The PKI was among the most vital and influential of the early Communist Parties in a colonial country. As the first Asian Communist Party to join the Comintern it was, in the first half of the 1920s, also the largest Comintern section in Asia. Working in, and partially leading, the popular Islamic party Sarekat Rakyat, the PKI played a central role in the mass rebellion that broke out against Dutch imperialism in 1926. In the aftermath of the insurrection, a mass wave of terror hit the Indonesian workers’ and anti-imperialist movement.

‘Report of Indonesia’ from The Communist International Between the Fifth and the Sixth Congresses, 1924-28. Published by the Communist International, 1928.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION

THE economic structure of the Dutch colony of Indonesia is characterised by high concentration of foreign capital and by a strongly developed State capitalism. In 1927 the capital invested in Indonesia, amounted to 6 billion Dutch florins, of which 70 per cent. was Dutch, 14 billion State capital and 1 billion Chinese and Arabian capital. Out of these 6 billions 60 per cent. were invested in large scale industries, and 4o per cent. in banking, commerce, private railways, and mining. The State capital embraces coal mines, zinc mines, Dyatti timber works, railways, the salt and opium monopoly, etc. Chinese and Arabian Capita] is invested overwhelmingly in commerce.

The greater portion of this capital is invested in Java, where the chief industry of Indonesia, namely, the sugar industry, is concentrated. Out of the whole population of Java, totaling 35 millions, about one-third are either directly or indirectly employed in the cane sugar industry, which is almost entirely in the hands of Dutch capitalists. On the rubber plantations 42 per cent. of the area is held by non-Dutch interests, including 32 per cent. British; on the tea plantations 24 per cent., including 17 per cent. British; on the coffee plantations 21 per cent., including 17 per cent. British. Besides the British, there are big Japanese, American, Belgian and French interests in Indonesia.

The economic exploitation of the Indonesian peasantry takes the following forms:—Compulsory work on the building of roads in the islands outside of Java; the renting of land by peasants in Java under slave conditions; restricted application of the irrigation system and the enslavement of the masses of emigrants from Java to other islands by means of contract labour through the employment brokers. The consumption of commodities by the native population steadily declines. According to statistics furnished by the “Van Ginkel” government commission, the average annual income of the native population stands at 48.6 florins per capita, while in some districts it has dropped to 21.16 florins; a heavy burden of taxation results in a steady impoverishment of the peasantry.

The severe economic crisis of 1921, and the measures taken by the government to overcome its effects; the successful efforts to balance the State budget; the reintroduction of the gold currency to pave the way for fresh investments of Dutch and foreign capital,—all this has worked out to the detriment of the native petty-bourgeois elements. The measures taken by the government during the crisis, e.g., wholesale dismissals of State functionaries in 1923—led to considerable unemployment among the intellectuals, a phenomenon hitherto unknown in the country. The tremendous increase of taxation had ruined the majority of the petty-bourgeoisie, while the general discontent of the masses found its expression in 1923 in the rapid growth of the revolutionary (popular) movement, the trade unions, and the Communist Party. The impoverishment of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasants drove them to commit a series of bomb and arson attacks on the sugar cane plantations in Java. The rise of a militant labour movement and the development of the national liberation struggle was met by brutal suppression on the part of the Government. This suppression, and the growing impoverishment of the masses, considerably diminished the influence of the reformist tendencies in the national liberation movement and in the trade unions, whilst at the same time the influence of the Communist Party increased among the working classes and in the liberation movement as a whole. Proof of the foregoing is seen in the retrogression of the Sarekat Islam in 1923-26; the rapid growth of the revolutionary Sarekat Rajat, and the election of Communists to the leading organs of the trade unions.

The Insurrection and the Communists

In the summer of 1926 the government intensified the policy of terrorism against the Communist Party, whose influence as a leader of the masses had been demonstrated in 1925 and in the beginning of 1926, in the course of strikes which took place in Java and Sumatra. Not only the Communist Party, but also the trade unions and the revolutionary people’s movement of Sarekat Rajat were driven into illegality. Numerous newspapers were suppressed, wholesale arrests were made, and freedom of meeting was abolished. From the middle of 1923 till the middle of 1926 about 3,000 Communists were either arrested or deported. The government, whilst openly working for the physical destruction of the revolutionary people’s movement and of the Communist Party, endeavoured at the same time to win the support of the upper strata of the people’s movement and of the moderate leaders of the Sarekat Islam, the Rudi Utomo, by offering them government jobs and by making sham concessions; such as the reduction of the property qualification in municipal elections from 50 to 10 florins a month, the reform of the administrative apparatus in Java whereby the provincial councils were to have a majority of natives, with an eventual native majority in the so-called “Volksraad,” and the replacement of the oppressive per capita tax in Java by indirect taxes.

The policy of imprisonment and persecution had considerably weakened the Communist Party, as well as the now illegal trade unions which were led by Communists. Under the growing pressure of destitution and wholesale reprisals the indignation of the masses increased, whilst the popular movement was stimulated by the revolution then developing in China. The Dutch Government resorted to a combined system of provocation and suppression, deliberately in order to drive the masses to an armed insurrection, hoping in this way to drown the revolutionary movement in blood. The oppression and the growing discontent of the large masses rendered a sanguinary fight inevitable, and the Communist Party energetically and systematically prepared for it. Nevertheless the government succeeded in decidedly weakening the party before the outbreak of the conflict. The armed insurrection began on November 13, 1926. The first hours of the fight showed that while there had been certain technical preparations for the insurrection, there was a lack of serious political and organisational preparation, as subsequent events indicated. It is important to observe that the insurrection was carried on under the general slogan of opposition to Dutch imperialism, whilst no concrete political and economic demands were raised, such as might have drawn the large masses into the fight. Furthermore, no steps were taken to extend the movement among the peasantry and to bring it into line with the action of the masses of the workers. The insurrection was speedily crushed in Batavia, whilst the bloody suppression of the movement in Bantam (West Java), where the masses of the peasants took part in the insurrection, went on for a whole month. In other parts of Java no extensive fights developed. It was not until two months after the defeat of the insurrection in West Java, in January, 1927, that the armed insurrection broke out in West Sumatra, which was also led by the Communist Party. This movement, too, failed to extend beyond its local boundaries and to involve other parts of Sumatra in the fight, although the peasants there were equally oppressed by the heavy burden of taxation and restrictions. The insurrection in Sumatra was also suppressed and drowned in blood.

The fact that the Dutch authorities both in West Java and West Sumatra had to resort to strong measures to suppress the insurrection is sufficient proof that the fight arose out of the profound discontent of the masses, and that notwithstanding the bloody reprisals and terrorism against the Communist Party and the Sarekat Rajat, the revolutionary movement for independence is a serious factor in the life of Indonesia. The Dutch authorities are therefore endeavouring, whilst continuing the policy of reprisals and strengthening the police and military organisation, to bribe the leaders of the national movement by means of sham reforms and promises. In this policy they are receiving the full support of the subservient Social Democrats.

The moderate nationalists immediately changed their attitude after the insurrection. One of the chief leaders of the nationalists, Doctor Sutomo, together with other nationalists, declared after the insurrection that the government should now try to establish closer collaboration with the Indonesian intellectuals. Tjokro, the leader of Sarekat Islam, declared that the rebels should be executed in conformity with the rules of the holy Koran. The Dutch Social Democrats in Indonesia hailed the smashing of the Communist movement, outstripping even Sutomo and Tjokro in their attacks on the Communists. The leader Stokvisch, a member of the Kolksraad, urged the Governor General to apply capital punishment to the imprisoned Communists. They did everything possible to spread the lie that the insurrection was not the consequence of the brutal actions of Dutch imperialism, but the result of “Muscovite maneuvers.” In this respect the slaves excelled their masters, since the Dutch government could not sustain the charge that the insurrection “had been financed by Moscow,” as the confiscated archives of the Indonesian C.P. had clearly established the fact that the Indonesian workers and peasants had contributed from their paltry earnings the necessary funds to purchase weapons and to procure all other means to organise the revolt against their oppressors.

The Social Democrats

During the insurrection and after, the Social Democrats in Holland openly played the role of advisers to Dutch imperialism in the corruption of the Indonesian intellectuals and of the nationalist movement. Not only did they denounce the insurrection as a “putsch” undertaken “on orders from Moscow,” but they also declared that the Dutch government was perfectly right in suppressing the revolt in blood. The reformist trade union leaders did not lift a finger in opposition to the bloody measures of repression. They rejected all the proposals of the C.P. of Holland for protesting against the reign of terror. In Parliament the Social Democrats voted against Communist motions far the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Indonesia and for an amnesty to the thousands of the imprisoned and exiled.

The Terror

The bloody terror of Dutch imperialism is still going on. During the insurrection and after, there were 800 revolutionaries killed and about 10,000 members of the C.P. and of Sarekat Rajat were imprisoned. Of the latter about 5,000 were sentenced to terms of imprisonment from 1 to 20 years, and 3,000 were deported to the Digul malaria swamps in New Guinea. Nine Communist leaders were hanged: they met their death shouting, “Long live Communism!” It should be recorded that the comrades faced their judges with great courage. The arrests are still going on. Almost every month there are press reports about newly revealed conspiracies and the arrests of Communists and revolutionaries, e.g., new mass arrests in July, 1927, in Java, in October, 1927, in West Java, in January, 1928, in West Sumatra, and in February, 1928, in Bali.

The Communist Party and the Red Trade Unions have been entirely outlawed, and no legal Communist activity is possible. The chief task of the Communists at present is to reorganise the suppressed movement and to rally its forces. The repeated arrests indicate the fact that our comrades are continuing their activities in spite of the most brutal terror.

The nationalist movement is showing some revival. The masses, seeking for ways and means to participate in legal activity, are streaming again into the Sarekat Islam, whose corrupt leaders Tjokro, Amminoto and Hadji Salim are being forced, under pressure from the masses, to adopt Left phrases. A new nationalist party has been formed—the “National Party of Indonesia,” the intellectual leaders of which are also given to Left phraseology. In opposition to the efforts of the Dutch Government to gain the co-operation of the nationalist movement— the so-called Indonesian majority in the Volksraad—the National Party of Indonesia and the Sarekat Islam are now advocating the policy of Non-Co-operation. On the other hand, a section of the nationalists (Dr. Sutomo, Budi Utomo) has been won over to the policy of co-operation with the government. Nevertheless, there is no clear line of demarcation between the nationalists who have been corrupted by the government and the Left nationalist groups. The “National Bloc” formed in December, 1927, on the initiative of the “National Party of Indonesia” embraces the Left wing organisations as well as the Right wing nationalist groups.

The Present Situation

The efforts of the Social Democrats to gain influence in the nationalist movement have lately been crowned with some success owing to the complete illegality of the Communist movement. The organ of Indonesian Social Democracy,  “Het Indisch Volk,” has attracted some Indonesian collaborators, whilst one Indonesian has also joined the Central Committee of the Indonesian Social Democratic Party. The Social Democrats have also succeeded in gaining the leadership of the V.S.T.P. Railwayman’s Union, and in rebuilding this Union, which had previously been disbanded together with the other Red Trade Unions. The failure of the “Left” social democratic leaders of the Anti-Imperialist League, Schmidt and Kies, to defend the Indonesian students arrested in Holland, has had its repercussion in Indonesia—while at the same time redounding to the credit of the Dutch Social Democrats. In this connection a meeting of the Sarekat Islam and the National Party of Indonesia at Randmig sent congratulatory messages to the S.D. Party in Holland and to the social democrat Stokvisch, a member of the Indonesian Volksrat.

Thus, the C.P. of Indonesia is confronted with extraordinarily difficult tasks; not only must it organise anew its own forces and the trade unions, and direct the nationalist movement into revolutionary channels, but it must also unmask before the masses the subservient social democrats who are backed by the governmental terror, and endeavour to detach the honest nationalist elements from the social democratic influence.

The Communist International Between the Fifth and the Sixth Congresses, 1924-28. Published by the Communist International, 1928.

PDF of full book: https://archive.org/download/comintern_between_fifth_and_sixth_congress_ao2/comintern_between_fifth_and_sixth_congress_ao2.pdf