A substantial essay on dialectics and physics from Dr. Friedrich Adler who gives a critique of the work of Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius on the occasion of Mach’s 70th birthday. I can not vouch for the science, but it’s fascinating.

‘The Discovery of the World Elements’ by Friedrich Adler from the International Socialist Review. Vol. 8 No. 19. April, 1908.

(In Honor of Ernest Mach’s Seventieth Birthday.)

I. THE ABSOLUTELY UNCHANGEABLE BODIES.

IN A PARIS BUILDING expressly erected for this purpose, the Bureau International des Poids et Mesures (International Bureau of Weights and Measures), the standard measure of length, the prototype of the meter, is stored away. The walls of this building are hollow, so that liquids of definite temperature may be passed through them for the purpose of maintaining a constant temperature in the rooms, which contain the standard meter. But even this does not suffice to protect the rod against changes of temperature, and thus against expansion. In addition to these precautions, the rod must be kept in a bath of definite temperature.

After many tests this rod was finally made of an amalgamation of Platinum and Iridium, which are but little subject, like other precious metals, to chemical alterations under ordinary conditions, and which have the additional advantage of great hardness.

The hardness of the metal, and the form in which this rod has been molded (its cross section is approximately that of a cross) protect the rod against bending by its own weight and thus against contraction.

We will not mention all the other precautions taken for the prevention of alterations in this rod of Platinum-Iridium. We have said enough to indicate how much the physicists have labored, and how much the employes of the Bureau of Weights and Measures still have to labor every day, in order to maintain this body unchanged. Under these circumstances this standard longitudinal measure, aside from its great practical significance for systems of measurement, stands forth as the most striking monument of the variability of all bodies. For if the success of all exertions of science to find an unchangeable body is embodied in this Paris type of the meter, which human beings might break, melt, dissolve in acid, might change at will in all its qualities, then it becomes palpable that we cannot find in this world any body that shall be permanently unchangeable.

In spite of the immense labors performed by the physicists and chemists in the manufacture of standard measures, and in spite of the fact that all their labors have led only to relatively unchangeable bodies, the idea is still widely entertained precisely by the scientists of these fields that there are such things as unchangeable bodies, or even that all the changeable bodies of the world consist in reality of absolutely unchangeable bodies.

In our experience, as we have just indicated, we do not meet with such absolutely unchangeable bodies. We can construct them only in imagination. We may assert that they exist, and we may express the hope that we may find them some day. Such constructions of imagination have appeared several times in the course of the development of physical sciences and have presented different forms. The particles of matter carrying heat, electrical fluids, light as conceived by Newton, were such unchangeable bodies. But no one takes any more notice of them to-day. On the contrary, belief has now passed on to the existence of molecules, atoms, ions which have been joined quite recently by the electrons. These different classes of allegedly unchangeable bodies are mainly distinguished from one another by their size.

What does physics want with these imagined unchangeable bodies? It desires to understand the alterations of the real variable bodies, which we know, by different arrangement and different conditions of motion of such unchangeable bodies.

The aim of physics, then, is the understanding of the alterations of real bodies, which we know from experience. It desires to show in what manner the mutual positions of these bodies are changed, what is the interrelation of the changes in temperature among them (for instance in case of mixtures), what new bodies arise from the chemical combination or disintegration of certain bodies, etc. The imaginary unchangeable bodies serve merely as auxiliaries for the understanding of the changes in real bodies.

If we remember the fate for the many unchangeable bodies, which have fallen into oblivion, if we look at the meager success in the figuration of the world of phenomena by unchangeable bodies, when we consider that precisely those lines of physics which do not make use of unchangeable bodies, have made the greatest progress and are regarded as the most secure, then we involuntarily face the question: Cannot physics accomplish its aim, the figuration of changes in real bodies, without the existence of absolutely unchangeable bodies?

If we are to-day in a position to reply that the elimination of the idea of all absolutely unchangeable bodies from physics is possible, and therefore necessary, we owe thanks for this to the comprehensive critical labor, to the penetrating investigation of the entire science of physics, performed by Ernest Mach. In fact, the clarification of this question is one of the most important steps taken by Mach in his effort to remove all metaphysics from science.

The researches of Mach have been published partly in the form of critical historical essays, partly in monographs. He did not write any systematic presentation of the fundamental principles of physics based upon variable bodies. In the following lines, we intend to discuss briefly two preliminary questions, which belong to such a presentation of physics. These questions are: What is a real body, if it does not consist of unchangeable bodies, and in what does the unchangeable consist, if it is not a body?

II. THE DIRECT EVIDENCE.

A deep chasm has long separated the physical from the psychological sciences. (By physical science we mean physics in its widest sense, including chemistry and astronomy.) The psychologists opposed to the unchangeable bodies of the physicists the sensations and feelings of human beings, as the last resort of human experience. They argued justly that the sensations and feelings were directly evident in human beings, their existence could not be doubted, the standard of false or true could not be applied to them at all, they were the most reliable foundation of human knowledge. Of course, the direct sensations and feelings should be distinguished from the interpretations and theories which are connected with them. The interpretations and theories may be false, but never the sensations and feelings as such.¹ And psychology adds rightly, that these directly perceived sensations and feelings are the most familiar and best known facts, which do not require any further explanation.

At this point the chasm widens. The psychologist says: I know only the directly perceived sensations and feelings, I do not know how I shall get them in touch with the bodies of the physicists. And the physicist says: I know only the bodies, which consist of nothing, but unchangeable bodies, that cannot be analyzed any further, and I do not know how I shall bring them in touch with the sensations and feelings. Between these two, there exists an apparently irreconcilable dualism: On the one hand the world of sensations and feelings, on the other hand the world of bodies.

Attempts were made repeatedly by both sides to bridge this chasm and to establish a monistic conception. The ways chosen for the purpose of reaching this goal resemble one another in that they are equally absurd.

On the psychological side the way led to “pure idealism” or “solipsism”. Nothing was recognized but the direct evidence, but the existence of the bodies, of the “outer world”, was denied. On the physical side the equally preposterous attempt was made to reduce the direct perceptions, the sensations and feelings, to the movements of atoms, or other unchangeable bodies, to “explain” the best known by the entirely unknown.

If we leave aside these two absurd expedients, the chasm between the physical and the psychic remains open. Nevertheless we may succeed by a simple move in overcoming this chasm and arriving at a truly monistic conception. Like so many other great discoveries, this move, which we will call the discovery of the world elements, was made simultaneously in two places, independent of one another. It was made on the psychological side by Richard Avenarius, and on the physical side by Ernest Mach.

III. SUBJECT AND OBJECT.

In the human language the separation of subjects from objects, such as is required for everyday use, has been completely effected. It teaches us to recognize things (bodies), such as “the house”, “the tree”, “the book”, etc., and “I’s” such as “I”, “You”, “my uncle”, “Mr. Smith”, etc.

This “I” of common speech comprises on closer scrutiny two different “I’s”, which may be distinguished even by the simplest mind. It is customary to speak of “body and soul”, of “body and mind”. The most complicated philosophical theories are connected with these terms. We need not enter into them here. It is enough to say that in almost every one of such commonplace expressions a certain understanding is put forth. From every one a correct kernel may be culled, which will prove useful to science. So it is here. There are two kinds of “I’s”. We will distinguish them for the present by the terms “physical I” and “psychical I”, without deducing any further theories from them. The “physical I” is a body like other bodies, such as a house, a tree, etc. When we speak generally of the “I”, we will have it understood that we mean the “psychical I”.

Ordinary language divides everything into subjects and objects, into “I’s” and “bodies”. It enumerates “the qualities of the thing” as well as “the sensations” of the “I”. We say that “the leaf is green” and besides that “the I has the sensation of green”. The thing and the I’s are regarded as isolated, the green appears on the one hand in the thing and on the other in the I, it appears twice.

This conception of things is in keeping with the ordinary view of the matter. But if we desire to know what a thing (body) and an I is, we must not analyse the abstractions of ordinary language, but must rather investigate the actual interrelations. The most complicated and superfluous problems of philosophy are due precisely to the fact that the abstractions of ordinary language were made special objects of investigation. But if we consider subject and object in their actual interrelations, as Mach and Avenarius have first done, then all these difficulties disappear.

The truth of the saying, that “the leaf is green”, is accurately considered the following: If I or some other person look at a leaf, we have the “sensation of green”, or rather, we often have this sensation. For the green appears only under normal circumstances, when the light of the sun and our organs of vision are normal. In the light of a sodium flame the color is brown, and when we have taken a dose of santonin it is yellow. The two phrases “the leaf is green” and “the I has a sensation of green” resolve themselves on close scrutiny into this single fact: Different I’s have the repeated sensation of green. If I and a leaf enter into relation with one another, one green appears. If I turn my head, the sensation of green disappears. If I look again, the green reappears. We do not know what happens, when we do not look at the leaf. It is true, the philosophers have put forth many theories as to how the leaf looks. when we do not see it, but science can fulfill all its duties without knowing the unknowable.

A leaf is green, when I and the leaf, or more generally, when subject and object, are in touch with one another. This fundamental relation between subject and object, which is the only one that is known to us at all, is called by Avenarius the “coordination of principles.” There is only one green which belongs simultaneously to the subject and object. In its relation to the subject, to the I, we call the green “a sensation”, but in order to make it plain, that it belongs at the same time to an object, we call it “an element”. As such elements we must consider all sensations known to ordinary language, that is, colors, forms, tones, pressures, etc. But in their capacity of “elements” they are not merely sensations in the sense used by ordinary language, they belong at the same time to certain objects.²

IV. THE ELEMENTS AS STARTING POINTS.

We have now come to the understanding that an “element” is a combination of subject and object. This enables us to grasp the step taken by Mach and Avenarius. It consists in a change of perspective. They leave aside the ordinary separation into subjects and objects, and make the elements the starting points of their researches. Since the elements are the direct perceptions, the most familiar and known facts perceived by us, and since every element, which belongs to some object, must also belong to some subject, we undertake to show that the world of subjects and objects is built up of such elements.

The attainment to this standpoint of Mach and Avenarius which takes the elements as its point of departure, is by no means easy. It is true we may grasp the possibility of this point of view by logic, but in order to be safe against a relapse into the conceptions of ordinary language, it is necessary that the indicated change of perspective should be actually experienced. As Mach puts it, it requires “a complete psychological transformation”. But once that we have worked our way through into this point of view, we find easily the solution of all so-called riddles of the universe, which go with the use of the ordinary language in the investigation of fundamental questions.

We will now attempt to sketch a few outlines of the world image, as it appears in the light of the conceptions of Mach and Avenarius. The understanding of all such questions and their details requires, of course, a familiarity with the original works.³

From our new point of view we now ask: What are subject and object, I and body, with reference to the world elements? (Keeping in mind that the “I” has also some elements, which are not bodies.) We answer: The “I” is a combination of elements, which are at the same time parts of different bodies. A body is a combination of elements, which are at the same time parts of different “I’s”.

It is, as a rule, readily understood that the psychical “I”, or as Avenarius calls it, the central link, is but a combination of elements, but it is not so easily grasped that the same is true of the Body, or, as Avenarius has it, the opposite link. We cannot discover any other components in the “I” but sensations and feelings. Some philosophers, for instance Kant, operate with an “I in itself”, but so far as we are concerned this is merely a metaphysical construction, with which we have nothing to do.

It is the same with a body. Take, for instance, a leaf of some tree. It is green, it has a certain visible form, it smells and tastes in a certain way, it feels soft and cool to the touch. This leaf may change its “qualities”, yet in ordinary language we. still speak of it as the same leaf. It may turn red instead of green, it may feel warmer to the touch, it may assume a different form, present a different scent. It may also lose certain qualities, it may become scentless, tasteless, invisible. This induces the idea as though all its qualities could be taken away and yet something left over, “the thing itself”. But so far as we are concerned, “the thing itself” belongs as much to the realm of metaphysics as “the I itself”. Science has forever separated from metaphysics.

The elements are mutually connected in a very complicated manner. In this whirl of elements we might regard every bundle of elements, which turns around some central link, as a “thing”, but generally we select a whole bundle of elements containing a goodly number of central links. The boundaries, which we draw, are to a certain extent arbitrary and determined chiefly by the temporary aim, which we seek to accomplish. Take, for instance, some monument, say, the “Lion of Lucerne”, as an illustration of a thing. The “Lion of Lucerne” is a certain combination of elements, which, since the time of their creation by Thorwaldsen, have been parts of innumerable human beings. The “Lion of Lucerne” is therefore, in its capacity as a thing, above all one immense bundle of elements, which grows every time that this thing becomes an opposite link of some central link (co-ordination of principles). The interrelations of that network of elements, which we call our “I” (central links), pass through a similar development, which begins with the birth of a human being and ends with its death.

That immense bundle of elements called “The Lion of Lucerne” shows a certain systematic arrangement. Certain of its parts, which repeat themselves frequently, may be selected from it, that is to say, we can find in it certain groups of elements, which, aside from their connections, from which they are isolated, are equal. Such equal groups of elements belong successively at repeated intervals to some “I”, and they may also appear side by side at the same time in different “I’s”.

V. THE BODY.

A body consists of a combination of different groups of elements which repeat themselves. For the crude approximations of ordinary life it is customary to overlook many changes and call a body the same, even though some groups may have received different elements, and other groups may have been entirely displaced by new ones. “My table is now lighter, now darker, according to the light, it may be warm at one time, cold at another. It may get an ink blot. One of its feet may be broken. It may be repaired, polished, renewed part by part. Yet it remains for me the table at which I write every day.” Every-day life is inaccurate, it gives to a body the same name, when a certain relatively large part of its elementary combinations remain the same.

In science, likewise, the conception of a body had not been sharply defined, any more than in ordinary life. The term “body” was employed for various purposes. It will contribute materially to a clear conception, if we will consider a body as a definite combination of definite groups of elements, and every change, either in the individual groups or in the whole combination, as a transformation into a new body. Then we shall no longer speak of alterations in the conditions of the body, but shall rather express ourselves somewhat in the following manner: The body water becomes the body ice. Elements of heat, pressure, color, form, have changed, the groups of elements differ, a new body has arisen.

Scientific investigation generally extends only to certain elements, not to the whole combination of elements, which we term a body. This sort of investigation will not be interfered with, if changes of the body take place while investigation continues, provided only that the special objects of the investigation remain unaltered in the elementary combination. It will then be the task of science to define the characteristic part of the elementary combination for every kind of investigation and give it a special name. For instance, in the analysis of mechanics any changes in light, color, temperature, will be immaterial, since it is mainly a question of the volume, which presents itself as a combination of sensations of touch. So long as any such volume is bounded by one limited plane, the object of analysis is not altered for mechanics. Those changes, which mechanics does not consider, are, however, the objects of analysis of other physical researches, such as changes of temperature, which are the objects of the science of calorics.

Chemical analysis deals with a larger portion of elementary combinations (bodies) than any other, yet it also leaves aside some alterations. In short, no scientific investigation embraces the whole actual body, but always merely some segment of it, some abstraction. There is no reason why such segments should not be called abstract bodies. For instance, the objects of mechanics might be called “haptic (tangible) bodies”. The science of the real body would then be the sum of all statements concerning the abstract bodies.

Let us keep in mind, that the physicists were always of the opinion, that a real body consisted of absolutely unchangeable bodies, and we shall realize the revolution in physics accomplished by Mach. We see, then, that science consists of abstractions, but the real body does not consist of abstracts.

In attempting to arrive at a clear conception of a body in the way indicated above, a difficulty arises often through the following circumstance. If we leave aside the color, scent, taste, temperature, of a body, its touch remains as a last kernel. This “tangible” part is either directly the actual essence of “the thing itself,” although some philosophers will not admit this, or it is at least the source, from which this preposterous imagination, which carries this name, derives its life. For us, however, the tangible part is by no means an indissoluble kernel, which cannot be analysed, but a combination of pressure elements (sensations of touch).

This combination of elements of touch is relatively more stable than that of the other elements among themselves and with the first. For our orientation these relatively most stable combinations have a fundamental significance. We make them generally the points of departure of our observations and relate the other elements, which are more fleeting, to them. But even these combinations are by no means absolutely stable. If we melt ice and then steam the water, the groups of tangible elements perceived in a piece of ice and a volume of water differ widely. The “tangible kernel” does not remain the same, there is merely a continuity between the various successive combinations of elements of touch. Their. characteristic expression is the statement, drawn from experience, that no volume, which presents itself to us as a combination of elements of touch, can be reduced to the magnitude zero. This statement comprises one of the experiences which are summarized in the unclear phrase of the ‘‘indestructibility of matter.”

We have just said that the sensations of touch have a fundamental significance for our orientation, and to that extent the commonplace conception is justified. But we must guard against an overestimation of the sensation of touch, because all kinds of elements are directly perceptible and to that extent of equal value. With the understanding, that only certain volumes present themselves as sensations of touch, but no other magnitudes (no mass, no capacities of heat, etc.), all difficulties disappear, pee the conception of a body after the manner of Mach might offer.

VI. THE LAWS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF BODIES.

Does this definition of a body as a combination of elements say everything that might be said about a body? Even commonplace reason will say: By no means. And Mach’s conception agrees to that.

Are two bodies, which are equal as combinations of elements, altogether the same? In what can their difference exist, if a body is only a combination of elements?

I have a number of coins before me. They show the same coinage (form), the same color (bright silver), they are equally hard and heavy, in short, they are equal as combinations of elements. And yet I may ask, whether all these coins are “genuine”. In other words, I ask whether they differ in something. I throw every coin, or equal parts of them, into a test tube containing dilute nitric acid. The coins are “dissolved”, that is, new bodies are formed. I combine every one of these new bodies with another body, a solution of kitchen salt. A solid white body is formed, which I call chloride of silver. If I obtain the same quantity of this white body in all test tubes, then the coins were all equal and I shall designate them with the same name, for instance, “genuine dollars”. But if any of the test tubes contains less chloride of silver, or none at all, I shall give the original body a different name.

It follows, then, that we may distinguish such bodies, as are equal as combinations of elements, by the laws according to which they are transformed into other bodies. Two bodies, which are equal as combinations of elements, will receive different names when the bodies, into which they may be changed under otherwise equal circumstances, are different.

This may happen even in the case of the simplest alteration, division. If division turns bodies, which are equal as combinations of elements, into new ones that are unequal, then the original bodies receive different names.

We see, then, that we do not have to discover a mysterious “something” hidden in bodies, but only ascertain the laws, by which bodies are transformed into one another.

The finding of these laws is all that science can accomplish. But that is in fact all we need to learn. The most comprehensive of these laws, and therefore the most important, are that of the mass, that of the capacity of heat, etc., which are generally comprised in the laws of matter, and the laws of energy.

In the natural laws, which indicate the way in which bodies change, we also find that which remains unchanged in our image of the universe. With every progress of: our knowledge, with every new law that is discovered, our image of the universe gains in stability.

The first step in every physical understanding consisted always in the claim that a new unchangeable body had been discovered. The latest discoveries on the field of electric radiation have again induced the belief in many physicists, that at last the unchangeable body had been actually found, namely the electron. But the opinion is only too well justified that just as our previous knowledge of electricity developed from the primitive conception of electric fluids to the laws of electric science, so the primitive conception of an unchangeable electron will be relieved in due time by the laws of electric radiation.

In spite of the rise and decline of the ideas of unchangeable bodies, the belief in the existence of unchangeable bodies remained. It seems that these unchangeable bodies lent a durable and stable basis to the various systems. In the conceptions of Mach the unchangeable likewise is recognized, but it does not consist of bodies, which we have never perceived. It consists in the natural laws, which we learn to understand in an ever increasing degree.

In the old conceptions the point of departure of science coincided with the permanent, stable, substantial parts of the universal picture. Mach has shown that a separation is necessary here. The point of departure of science should be the most variable, the elements: the permanent, stable, is the crowning of the system, the laws of nature.

VII. PHYSICS AND PSYCHOLOGY.

We know only one kind of elements, but these elements form two kinds of combinations: On the one hand the psychical combination (The psychic I, the central link), on the other hand the physical combination (the thing, the body, the opposite link). In reality there is no opposite link without a central link, there are no other combinations but co-ordinations of principles. Research divides the field of labor in such a way that certain explorers, the psychologists, study above all the combinations which we call the central link, while those explorers, who deal with the opposite links, to the extent that they are bodies, are devoted to physics in the widest meaning of the term.

The central link consists of elements, which in their turn form opposite links in particular bodies. If this combination is intended to be the object of psychological study, then the elements must be studied in all their interrelations. If we are led astray into the belief that the boundary between the different fields of research is a boundary of the real elements, then the field of research becomes a hotbed of metaphysics, then people speak of a “soul itself”, “a psychic force itself”, “a thing itself”. The accomplishment of Avenarius consisted in recognizing that psychology can be carried on scientifically only when the world elements are studied in all their interrelations, when the object of psychology is all-embracing.

And on the other hand, in order to study the physical interrelation, the body, which is the object of physics, the opposite link, the body, should not be isolated, the elements, the co-ordination of principles, must not be drawn apart. It should rather be remembered that bodies consist of elements, which belong at the same time to central links. In this understanding culminates the achievement of Mach. In the experience of the physical we must not exclude the psychical, otherwise we come face to face with “matter itself”, “energy itself”, “the thing itself”.

In following up special problems, we can devote ourselves only to definite interrelations at one time, we must leave out of consideration certain other interrelations, but we must not do this in such a way as to lose our way back to a monistic picture of the whole. The one whole picture shows that science is not limited to the sensations of the “I”, that its progress does not consist in reductions to unchangeable bodies, but that its goal is rather the figuration of the mutual interrelations of the world elements.

NOTES

1. For instance, I saw a man standing at a certain distance in a garden. But when I came closer to him, I noticed that I was mistaken, that it was not a man, but a dry tree stump. Now what was false here? What did I really see from the distance? A brown spot of a certain form. This was the real observation, which I shall make again, if I go back to the same place. This observation, this complex set of sensations. is something actual What. then, must be false or true here? The interpretation, the theory, which I drew from the observation. In what does the false interpretation consist? I merely chose too narrow a term for the designation of my actual observation. Instead of the conception “a long and erect brown spot” I selected the conception “a man,” which is much more defined, since it carries many more marks of identification than I had actually perceived. I merely expected to find those marks under different circumstances. My false interpretation consisted in the application of a false conception. The observed brown spot is a fact, which cannot be false. no matter whether I interpret its connection with other facts correctly or not.

2. There are also some elements, which correspond exactly to the term “sensation” as used by ordinary language, that is, there are some elements, which do not belong to any body. There are cases, in which there is no body that is “green,” as ordinary ttl dua ae would express it, and yet the element “green” appears in some “I,” as it does in mechanical affection of the retina, hallucinations, etc. These elements we will not discuss at this point, where we are concerned principally about the elucidation of the essential principles, particularly about physical bodies.

3. Of the original works, the following will be most suitable for the beginner: Avenarius, “Remarks Concerning the Object of Psychology,” a short essay. which appeared in volumes 18 and 19 of the “Vierteljahrsschrift fir Wissenschaftliche Philosophie.’ Furthermore: Avenarius, “The Human World Conception,” a small work, which appeared recently in a second edition. Mach treats of that part of the fundamental questions, which we are discussing here, in his “Analysis of Sensations,” fifth edition, 1907. This, however, is not so easy for the beginner. <A position closely akin to this one is taken by Cornelius in his “Introduction to Philosophy.” and by J. Petzoldt in his “World Problem,” which appeared in Teubner’s collection of “Aus Natur und Geisteswelt.”

The International Socialist Review (ISR) was published monthly in Chicago from 1900 until 1918 by Charles H. Kerr and critically loyal to the Socialist Party of America. It is one of the essential publications in U.S. left history. During the editorship of A.M. Simons it was largely theoretical and moderate. In 1908, Charles H. Kerr took over as editor with strong influence from Mary E Marcy. The magazine became the foremost proponent of the SP’s left wing growing to tens of thousands of subscribers. It remained revolutionary in outlook and anti-militarist during World War One. It liberally used photographs and images, with news, theory, arts and organizing in its pages. It articles, reports and essays are an invaluable record of the U.S. class struggle and the development of Marxism in the decades before the Soviet experience. It was closed down in government repression in 1918.

PDF of full issue: https://www.marxists.org/history/usa/pubs/isr/v08n10-apr-1908-ISR-gog.pdf