in the city. An important ‘secondary leader’ in the Party, in 1933 he was a District Organizer with this being a report to District Eight (Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri) Plenum in October of that year.

‘Mass Struggles in the Chicago District and the Tasks of the Party’ by B. K. Gebert from The Communist. Vol. 12 No. 12. December, 1933.

The purpose of the Industrial Recovery Act is to prevent strikes. The industrial codes were of such a nature in every industry that approximately one million workers in basic industries went out on strike primarily against the industrial codes. The strike struggles in the textile, mining, and steel industries are not ordinary struggles of the workers. These strikes carry with them political elements against the government, against the N.R.A. The militancy of the workers is a characteristic of these struggles, no matter to what unions the workers belong, or whether the workers are unorganized. The actions of the workers in Pennsylvania especially show the tremendous initiative and militancy of the American working class. We saw them in struggle, involving hundreds of thousands and nearly millions throughout the country. In this situation, the application of the united front from below can be better realized than in any other period.

Comrades, this wave of strike struggles did not fully register in our district. It is true that we led more strikes in the last period than in the history of our Party in this district. We led approximately 10,000 workers in strike struggles directly under the leadership of the T.U.U.L. The majority of these strikes were won. But where were the strikes led? In steel? No. In packing? No. In railroad? No. In the industries of concentration, in the shops of concentration, we did not develop strike struggles. We led a number of strikes in the small shops, some metal shops and light industries. We do not want to minimize this. But we are of the opinion that our attention was occupied too much with these little strikes, to the serious neglect of our plan of concentration and work in the heavy industries.

The only strike led through concentration was Standard Forging. If we had not concentrated on the shop, there would have been no strike. When we decided to concentrate on Standard Forging, we declared that this was one of the weakest links in the Calumet steel region, that once we started the strike, we would utilize it to penetrate into the steel mills in Calumet. Probably it would have been impossible to develop strike struggles in the other mills; but one thing is definite—that on the basis of this strike we could have penetrated into the steel mills and organized workers into the Steel and Metal Workers’ Industrial Union, and developed partial struggles inside. That was our outlook. That is why we decided to concentrate on the Standard Forging and Illinois Steel in Gary. The strong point during the strike was that we were able to defeat the A.F. of L. and the Red Scare quite effectively. A shop nucleus was built in the strike. Yet what was lacking?

During the strike everything else stopped functioning. The shop nuclei in other mills did not meet. Union groups did not meet. Everybody was looking for one thing—for a victorious ending of the Standard Forging Strike; and then the workers would flock to our union and the problems would be solved. It may not have been said in so many words, but that was the outlook. Comrades will dispute this. They say we organized mass meetings, etc. It is true that we organized mass meetings, but we stopped there. We did not organize the workers to penetrate the steel mills. When the strike began we decided to organize a huge parade in the steel region. When the question was raised, a number of leading comrades in the union objected to it. What do you mean organize a parade in four days? We need at least two weeks for preparations. The strikers themselves rejected this. Results showed that as far as mobilization is concerned, in other words as far as the influence of the Party upon the workers is concerned, the parade strengthened the strike to a large extent.

Secondly, a conference was decided upon, a delegated body of workers from the shops, from the organizations and from the unions. ‘This decision did not receive sufficient attention from the fractions or the Party in the region. If that conference had been called earlier, it would have strengthened the strike. That conference registered one thing, that there is an upsurge in the steel region, not so much from the number attending, but in the sense that we are able to build the union. I want to add that the strike was called off after six weeks. It was impossible to hold the strike any longer. It was ended just at the proper time. We won the confidence of the workers. They know very well that the U. S. Steel, Republic Steel were watching every move and were behind the Standard Forging Co. The steel bosses knew the meaning of even a partial victory of the Standard Forging workers. Our lesson is that when there is a strike in one shop, it must be utilized in the whole industry to build the union.

The A.F. of L., comrades, remains in the steel region as the main obstacle in the way of organizing the workers. In the strike of the Standard Forging, the group of 15 or 20 organized by the A. F. of L. were quite an obstacle. It was a central point around which the company maneuvered, the break the strike. Anybody who thinks that the A. F. of L., because it holds no mass meetings, is now out of the picture, is mistaken. The demagogy of the Roosevelt administration and influence of the reformists among the workers still exists even among militant fighting workers. That is something that many of us have not fully taken into consideration in the daily work among the masses.

Revolutionary unions have grown in this period. We can record a growth of 5,000 in the T.U.U.L. unions. You will find, however that the: bulk of the membership in the T.U.U.L. are not in the basic industries. In the steel industry our immediate task is to carry through the decisions of the united front conference.

In mining we cannot say we made headway. Organization gains were very negligible. Our comrades there do not yet understand the Party policy. From the leadership down, there is a definite policy to be the tail to the Musteite elements. Our comrades proclaim that these people are leaders of the miners and our whole policy depends on what these people will do. Because of this we have not built the opposition in the P.M.A. but allowed events to pass through our hands. The miners closed the mines and marched on the Springfield. They marched against the N.R.A. The leadership of the P.M.A. sanctioned the movement, but did not expect it to develop to such a broad extent. When the 10,000 miners arrived, the official leadership could not be found. Our comrades took advantage of this. They put forward slogans for spreading the strike, for the election of a strike committee. These slogans remained words because we relied on Mrs. Wieck and she sabotaged.

In the Illinois coal fields we can make no headway without defeating Mrs. Wieck, Allard and company and winning the miners for our program. We must recall to our comrades the statement in the Open Letter:

“The reformists and especially the Musteites are attempting in the most active manner to paralyze the influence of the Communists by their own activity.”

This is exactly what is taking place in the Illinois coal fields. As long as our Party fails to understand fully the role of Musteism we shall not be able to make headway among the miners.

We must raise sharply the unity of the U.M.W.A. and P.M.A. miners. The policy of the P.M.A. leadership has drawn a line of hostility between these U.M.W.A. and P.M.A. miners. The overwhelming majority of the members of the U.M.W.A. can and must be won. The fact that 13 locals are moving to the Left is one of the examples. We must speak openly about the betrayal of the miners’ strikes in Franklin and Saline counties by the leaders of the P.M.A., who instructed the miners not to go on the picket lines because they might get hurt. We know that the miners in Saline county disregarded this policy and with guns on their shoulders marched to the mines of the Peabody Coal Co. and fought.

It is essential to strengthen our points of concentration, to establish our units, not only numerically, but politically. In Springfield our comrades issued a leaflet against the N.R.A. While that leaflet had not a clear Party position, it was against the N.R.A. It was received by the miners enthusiastically. In some locals of the P.M.A. the miners voted against the N.R.A. parade. This shows that when we develop a proper approach, with adequate slogans, we shall win the miners in struggle against the N.R.A.

In the packinghouses, both in Chicago and East St. Louis, we can say that no headway was made. Our organizers in the Packinghouses in Chicago are functioning as substitutes for the masses. Even those workers who did join the union do not feel that it is their union. There is no democracy in the little groups or locals of the union. We have no faith that the masses will develop organization and struggle. There is a complete neglect of work among the unemployed stockyard workers. But this does not mean that the stockyard workers are any different from: workers in other industries. The whole method of work must be changed. Our sections on the South Side, particularly the District Committee and the District Buro, do not pay sufficient attention to the stockyards. We are occupied with the steel and mining industries and have seriously neglected work in the stockyards. This calls for an immediate, drastic change.

In the railroad industry there have been steps forward, as shown at least in a better orientation by comrades here. Our comrades in the railroad industry do not think that the Party can help them. Recently there was a Pension Convention in Chicago, a movement of the railroad workers for old-age pensions. We decided that the unity movement call a mass meeting at the time of this convention. The comrades objected at first, but finally agreed to organize the meeting. There is, however, a National Committee, which decided against a meeting. They thought they might have an opportunity to speak inside the convention and that the meeting of the rank and file would lose them the chance. This is exactly the same policy as in the coal fields. Our work among the railroad workers basically is the same as in other industries, although we cannot close our eyes to the aristocracy traditions. When the Party decided to issue a leaflet in its name to the railroad workers, a leading comrade said, “nothing doing”. The workers, he contended, would say that the unity movement and the Party are the same thing. That leaflet, when finally issued, was greeted by the workers. They took it into the shops and the lodges.

Now, as to the A.F. of L. strikes. The A.F. of L. did not lead any important strikes in this district in heavy industries. They led, however, the needle trades both in Chicago and St. Louis. They led a number of small strikes here and there. Nowhere in these strikes did we fight sufficiently for independent leadership in the strike and on the general strike committees. There was a tendency either to drop completely the industrial union and go into the A.F. of L. or to stay away completely. We discussed these questions time and again with the comrades from the needle trades, but the struggle for independent leadership was not fully waged. Attempts were made here and there, even with some success, but in general we cannot be satisfied. One of the principal tasks in all strikes is to fight for independent leadership. The A.F. of L. was quite active in the strikes called by the T.U.U.L. It is just sufficient to mention Oppenheimer Packing, Stewart Dye Casting Corporation and Standard Forging. We did not have a single strike in which we did not come into conflict with the A.F. of L. The A.F. of L. organizers went to the point where they came to the Peoples’ Auditorium to attend the meetings of the workers. The A.F. of L. does not give up the struggle for the workers who are on strike under our leadership. In some cases they were able to break the strikes. In many cases, because of our incorrect approach, we lost the strikes to the A.F. of L. or to independent unions.

Comrades, our Party is a sort of one-track mind Party. Wherever we set one task to carry, we always forget about everything else. I have in mind particularly our work among the unemployed. The Open Letter warns us against this:

“The necessary concentration of our work on the most important factories does not of course, in any way mean that we should allow our work among the unemployed to slacken.”

Our unemployed work has considerably slackened. This neglect of the unemployed opens the way to the Musteites. They have not yet moved in on Chicago, but in the Illinois coal fields they are calling mass rallies of unemployed in Springfield. In the Illinois coal fields and throughout Illinois, our Unemployed Councils established themselves to some extent. We must particularly carry on the Unemployment Insurance campaign. The Springfield conference decisions were sent to fractions and organizations, but that is as far as it went. The problem is not only that of the Unemployed Councils, but of the Trade Unions. We do not combine our work. We did not rouse the masses to carry out the decisions of the Springfield Convention, This is a particular danger in view of mass lay-offs and the fifth winter of hunger and starvation.

Comrades, I want to spend a few moments on work in the A.F. of L. Our work in the A.F. of L. in our district is at a stand-still, with the exception of the carpenter’s union, where we forced the bureaucracy to re-admit members of the union without paying initiation fees. In other locals we hardly exist. There are larger and larger numbers of workers from the A.F. of L. joining our Party. The workers now joining the Party are willing to carry on the fight for the Party policy, and around them can be developed a movement inside of the locals of the A.F. of L. But this problem of the A.F. of L. is not taken seriously in our work, neither by the District Buro nor by the sections. We were unable to establish a real leadership among the opposition elements of the A.F. of L. locals. At the C.C. Plenum, Comrade Stachel proposed that it is necessary to set up a city organization committee, an elected body of opposition groups under our control to discuss the problems for work in the A.F. of L. I believe this will receive some attention, particularly from those who are working in the A.F. of L. It seems to me that our methods are not bringing results. It is necessary to change and improve them.

I have cited some of our outstanding weaknesses and errors. They are all expressions of the Right danger, the main danger in our Party. We can enumerate a long line of examples. We have mentioned the leaflet in the coal fields. In St. Louis our union held a mass meeting at which a resolution was passed finding the company guilty of violating the N.R.A. Our leading comrades, on a number of occasions, prevented the sale of the Daily Worker at strike meetings, stating that these were union meetings and not Party meetings. In most of the strikes the Daily Worker may not be spoken of officially. We do not bring sufficiently forward in the course of the strikes the program of the revolutionary unions; we hide the face of Party. The results of this are very disastrous. I wish the comrades from Section 3 would speak about the Kimball Piano strike where our Party comrade at a mass meeting of the strikers, when asked whether the T.U.U.L. is a red union, said “No.” But the workers found out that it is a red union. They came to the next meeting and said, you lied to us. In Coleman Bronze we organized the workers, we led a strike and won the strike; but we failed to clarify our position. After the strike the workers decided to withdraw from the T.U.U.L. and organize an independent union.

On the other hand, comrades, we have “Left” tendencies, such as calling strikes prematurely (nut pickers in Section 1, Stewart Dye Casing Corp). We cannot play with the workers. Every action of ours must be well prepared.

In the mass work of our Party, the Party was not built. It will probably be a surprise to you, comrades, to learn that in the first nine months of 1933 compared with 1932, we recruited approximately 60 percent less to the Party. Recruitment to the Party dropped considerably. Here are the figures: In June 1932, we recruited 233; in July, 250; in August, 199; in September, 240. In June, 1933, we recruited 133; in July, 144; in August, 188; in September, 165. Fluctuation is still 61 percent in the Party.

Comrades, this is an alarming situation. It calls our attention to the life of our units and the work of our fractions. There is one bright spot in the recruiting in the shops. In July there were 36 shop nuclei and today we have 45 shop nuclei with approximately 10 percent of the membership in the shop nuclei. True, not satisfactory, but a little progress has been made. Some old shop nuclei do not expand, they do not grow, they just stick. That shows that our work in the shop is of such a character that we do not attract the workers.

Our shop papers cannot be distinguished from union organs. Our papers are not political organs of our units in the shops. Our shop papers in many shops are an important instrument in the hands of the workers. A number of comrades report how workers take our papers, how they like to read and spread the papers. Non-Party people take the shop paper inside the mills, as well as our leaflets. But the content of our papers is not satisfactory. We have 45 shop nuclei and only about ten shop papers; and not all of them are issued regularly. There is a serious problem confronting us in that our sections of concentration, where we must have the strongest sections, are the weakest. For instance, our Stockyard section is the weakest section; and to it falls the task of organizing the biggest industrial plant in the city. As far as leadership is concerned, the composition of the Party there is not satisfactory. If we go to the other sections, we find that neither 6 nor 12 is in a good situation. Nor can we be satisfied with Gary. Our comrades have some explaining to do as to why our nuclei stopped functioning during the strike at the Standard Forging. Again, in the coal fields, what are we doing in the base of concentration? We know that there is something going on among the nut pickers, but we would like to know what is going on among the steel workers. In every section our concentration points are weak, and their strengthening is the biggest task.

Comrades, I want to deal with a problem that is quite often spoken of at all our plenums, namely, to build the Young Communist League: In our plan of concentration we state how much will be done for the Y.C.L. by the Party. Wherever there exists a Party nucleus, we will build a Y.C.L. nucleus. Some work has been done in this direction. In St. Louis the Y.C.L. was built to quite an extent in the course of the nut pickers’ strike. In the coal fields three units of the Y.C.L. have been organized. This is progress. But on the whole the problem of building the Y.C.L. is forgotten, it is because our Party has not yet discovered the American youth politically. We do not approach the young workers in our every day life and activity. We did not even make slogans for the youth, we are isolated. In drawing up our demands we do not take into consideration the problem of the young workers in industry. How can we organize them if we have not this economic approach to the young workers? Some language groups have done some good work, particularly the Lithuanians, who organized a youth movement. If our language comrades can organize youth, why can’t the Party organize youth around the Party units and other mass organizations? We speak of the danger of fascism and war. When we speak of fascism and war, we cannot omit the young worker.

We have 400 young workers in the Y.C.L. Out of these 200 are dues-paying members. When the comrades speak of other problems they should speak of the American young workers, employed and unemployed. I fully realize the importance of the students, but they are not basically a proletarian youth. If we had 400 packinghouse, steel and mining youth, I would say, yes, we have a good beginning; but you will find that this is not the case. The percentage of the steel workers, miners, etc., is negligible. We have built a shop unit in the steel industry. This is a step forward, but not enough. Now I want to come to one of the very important problems confronting our District—the question of building of the League of Struggle for Negro Rights as a mass Negro liberation organization. The District Buro wholeheartedly agrees in this with the decision of the C.C. It is not the first time that we have discussed the question of building the L.S.N.R. But on a number of occasions leading comrades, in this district as well as nationally, have raised serious objections to building the L.S.N.R. All kinds of pretexts have been offered, such as, that the L.S.N.R. implies a Jim Crow organization, that it would be a substitute for the Party, that it has no program, etc. There are only a few comrades who have spoken for the L.S.N.R., but many who have spoken against it. Objectively it has led to the situation where we have a struggle against the L.S.N.R., which means a struggle against carrying on work among the Negro masses, particularly against the work for Negro liberation. That is the political meaning of the opposition to the L.S.N.R.

The L.S.N.R. will be a tremendous help to bring the Negro workers into the T.U.U.L. Throughout the Party there is a tremendous neglect of bringing the Negro workers into the unions of the T.U.U.L. We can record only some organization of the Negro workers in Sopkins and among the nut pickers. But in the basic industries where the Negro proletariat is working we have as yet been unable to win the Negro workers for the T.U.U.L.

Comrades, in all our activities, in all our struggles, the united front is the best instrument to mobilize the workers for struggle. Be the united front between organizations, unorganized workers, or members of the reformist organizations, in the shops, in all forms and fields of activity, it has meaning only when it is a united front of action. If not, we are committing a crime against the working class, because we make it just more comfortable for Muste and other elements to mislead and betray the workers. And we must not hesitate to expose before the masses of workers anybody who professes agreement with the program and refuses to carry it out in practice or openly sabotages it. The present upsurge of the masses gives us a splendid opportunity to build a real mass united front from below.

Finally, in all our work there is one outstanding problem confronting us, and that is to improve the political life of the Party and of our fractions. In our agitation and propaganda among the masses we must learn to raise the problems to a higher level. To bring forward our ultimate aims for the overthrow of the capitalist system and for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

We do not fully popularize the achievements of the Soviet Union. The recognition of the Soviet Union has aroused the masses of the workers, who would like to know more about it. Not the Chicago Tribune, but our Party, should be the one to tell the workers about the life of the Soviet Union.

The problem of schools, both central and section schools, must receive more attention. The sale of literature, Daily Worker, Young Worker, Working Woman, etc. must be a question combined with the everyday activity. There should be no mass meeting, demonstration, picket line at which we haven’t our publications. This is necessary because it will also increase the class consciousness of the masses of workers and toilers in general. In this connection I want to raise very sharply the question of the Daily Worker. I have lost track of how many months we are in the campaign for the Daily Worker to raise $40,000. To date our district has raised only 25 per cent of the quota—a little over $1,000. This shows that there is something wrong with our approach to the workers. There can be no excuse that there is no money. It is true that we cannot expect $100 donations, but donations of $1, 50 cents, 15 cents and dimes can be raised from many workers. The District Buro proposes to make it mandatory on every member of the Party to raise $1 for the Daily Worker. We cannot continue this drive forever. This money means the life or death of the D.W. We discussed the question of the D.W. at the meeting of the C.C., and the situation is such that without the $40,000 not only can we not continue the improvements, but there will be no D.W. Surely our district cannot be a partner to anybody who will help to put an end to the D.W, $5,000 can be raised in our district if we want to do it. There are sections which raised the tremendous sum of $2! Nobody can convince me that in a whole section with all its influence among the workers, only $2 can be raised. That means that the whole section is out of the picture as far as the D.W. is concerned. There are other sections equally “good.” The out-of-town sections do not even realize the problem of the D.W.; it is only a problem for the Chicago sections. We must change this attitude. We must see to it that the D.W. be recognized as the national organ of the Party.

Now as to the work in the A.F. of L. I want to state that the main task confronting our Party is to organize the unorganized workers in the heavy industries into the unions of the T.U.U.L. But this task, comrades, is not in opposition to work in the A.F. of L. On the contrary, without the work inside the A.F. of L., we cannot carry the first point. That is the relation of the two, because the A.F. of L. bureaucracy will always remain the main obstacle in the struggles of the workers. Therefore, our task is to penetrate inside the A.F. of L.; but the first step toward penetration, it seems to me, is the problem of organizing of our Party forces inside the A.F. of L. Between 20 percent and 25 percent of our Party membership are members of the reformist unions. What a powerful force this is! But this force is not organized, and hence it is not a force at-all. It is necessary to organize this force. Comrade, who did not hear the report, raised the question, just as it had been raised in the report, of organizing some sort of committee or council to which delegates from groups of the A.F. of L. locals would come, maybe once a month. To have their own center (not ideologically independent of the T.U.U.L.), so that they would be able to discuss and take up their problems. At the present time it is difficult to give leadership through the T.U.U.L. to the A.F. of L. Comrade Stachel raised this question at the Plenum of the C.C. After the remarks of Comrade —— I am more than convinced of the necessity for setting up such a committee of the A.F. of L.

We must not overlook the fact that tens of thousands of workers joined the A.F. of L. in the last period. For every member organized in the district in the T.U.U.L., the A.F. of L. has organized at least ten. What is interesting is that they penetrated in this distract not only the needle trades, but also some heavy industries. 

Our task, therefore, is not to isolate ourselves from these workers, but to be with them. In these newly organized locals of the A.F. of L. work can be carried on much more easily. Anyone who knows anything about newly organized unions knows that it is easy to carry on work there. Our work in the A.F. of L. must be placed in this light.

The same applies to the railroads. Some time ago we liquidated the railroad workers’ league and commenced work inside. But our work in the A.F. of L. and Railroad Brotherhoods can be successful only when we combine work inside the local with the struggle on the job. This means struggle for independent leadership in strikes, it means preparations for strikes—something that is seriously lacking in our work. Then there is the struggle of the unemployed workers who are members of these unions. Relief committees must be elected in these locals to carry on the struggle for relief for the members of these organizations. In short, our work there is not only our struggle against the bureaucracy abstractly, but for the improvement of the economic conditions of the workers and in the course of the struggles there should naturally take place the building of the opposition movement and of the Party. We must bring many more workers who are members of the A.F. of L. and Railroad Brotherhoods into the ranks of our Party.

The question of independent unions is quite a topic of discussion, this is an important question. We cannot say that under all conditions must we organize only the T.U.U.L. There are certain conditions where we shall organize independent unions, providing we become active in them.

There have been all kinds of discussions on the United Front and the fight against the social-fascists. I think the language of the Communist International is clear. Yes, we are entering a united front with organizations, which is not the main point of emphasis, but with the workers below. Once we reach an agreement on what basis we shall struggle and that agreement is broken by the organization, we will expose the leaders and not tolerate them. No one will claim that the Musteites carry through the struggles and policies agreed upon at the Cleveland Conference; but we do not expose them. No wonder the miners cannot distinguish between us and them. Further, we must clearly understand that Musteism, “Left” social-fascism, prevents the emancipation of the working class from the bourgeoisie. That is the political characterization of Muste’s role today. We must clearly understand this, and in our daily work apply this understanding. A classic example is the Illinois coal fields, Muste, as a rule, has influence among the native American workers, and it is this particular section that our Party has to win. It represents a problem of life or death to our Party. We must not underestimate Musteism, particularly in this period, for it has tendencies of growth due to the revolutionary upsurge of the masses, Be. cause of the weak class consciousness of the American proletariat Muste can get more of these masses and prevent the development toward the revolutionary road. That is why we must in every concrete situation examine thoroughly all these problems and strike hard against the leadership; we must win the membership and their supporters and followers. This can be done only then when we have the courage to criticize these people in the open in the course of struggle. That is one of the most important means of winning the workers on our side.

In the remarks of one of the comrades an expression of this sort was made—that the N.R.A. will collapse practically by itself. There is no such thing as the automatic collapse of the N.R.A, That we must emphasize very categorically. There are signs of the breakdown, but there will be no automatic collapse of it. We must be the ones who will fight and defeat it. The N.R.A. is not the last resort of the capitalist class; it paves the way for fascism. Therefore, the tendency will not be “backward,” but forward, not to the pre-N.R.A. period, but towards fascism. That is the tendency. The breakdown of the program of the N.R.A. does not mean that the bourgeoisie will not intensify its campaign towards tightening and building a fascist organization in one form or another. It is a step in that direction. It must also be clearly understood that there can be no automatic collapse of capitalism. There is only one way and that is the revolutionary way out of the crisis.

In this connection I want to repeat what one comrade raised at the C.C, Plenum: “What has happened to the slogan for the overthrow of the capitalist system?” We are so engrossed in the practical, everyday work that our final aim for the overthrow of the capitalist system is left in the background.

Comrades, I want to conclude with a quotation. In No. 17 of the Communist International there is a very important article by Comrade Green.

“Until the Party has its fundamental basis of American cadres, the Party will not be able to become a real mass Party, leading the revolutionary struggles of the American proletariat and the American toiling masses. Therefore, the question of new cadres in the American Party, along with the question of concentration, is a radical question for the further development of the Party. In the preparation of cadres the Party must have its own political ‘Five Year Plan’ if it may be so expressed.”

There are a number of journals with this name in the history of the movement. This ‘Communist’ was the main theoretical journal of the Communist Party from 1927 until 1944. Its origins lie with the folding of The Liberator, Soviet Russia Pictorial, and Labor Herald together into Workers Monthly as the new unified Communist Party’s official cultural and discussion magazine in November, 1924. Workers Monthly became The Communist in March, 1927 and was also published monthly. The Communist contains the most thorough archive of the Communist Party’s positions and thinking during its run. The New Masses became the main cultural vehicle for the CP and the Communist, though it began with with more vibrancy and discussion, became increasingly an organ of Comintern and CP program. Over its run the tagline went from “A Theoretical Magazine for the Discussion of Revolutionary Problems” to “A Magazine of the Theory and Practice of Marxism-Leninism” to “A Marxist Magazine Devoted to Advancement of Democratic Thought and Action.” The aesthetic of the journal also changed dramatically over its years. Editors included Earl Browder, Alex Bittelman, Max Bedacht, and Bertram D. Wolfe.

PDF of full issue: https://www.marxists.org/history/usa/pubs/communist/v12n12-dec-1933-communist.pdf