Louis B. Boudin wrote a series of articles in the first decade of the last century defending Marx’s economic and political conceptions against revisionists and opportunists for International Socialist Review. These important articles would be compiled in ‘The Theoretical System of Karl Marx in the Light of Recent Criticism,’ arguably the most important U.S. Marxist text on economy. Helping to inform a generation of revolutionaries in their own fight with the Socialist movement’s Right Wing, a foundational part Boudin’s argument was the elucidation and defense of Marx’s concepts of value. Part two here.

‘The Labor Theory of Value in the Light of Recent Criticism, Part I’ by Louis B. Boudin from International Socialist Review. Vol. 6 No. 5. November, 1905.

In our introductory chapter, in speaking of the criticism and the critics of the Materialistic Conception of History, we have observed that the discussion of the subject was very much obscured by certain prejudices existing against that theory, which prevent any unbiased examination of the subject on its merits. This must be repeated and even emphasized with reference to the criticism of Marx’s theory of value and surplus-value. It is safe to say that at least one-half of the adverse criticism of this theory contained in the literature of the subject is due to prejudice which obscures the vision of the critics and puts their thinking apparatus out of joint. This prejudice is not confined to any particular category of critics. It affects the dignified scholar and the fighting publicist alike. The great Böhm-Bawerk, head and front of the “scientific” Austrian school of political economy, and the prating “popular” Professor Masaryk are both fair specimens of it. In his great work on capital and interest,1 where more than one hundred pages are devoted to the criticism of this theory, Böhm-Bawerk starts out his examination of the theory by characterizing it as the “theory of exploitation,” and the whole trend of his argument is directed towards one objective point:— to prove that the supposedly main thesis of this theory, that the income of the capitalists is the result of exploitation, is untrue; that in reality the workingman is getting all that is due to him under the present system. And the whole of his argument is colored by his conception of the discussion as a controversy relative to the ethical merits or demerits of the capitalist system. The same is true of Masaryk. In his bulky book on Marxism his examination of the problem of value and surplus-value starts out with the following introductory remarks:

“Sociologically the conception of surplus-value stands foremost. Surplus-value is the economic expression of the social conception of the classes and their mutual relations,— of their struggle. The expression Surplus-value is intended to characterize and condemn the whole capitalistic order and civilization. It is obvious: Das Kapital is not a positive theory of economy, but, as is indicated by the subtitle, a critique of the science of economics to the present time. Das Kapital presents the theory of capitalistic exploitation. It is a text-book of capitalistic extortion, and at the same time its vehement denunciation. Das Kapital is therefore at the same time the theory of the Socialist revolution,— yes, it is the revolution itself.

“As already stated, we will concentrate our criticism on the conception of value and surplus-value. We will investigate whether or not labor, the labor of the proletarians, is the only source of economic value and surplus-value. Such an investigation squarely presents the question whether or not the social order of civilization really means the exploitation of the proletariat by the capitalist class— the criticism of Capital will resolve itself into a further investigation of the doctrine of the Class Struggle.’”

We therefore advisedly stated in the last chapter that in employing the adjectives “necessary” and “surplus” in connection with labor or value, it is not intended to convey any meaning of praise or justification in the case of the one, nor of condemnation or derogation in the case of the other. As a matter of fact, Marx repeatedly stated that the capitalist was paying to the workingman all that was due him when he paid him the fair market value of his labor power. In describing the process of capitalist production Marx used the words, “necessary” and “surplus” in characterizing the amounts of labor which are necessarily employed in reproducing what society already possesses and that employed in producing new commodities or values. He intended to merely state the facts as he saw them, and not to hold a brief for anybody. If his theory of value and surplus value and his condemnation of the capitalist system stood in any causal relation (and the determination of this question we will leave for the future), his theory of value and surplus value was probably the cause, and his condemnation of the capitalist system the effect, rather than the reverse. The statements of many of his critics, that Marx was influenced in his examination of the question of value and surplus value by a pre-determined thesis in favor of which he intended to hold a brief, is absolutely false, and the writings of these very critics contain abundant proof of our assertion. At some future time we will discuss the so-called ethical theory of the Socialist movement which is so much in vogue among many of the latter-day Marx critics, and it will then appear beyond the possibility of a doubt that it was only his intense craving for the absolute and unalloyed truth that guided Marx in his examination of the subject which led him to the formulation of his theory of value and surplus value.

We saw in preceding chapters what the problem which confronted Marx at the outset of his examination, and which required solution at his hands was,— Is his solution of that problem as contained in his theory of value and surplus value a true one? That is, or at least should be, the only question before us. Is Marx’s theory of value and surplus value, viewed without any bias or prejudice, correct? It is very much to be regretted that we cannot, for the lack of space, preface our examination of the Marxist theory of value and surplus value with an examination of the other theories of this subject. Such an examination and a juxtaposition of the different theories would be an invaluable aid in arriving at a true answer to the question before us, and it is the hope of the present writer that he will at some future day be able to do this work, so that the relative position of the Marxian theory may be fully appreciated. In this present discussion, however, we will have to be guided by, so to speak, absolute standards rather than relative ones, and other theories of value will only be gone into in so far as is absolutely necessary to the discussion of the main criticism leveled against the Marxian theory. This particularly applies to the so-called “modern” theory of value familiarly known as the Austrian, although by origin and popularity England has as much claim upon it as Austria. This “honorable mention” of the Austrian theory of value is due not so much to its own originality or importance, as to the fact that it seems to be the prevailing one among the latter-day Marx critics, Böhm-Bawerk himself taking the lead in the particular field of inquiry now under discussion.

While, as we have already stated in the introductory chapter, each tub of anti-Marxian criticism lays claim to and is entitled to stand upon its own bottom, in the discussion of the Marxian theory of value and surplus value, we will, to a great extent, have to limit ourselves to the arguments advanced by Böhm-Bawerk. The reason for it is two-fold: first, because Böhm-Bawerk is so far superior to his comrades in arms, and his authority on the subject is acknowledged by them to such an extent, that it can hardly be claimed to be unfair to these critics, to pick Böhm-Bawerk as an example of them all. Second, because there seems to be quite a good deal of unanimity among these critics on this particular point, and the arguments advanced by the others are either directly borrowed from Böhm-Bawerk, very often, with an acknowledgment of receipt, or are variations on the same tune deserving no particular attention. Where the variation is sufficiently distinct to make a difference, it will be duly noted, as will, certainly, all those arguments which have any claim to an independent source.

Böhm-Bawerk starts out by stating that all the predecessors of Marx who have adhered either in whole or in part to the labor theory of value, including such great lights of the science as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and, Karl Rodbertus, have really “assumed” the labor theory of value without even as much as attempting to prove it. It was pure assertion on their part, without the semblance of an argument to support it. Karl Marx was the first who not merely asserted the labor theory of value but also attempted to prove it. In this Böhm-Bawerk recognizes Marx’s superiority to the great luminaries of the science of political economy who have preceded him. But he does not like the way Marx did it, and is not convinced by the proof offered by Marx in support of his theory. Böhm-Bawerk, like the good professor that he is, instructs us as to how Marx should have gone about the job of proving his theory of value and puts his emphatic disapproval on the way Marx is supposed to have actually gone about it. He says that there were two ways open to Marx: first, to analyze the “pyschological motives” to which the process of exchange is due; or, second, to examine the actual “experiences” of the relations of exchange. Instead of adopting either of these two courses, he says, Marx adopted a third rather peculiar one for the subject of this inquiry, namely, that of purely logical deduction and dialectic argumentation.

That Marx did not go about the task of discovering the true laws of exchange-value by way of an analysis of the “psychological motives” of exchange is perfectly true. And we have already seen in the preceding chapter the reason for it. The problem by its very nature showed that its solution lay in some social phenomenon and not in any attribute of the individuals entering into the relation of exchange. The “psychological motives,” therefore, of exchange, could not possibly have anything to do with the problems that confronted Marx. Aside from that, it was very evident that “psychological,” as well as other “natural” motives or causes which remain unchanged throughout the history of mankind, could not be the cause, nor offer any explanation, of the phenomena of capitalist production and distribution which are not common to all human society, but are strictly limited in time as well as in place to only a small portion thereof. It is the same thing that we have already observed in discussing the Materialistic Conception of History:— a constant factor cannot possibly be the cause of a change in the result of an operation.

It is not true, however, that Marx did not adopt the course of examining the actual experiences of exchange relation. Nor is it true that the course he did adopt was that of purely logical deduction. Marx did make a thorough examination of the actual happenings and “experiences” of the exchange relation as Böhm-Bawerk would have him do, although this job did not prove so very “simple” as Böhm-Bawerk imagined it would. In order, however, that he might learn something that was worth while from the actual “experiences” of the exchange relation, he had to put these “relations” to a very careful analysis. In doing that he was certainly guilty of using some very sharp and pure logical reasoning. In this he could not help himself, as he was “naturally” so constituted that to whatever task he applied himself he could not help but use his logic. And that was of the very purest sort. There were, however, no purely logical constructions or abstractions used by him in order to prove his theory of value or surplus value. Those abstractions which he did make, and they will be duly noted, one by one, in the course of the discussion, were not only justified, but required and demanded by the subject matter itself. But he did not start out with any purely logical notions or abstractions, nor did he proceed to any purely logical constructions. On the contrary, he kept to his base all the time, and that was the solid ground of the facts of capitalistic production and exchange. It is very significant that in the whole volume of Marx’s economic writings there is no mention of the “economic man” or of his supposed attributes, “psychological” or otherwise. Nor is any kind of an abstract man part of his discussion. Throughout his entire work he keeps strictly to his problem, and that is the doings of the real, live man in the real historic situation known as the capitalist system. In this connection it is more than a mere curiosity to compare the opening passage of Capital with the opening passages in the works of some of his illustrious predecessors and contemporaries.

Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations opens with the following passage:

“The annual labor of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessaries and conveniences of life which it annually consumes, and which consist always either in the immediate produce of that labor, or in what is purchased with that produce from other nations.””

The opening passage of Ricardo’s “Principles” reads as follows:

“The produce of the earth,— all that is derived from its surface by the united application of labor, machinery and capital, is divided among three classes of the community, namely, the proprietor of the land, the owner of the stock or capital necessary for its cultivation, and the laborers by whose industry it is cultivated. But in different stages of society, the proportions of the whole produce of the earth which will be allotted to each of these classes, under the names of rent, profit, and wages, will be essentially different, depending mainly on the actual fertility of the soil, on the accumulation of capital and population, and on the skill, ingenuity and instruments employed in agriculture.”

Jevons, the English head of the “Austrian” school, opens his book on the principles of political economy with the following words:—

“The science of political economy rests upon a few notions of an apparently simple character. Utility, wealth, value, commodity, labor, land, capital, are the elements of the subject; and whoever has a thorough comprehension of their nature must possess or be soon able to acquire a knowledge of the whole science. As almost every economical writer has remarked, it is in treating the simple elements that we require the most care and precaution, since the least error of conception must vitiate all our deductions. Accordingly, I have devoted the following pages to an investigation of the conditions and relations of the above-named notions.”

And the opening passage of Böhm-Bawerk’s own book on capital reads:—

“He who possesses a capital is as a rule in a position to derive from it a continued net income, which income is known to science under the head of Rent of Capital or Interest of Capital in the broader sense of the term. This income possesses certain remarkable qualities. It arises independently of any personal activity of the capitalist,— it comes to him even though he never raised a finger to create it, and seems therefore most truly to flow from, or according to an ancient simile, to be generated by capital.”

All of these great luminaries of the science seem to be ready to lay down general laws governing human society, without regard to time and place. They all seem to be oblivious of the fact that the laws which they are about to explain have no universal application and are limited to a certain form of society, far from being universal in space, and further still from being perpetual in time. Not one of them seems to have given the slightest thought to the fact that the phenomena which he was about to describe and examine were part of a certain historical situation and the result of a certain historical development. History, with its actual, real facts and relations does not exist for them. All the nations, all the ages, and all stages of human development are subject to the laws which they lay down. To one of them, and that one the great “modern” Jevons, one of the great triumvirate of the “modern” school (Jevons,— Menger,— Böhm-Bawerk), the laws of political economy are not only extra-historic but extra everything else that has a semblance of reality, and reduce themselves to a few purely logical “notions,” a correct “conception” of which gives one the key to the science of political economy quite irrespective of the knowledge of the facts of life, which seem to be an entirely negligible quantity to our great “modern” scientist.

Contrast with all this the opening sentence of Marx’s Kapital:— “The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails presents itself as an immense accumulation of commodities.” With one mighty stroke of the pen all the conditions and limitations of the problem are given, the picture put in its historical setting! No soaring in the air, superior to space and time. No generalizations that may fit everything in general and nothing in particular. But a real, live situation, with a definite burning problem. No wonder that instead of losing himself in generalities or wasting himself on definitions of all sorts of “conceptions” and “notions,” he delves right into the heart of the problem, and declares immediately that “our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity.” This he immediately proceeds to do. And how he does it!

To be sure, he does not do it to the entire satisfaction of his critics, but we shall see that this is due mainly to failure on their part to understand his work, as is the claim of Böhm-Bawerk about the supposed purely logical argument employed by Marx. Where these critics do understand Marx, their dissatisfaction with his argument is due to their lack of knowledge of the subject itself.

Slonimski, for instance, objects to Marx’s analysis for the reason that in this analysis “the conception of labor becomes independent of the purposes and necessities for which it was undertaken,” and the value created by labor “becomes an independent quality inherent in the commodity irrespective of its usefulness and exchange-value.” Aside from the evidently absurd statement that according to Marx the exchange-value of a commodity is inherent in the commodity irrespective of its exchange-value (Marx knows of only two kinds of value: use-value and exchange-value, and wherever he says simply “value” he means exchange-value), the statement contains some important inaccuracies.

To begin with, Marx never forgets the “purposes and necessities” for which production is undertaken. Quite the reverse: this thought is ever present in his mind, and it is due to this very fact that Marx did not fall into some of the grievous errors into which his critics, particularly the “moderns,” have fallen. These gentlemen talk of the “psychological” motives of exchange as the cause and measure of value, all the time forgetting that before a commodity can be exchanged it must be produced, and that there must therefore be, first of all, “psychological” motives of production which ought to be of some considerable interest. Not so with Marx. He always remembers that in our capitalistic system (be it remembered: Unlike his critics, Marx never talks of eternity, but of the present capitalistic system) production is undertaken for the purpose of profit. This implies two things: First, that the producer does not produce the thing for its use-value, he does not give a snap for that, it is absolutely useless to him, and he will just as soon manufacture chewing-gum as Bibles.— And, second, that he knows in advance, or at least thinks he knows, the value of the product he is going to produce; in other words, he knows that the value of his product will depend on something more substantial and rational than the whimsical “desire” of the prospective purchaser based on some individual, “psychological” motivation. And this knowledge on the part of Marx of the purposes of capitalistic production had something to do with his abstracting from the useful qualities of the particular commodities when examining their exchange-value, as well as with his refusal to follow Böhm-Bawerk’s advice to arrive at the laws of exchange-value by way of an examination of the “psychological” motives of exchange.

It is also somewhat inaccurate to say that, according to Marx, exchange-value is inherent in a commodity, or that it is independent of its usefulness. Marx, as we have already seen, specifically says that exchange-value is not something inherent in a commodity, that it could not be inherent in it, for it changes with social relations; that the whole thing is merely the expression of a social relation and appears only under a certain social system. Marx also says specifically, as also already stated, that no commodity can have exchange-value without its having use-value, that use-value is the substratum of exchange-value, although it is neither its cause nor its measure. But then,— Marx contradicts himself! Poor Marx! He contradicts himself so much and so radically that one is forced to the conclusion that he must have been a raving maniac, and one is surprised to see the big regiment of these very learned and clever gentlemen bothering with the scribblings of such a poor wretch.

Böhm-Bawerk, who thinks that Marx’s was one of the greatest minds that applied themselves to this subject, also finds great comfort in Marx’s supposed neglect of usefulness as influencing the exchange-value of commodities. He does not say that Marx contradicts himself, but he thinks that he caught Marx in a mental faux pas. Indeed, this is one of the greatest, if not the chief point, in his whole argument against Marx’s analysis of a commodity, by which he arrives at his labor theory of value. Marx says:

“The exchange-values of commodities must be capable of being expressed in terms of something common to them all, of which thing they represent a greater or less quantity. This common “something” can not be either a geometrical, a chemical, or any other natural property of commodities. Such properties claim our attention only in so far as they affect the utility of these commodities, make them use-values. But the exchange of commodities is evidently an act characterized by a total abstraction from use-value. Then one use-value is just as good as another, provided, only, it be present in sufficient quantity. . . . As use-values, commodities are, above all, of different qualities, but as exchange-values they are merely different quantities and consequently do not contain an atom of use-value. If, then, we leave out of consideration the use-value of commodities, they have only one common property left, that of being products of labor. But even the product of labor itself has undergone a change in our hands. If we make abstraction from its use-value we make abstraction at the same time from the material elements and shapes that make the product a use-value; we see in it no longer a table, a house, yarn, or any other useful thing. Its existence as a material thing is put out of sight. Neither can it any longer be regarded as the product of the labor of the joiner, the mason, the spinner, or of any other definite kind of productive labor. Along with the useful qualities of the products themselves, we put out of sight both the useful character of the various kinds of labor embodied in them, and the concrete forms of that labor, there is nothing left but what is common to them all; all are reduced to one and the same sort of labor, human labor in the abstract.”

To which Böhm-Bawerk: “How is that? Where is the difference between labor and utility? While it is true that in the exchange relation of commodities the particularly useful qualities of the articles exchanged do not matter, the general usefulness of the commodities is not abstracted from. On the contrary, it remains common to them all. It does not matter whether the commodity can be used as an eatable, wearing-apparel, or for shelter, but it does matter that it be of some use, of use in general. Why, then, is utility rejected as a cause and measure of exchange-value, why is it ‘abstracted’ from? Again, when considering labor Marx is compelled to abstract from the particular kind of labor contained in the commodity, so that what is left to all commodities in common is general labor, labor in the abstract. Just as there still remains in common to all of them general usefulness, usefulness in the abstract. Why, then, this partiality for labor as against usefulness? Where is the reason for the discrimination in favor of the one as against the other, which mates the one the sole cause and measure of value, and denies to the other any influence whatever on this phenomenon?” And all this with such an amount of emphasis, that if it depended on that alone, the whole Marxian theoretical edifice would be smashed to pieces, which Böhm-Bawerk naively imagines that he does.

We do not presume to know whether Marx was ever embarrassed by these questions. But we venture to say that if he ever were, and all the resources of logic failed him, he had only to turn to the purposes of capitalistic production to be relieved of any difficulty. Slonimski touched a sore spot of anti-Marxism when he broached the subject of purposes of production, which his more discreet colleagues usually pass in silence. We have already dwelt on the subject at some length, but it is of such paramount importance that we cannot dwell upon it too much or recur to it too often.

Before commodities are exchanged, they are produced. They are produced, however, with a view to their exchange, and to the value to be realized on such exchange, and in the exchange itself the question of how, and in what manner the commodity was produced has a good deal to do with the fixing of its value. It is not, however, the question of the usefulness of the production that is considered. We have already mentioned that a capitalist will just as soon manufacture chewing-gum as Holy Bibles. But more than that. The purposes of the production of commodities being the realization of a profit, a capitalist will just as willingly manufacture an absolutely useless article, if he will be assured of a profit. He does not manufacture absolutely useless things, because in order to get a purchaser it must be of some use to somebody, but he personally does not care a rap whether it really is useful or not. Again, when the article is of some use to somebody, that is, salable, he does not care a bit about anything that goes to make it useful. This is absolutely indifferent to him. He will manufacture any shape, color, taste or other quality, and when he comes to exchange it,— sell it— he will not be concerned a bit whether the commodity he produced and is about to exchange is white, black, orange, or any other color; whether it is square, round, pointed or any other shape; sweet, sour, fragrant or otherwise; hard or soft, or whether it possesses any other quality which may determine its particular usefulness. But he will care how much labor it contains! This can readily be seen in our “advanced” methods of doing business when goods are “ordered,” that is, sold— exchanged— before they are produced. In making the sale-exchange the producer will comply with any request as to shape, color, taste, or any other natural quality which affects the usefulness of the commodity with alacrity, as it is a matter of complete indifference to him. But he will stand out against anything that will require him to put into the commodity more labor. In taking your order— exchanging in prospecto his goods for yours— he will “abstract” from any and all natural qualities upon which the usefulness of the commodity depends, but he will absolutely refuse to “abstract” from labor, and will doggedly insist on considering it when making valuations. Further, he will gladly “abstract” from the kind of labor. If he is willing to give you for a certain price the labor of, say, one hundred men for ten days, he will just as soon give you the product of the labors of tailors as of shoemakers. But he will make a stand on the question of the quantity of labor. He wouldn’t give you any more than he can help.

These actual “experiences” of the exchange relation which we have recounted are perfectly represented in Marx’s “logical” analysis, with which Böhm-Bawerk finds fault. It is true that as regards both labor and usefulness, we “abstract” in the exchange relation from the particular, the particular labor and the particular usefulness, and leave only the general labor and the general usefulness. But in abstracting from the particular utility we have abstracted from the quality of the utility and have shown the exchange-relation to be a purely quantitative relation. But general usefulness cannot be measured as to quantity. It is hard to measure qualities unless they are of the same kind. But it is absolutely impossible to measure the general, abstract usefulness of different things. How do you find the different amount of usefulness contained in a piano as compared with a suit of clothes, of an extension-table as compared with an engine-boiler? How do you measure general usefulness? If you cannot measure it, it cannot serve as a measure of value. And if it cannot serve as a measure of value, it cannot be the cause of value, for we judge the cause of value from the changes in value as shown by the measure of value. We find the very existence of value only because of its measure. Besides, the residuum of general usefulness which remains after we abstract from the particular useful qualities, is not general usefulness to the parties concerned in the exchange, and who fix the exchange-value, but general usefulness to somebody, that is to society at large. For the parties exchanging the commodity it has no use-value whatsoever.

Not so with labor. When we abstract from the particular labor contained in the commodity we abstract only from the kind of labor, that is, from its quality, but not from its quantity. And it is just the quantity that we want, as the exchange of commodities is a quantitative relation. And this quantitative relation of labor exists for these very people who enter the exchange relation. Abstract, general, human labor can be measured quantitatively, and quantitatively only. That is why Marx’s analysis is perfect. Abstract human labor, irrespective of the particular quantities of the labor employed to produce this commodity, abstract human labor, whose only measure is time, is the cause and measure of exchange-value.

Marx, however, never rests his case on a purely logical argument. Logic is to him only an instrument to the proper analysis and understanding of the actual facts of “experience.” We have seen that, as a “logical” proposition, usefulness is entirely eliminated from value. But we have seen from our examination of the “experiences” of the exchange relation that there is some residuum of usefulness, general usefulness to society, which plays some role in it. We have seen both as a matter of logic and of experience that it is not, nor could it be, either the cause or the measure of value. What, then, is its role? True to himself, Marx would not leave any actual fact unaccounted for. It is absolutely untrue that Marx disregards usefulness as a factor of value. Notwithstanding the fact that this is assumed by every critic of the Marxian theory of value, it is absolutely and unqualifiedly untrue, and is only one additional link in the long chain of proof that an absolute lack of understanding of the Marxian doctrine seems to be the first qualification of a modern Marx-critic.

General, social usefulness has some influence on exchange-value. It is not its cause nor its measure. What is it? It is its limitation. The facts of exchange, the “experiences” of the “exchange-relation,” prove that general, social usefulness, the only usefulness which plays any part in the exchange of commodities under our capitalistic system, is neither the cause nor the measure of exchange-value, but its limitation. And this is borne out by Marx’s very “logical” analysis, which so much aroused the ire and indignation of Böhm-Bawerk that he almost forgot the respectful attitude which he usually assumes towards Marx. This result of experience and analysis is one of the main features of Marx’s theory of value, that feature which more than any other, stamps it as peculiarly his own. We have already seen that, according to Marx, it is not every labor that creates value, but socially necessary labor. We have also seen already that Marx’s conception of “socially necessary” includes the general as well as the relative usefulness of the commodity to society. That is why, according to the Marxian theory, the value of a commodity is not measured by the labor actually contained in a commodity, but the labor socially necessary to reproduce it. In the last chapter we have seen the historical basis of Marx’s theoretical conclusions, now we see their logical and “experimental” justification.

Strange as it may seem, the very critics who are most vehement in the denunciation of Marx’s so-called abstractions as unwarranted, and his supposed disregard of the “category” of usefulness as unpardonable, are at the same time raising an outcry against Marx for his insistence that only “socially necessary” labor is the cause and measure of value! With all their astuteness they cannot see the very simple fact that Marx does include usefulness as a factor of value, and that this very inclusion, which they loudly demand, accounts for the “socially necessary” which they no less loudly abjure! Indeed, none are so blind as those who will not see.

Note

1. Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Capital und Capitalzins. Innsbruck, 1900. Karl Marx and the close of his system. T. Fisher Unwin.

The International Socialist Review (ISR) was published monthly in Chicago from 1900 until 1918 by AM Simons and later Charles H. Kerr and loyal to the Socialist Party of America and is one of the essential publications in US left history. During the editorship of A.M. Simons it was largely theoretical and moderate. In 1908, Charles H. Kerr took over as editor with strong influence from Mary E Marcy. The magazine became the foremost proponent of the SP’s left wing growing to tens of thousands of subscribers. It remained revolutionary in outlook and anti-militarist during World War One. It liberally used photographs and images, with news, theory, arts and organizing in its pages. It was closed down in government repression in 1918.

PDF of full issue: https://www.marxists.org/history/usa/pubs/isr/v06n05-nov-1905-ISR-gog.pdf

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