As head of the Comintern from 1926-8, Bukharin held great responsibility for policy centered on the alliance with the Koumintang, aligning to Bukharin’s Comintern’s notion of stages in national revolutions. In this essay, Bukharin defends the policy, if not its implementation, as the United Front collapses in mid-1927 after the purge of Communists from the KMT’s National Army and the bloodbath against the Shanghai working class.

‘Developments in the Chinese Revolution’ by Nikolai Bukharin from Communist. International. Vol. 4 No. 11. July 30, 1927.

THE Chinese revolution is passing through the most difficult phase of its development. The armed forces of the nationalist bourgeoisie are more and more being consolidated, are carrying away with them fragments from the Hankow army and turning their sharp edge against the mass movement of the lower social levels, against the workers and peasants, against the “plebeians” who have taken hold of the axe of the great agrarian revolution and are violently entering the struggle against the “illustrious,” “reputed,” and “enlightened” petty autocrats of the towns and villages. With the help of fantastic, shrewd and zig-zag political groupings, personal conflicts, generalissimo combinations, civil and military diplomacy, mixture of pompous declarations and equally pompous parades of the executioners, high-flown phrases about the “three principles” and the hangman’s noose, “Chinese ceremonies” and orders to shoot—with the help of this variegated mosaic of combinations we can clearly hear the clash of steel chains in the tense class conflicts, the entire brutal force of which is not as yet fully clear to many.

The alliance of Feng Yu Hsian and Chiang Kai Shek reflects the further parting of the ways of the class forces of the country. The special peculiarity of the situation lies in the fact that three social classes (analysing the events roughly) have their three organised government centres. True, hasty observers like comrade Radek have denied the existence of feudalism in China. They have drawn their conclusion on the basis of this “analysis.” It is true that other Opposition friends of Radek have never said a word (and this they call “conscientious Marxist investigation!”) about Radek’s mistake. But facts remain facts: the camp of the “Ankuochun” (“army for the pacification of the country”) with Chang Tso Lin heading towards the imperial chair, is a camp of feudal reaction, a camp entirely on the side of the imperialists, a camp which considers no “reforms” but one, namely, the foundation of a new dynasty and the coronation of the “Marshal.” This camp is now definitely inclined in that direction.

Liberals on Top

The second camp is the camp of the liberal bourgeois counter-revolution.

It is also a characteristic feature of the present moment that at the present stage of development in China, this camp represents, so far, the victorious factor and occupies an absolutely unique position in the class struggle.

The class background of the counter-revolutions carried out by the generals against the people is clear enough: it is the going over of the liberal bourgeoisie to the counter-revolution. Here it must be added that the agrarian revolution started by the Chinese peasants, which has frightened the life out of the liberal bourgeoisie and exasperated them to the highest degree, must also be understood in its specific Chinese aspect. Whereas in Russia the seizure of the land at first united almost all lavers of the peasantry against the landlords and set the whole mass of the peasantry up against the sharply distinguished class of Russian landlords, in the

Chinese village the land is limited, and the number of landlords is small, but there are many small landowners or well-to-do peasants. Here the civil war in the countryside is much fiercer, because considerably broader sections are injured by the revolution and they are consequently more widely connected with the urban liberal bourgeoisie.

The class division gave rise to Chiang Kai Shek. Chiang Kai Shek “begot” Feng Yu Hsian. Feng in his turn will undoubtedly give rise to betrayals by other generals which will become a great menace to Hankow. Chiang Kai Shek plus Feng, plus other generals, plus (perhaps) left “Mukdenites”—such is the military expression of the bourgeois bloc. This bloc is so far the most powerful of the contending forces; its forces will inevitably continue to grow in the near future.

We must analyse the situation coolly. It would be pure shortsightedness to underestimate the power of our adversary, who is already acting as the executioner of the workers and peasants.

The strength of this liberal counter-revolutionary camp consists, first, in the numerical superiority of its armed military detachments; second, in its political policy as compared with the political policy of the feudal camp. We must first of all deal in greater length with this second item.

The Liberal Programme

We have already pointed out time and again that the bourgeois camp is already shooting down workers and peasants, but has not as vet merged with feudal reaction and imperialism. It has a tendency to merge into that camp, and the greater the danger of a workers’ and peasants’ rising becomes, the clearer this tendency will become. But nevertheless it has not yet merged, it has a certain amount of independence; it still has much seeming independence. And this is what adds to its political strength in the country.

This is mostly clearly expressed in the programme put forward by the leaders of the bourgeois counterrevolution in so far as “ideology” is concerned—and in the encounters with the Mukden forces in so far as it is a question of the “facts” of civil war.

The tenth thesis of the declaration of Chiang Kai Shek (“the programme of action” of the Nanking Government) reads:

“There are three roads open to China:
(1) To submit to militarism and imperialism;
(2) To follow the path of Communism;
(3) To enforce actually the three principles of the Kuomintang and build a strong government.”

The liberals shrewdly utilise this position. They pose as the real liberators of China, in contra-distinction to the Communists, whom they treat as agents of the “Russian Government,” employing thereby the lies invented by Poincaré, Chamberlain and “international” Social Democracy. One of the articles of the fourth thesis of the same declaration formulates this position very shrewdly, cunningly and at the same time—from the point of view of fooling the masses—wisely as follows:

“The Kuomintang” (read “the right clique’ of Chiang Kai Shek and Co.’’) “stands for the self-determination of the peoples and for joining up with the world revolution” (no joke!—N.B.) “on the basis of equality between the nations, whilst the Communists submit to the manipulations of Russia.”

Of course, the falseness of this will become clearer to the masses every day. This lie will betray itself and is already betraying itself in the language of steel and lead—the shooting of Chinese workers and peasants by the liberal “liberators,” which is continually becoming more frequent. Its falseness will be revealed by the repressions with which the agrarian movement and the majority of the Chinese nation are being visited by these extremely queer adepts-of “world revolution.” Finally, this lie will not be rescued by the fiery speeches of our Opposition, which in criminally slandering the policy of our Party, calls it a policy of “national limitation,” and the embodiment of “national conservatism,” and so adds grist to the mill of the bitterest opponents to the revolutionary activities of the U.S.S.R. (because if the Opposition is right, then Chiang Kai Shek is also right on the question of the “manipulations of Russia”). But it must be admitted that the combination of a real struggle against the North with exploitation of the tradition of the national fight for freedom constitutes a definite amount of political capital which is so far still bringing in its political interest.

We shall not deal with the other points of the Nanking “programme”; we shall not deal with the cunning reference to the unemployment in Hankow (from whence the capitalists have run away, closing down the factories); we shall not deal with the promises of a “future” eight-hour day, etc. We want to emphasise here another strong side of the liberal counter-revolution, namely the fact that it has its agents in the third camp, in the Hankow camp, whilst the contrary is not the case.

Weakness of Hankow

Now we come to the third camp, the Hankow camp. Wherein lies its weakness?

Its weakness lies, in the first place in the fact that it and its government centre have no adequate reliable armed forces. Its army is dwindling. With the betrayal of Feng it has lost its best section (in a military respect). The remaining section under Tang Chen Chi is unreliable. To rely on the personal animosity between Chiang Kai Shek and Tang Chen Chi would be wrong. The voice of class “consanguinity” is stronger than the voice of personal animosity, and the logic of the class struggle is stronger than the logic of individual conflicts. The small really reliable sections are absolutely insufficient.

A second weakness of Hankow consists in the fact that in its camp (both in the C.C. of the Kuomintang and in the: Government) there are direct agents of Chiang Kai Shek and vacillating typical petty bourgeois politicians of a low calibre, who, at a moment of crisis, are sure to go with the liberals. Their fear of the agrarian revolution makes them tremble. If the danger becomes ten times greater it will throw them into the arms of the Chiang Kai. Shek liberals. When we remember that even leading Communists have made opportunist errors, it will be easy to understand that the weakness and vacillations in the political leadership of Hankow, in absolute contradiction to the progress of the masses, is the most vulnerable spot in the Hankow camp.

Hankow’s Failures

If the instructions of the Comintern had been actually followed; if the agrarian revolution had not been checked; if the workers and peasants had been energetically armed; if reliable divisions of troops had been gathered; if a clear political policy understood by the masses had been followed; if the lead on making the Kuomintang more democratic had been properly carried out, and so forth, and so on, then the situation would not be as dangerous for Hankow as it is to-day. The discrepancies and certain contradictions between the leading section of the Kuomintang and the mass of its members, between the leaders and the actual movement, this is the main flaw in the Hankow camp.

The strength of this third camp as a whole consists in the powerful movement of the workers and peasants. The revolution will cast aside the vacillating phrasemongers, the agents of the enemy camp and the wavering, scared “leaders.” It will make its selection, casting aside the chaff through the mill of great suffering. The mass movement is so powerful, such a gigantic multitude has been drawn into the movement, such colossal human masses have been roused, such a powerful human “plebeian” elements have been roused, that in the final analysis nothing can hold out before them.

Such is the main array of the class forces.

The Two Paths

It is not difficult to see now that the present phase has raised in all its*intensity the question of the two roads of development of the Chinese revolution. This question we raised theoretically from the very start. As always happens life has proved richer, more significant, more ramified, and “shrewder” than “pure theory.” But the practical value of this formulation of the question has been proved.

The camp of the bourgeois counter-revolution is for the time being fighting, paradoxically as it may seem, against the feudalists and partly against the imperialists (although it is making compromises, agreements, etc.). By doing this “work” it still holds to the traditions of the struggle for freedom. But at the same time it is making furious assaults on the workers and peasants of its own nation, becoming their worst executors, and by this (which counteracts in full measure everything else) it became the worst counter-revolutionary hangman.

This is precisely the concrete form of the class forces and their struggle, of the question of the two paths of development. A liberal and compromising solution of the question, and the unification of China on the basis of a “stable” bourgeois government under an economic protectorate of imperialism (with corresponding concessions on the part of the latter) and a compromise with the feudalists at home—that is the first path. The second path is a “plebeian” solution of the tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution, a determined eradication of all feudal survivals, a determined struggle against imperialism, the dictatorship of the working class and the peasantry, the prospect of a Socialist path for further development. To put it differently: it is the struggle between the working class and the liberal bourgeoisie for leadership and control in the bourgeois democratic revolution. This struggle for leadership, or, what amounts to the same, for the liberal or plebeian path of development of the Chinese revolution, is the very kernel of the present class battles.

The more dangerous the situation, the more energetic must be the support of the third camp, the more energetic must the mobilisation of the workers and peasants and petty bourgeois masses proceed. The “plebs” must be organised and raised to their feet in this great historic battle against the forces of imperialism, feudalism and the bourgeois counter-revolution which, all in line, are shooting and hanging workers and peasants, burning down villages and workers’ quarters and shouting chorus against the Communist Party of the Chinese proletariat, against the agrarian revolution and against the “terror” of the working class.

Policy of the International

The policy of the Communist International is absolutely clear. It must mobilise the masses, let loose the agrarian revolution, give an impetus to the Labour movement, undertake a determined struggle against the traitors. One of the most important slogans must be: “Workers and peasants, rely on your own forces only! Do not trust the generals and officers! Organise your own armed detachments!”

The struggle is now extending all along the line. Absolute clarity is necessary. All compromising tendencies of the semi-agents of Chiang Kai Shek and Feng must be resisted. The leadership of the Kuomintang must be purged of its vacillating elements. The real Jacobin and “plebeian” ranks must be consolidated so that they may be able to fight to the end, regardless of dangers and losses. Feng has gone over to the enemy camp and a ruthless struggle must be declared against them.

It would be absurdly naive to think that the Communists and the workers and peasants must now compromise with Feng and Co. Such tactics could be based only on an absolutely liquidatory attitude to the agrarian revolution and the struggle for a plebeian development of China.

But there is no reason why one should think in these terms. Even in the event of Hankow being surrounded and taken, even then the struggle would proceed only in new forms. It would not be an easy matter to effect a military occupation of the whole of China, the China of workers and peasants. The desperate nature of the struggle may be seen from the fact that in Hupeh province over 3,000 peasants were killed in May and June, and in the territory of the Nationalist Government, landlord detachments have killed about 2,000 active members of the peasant leagues.

But no matter how furiously the officers and the rabble of rural noblemen may rage, even large armies could not occupy such an enormous territory in which the flame of peasant revolt will undoubtedly flare up. By shooting hundreds and thousands, or even tens of thousands of peasants, the real objective problems to be faced by the revolution will not be solved. The liberal counter-revolutionaries are incapable even of a halfhearted solution of the agrarian problem, and this will eventually lead them to grief, no matter what may be their partial victories over the revolutionary people.

Here it is also necessary to state another fact: the more ruthless the bourgeoisie are in the struggle against the masses, the sooner will they fall into the arms of the imperialists and appeal to them for help. But the more rapidly this happens, the more rapidly will they squander away the remains of their political capital, the sooner will they meet with defeat, the clearer will it become that a consistent Nationalist liberation struggle in China is possible only if carried on against the bourgeoisie.

Policy of the Soviet Government

Another question may arise, namely the question of the policy of the Soviet Government. The question may be raised: should the Soviet Government refuse to have any relations with the Nanking Government?

The answer to this question must be in the negative. Only very inexperienced politicians and very “naive” people think that the essence of a proletarian State consists in having no connection whatever with its capitalist environment. On the contrary certain connections are desirable. No rational human being would propose to abolish Soviet diplomacy and foreign trade in the name of the so-called principle of “purity.” When the Soviet Government has its representatives in the bourgeois countries of the West and the East, when it enters into relations with the feudal government of Marshal Chang Tso Lin, when it has its representatives in the Fascist paradise of Signor Mussolini, there are no reasons whatever why it should not establish relations with the Nanking Government. These usual forms of contact must be preserved. Furthermore, if. Soviet diplomacy is obliged to take into account in a definite manner the relative differences in the interests of the imperialist Powers, it is obliged—in a still greater degree —to take into account the antagonisms between the liberal protagonists of a united China and their imperialist partners who rob China somehow or other, regardless of the “form of administration.”

Even Chamberlain Can See It

The practical difference between the Comintern and the Soviet Government is in this respect absolutely clear, and it seems to us that we have explained it in such a simple way that even Chamberlain might be expected to understand it. The proletarian government establishes diplomatic and commercial relations, not because it “approves” of the policies of the capitalist or feudal exploiters. The Communist international, however, has no commercial or diplomatic relations with “other Powers.” It is directly engaged in organising the revolution.

To return to the policy of the Comintern. Our oppositionists were always “indignant” and “protested,” maintaining that it was false, when the slogan of withdrawing from the Kuomintang was “ascribed” to them; now they openly demand this withdrawal.

The question arises: Why? Is it because the leaders of the Kuomintang are vacillating? But are the masses of the Kuomintang mere “cattle”? Since when does our attitude to a mass organisation depend on what happens at the “very top”?

All forces of the liberal counter-revolution are now directed towards throwing out the Communists from the Kuomintang, to isolate and surround them. All reactionary forces sing the same tune. It is a well-known fact that the influence of the Communist Party in the Kuomintang is rising continuously. It is a well-known fact that the lower units of the Kuomintang organisation, particularly those of the workers and peasants are under Communist leadership. It is a well-known fact that the Chiang Kai Shek clique is attacking Hankow because it regards the left Kuomintang as a Communist “agency.” It is a well-known fact, also, that Chiang Kai Shek proposes to arrest and execute Borodin.

And in the face of this we are told that from a “revolutionary” point of view we ourselves must play into the hands of these gentlemen!

We cannot let ourselves in for such tactics. We must intensify our work in the Kuomintang still further, purging it from the bourgeois hangers-on and traitors of every description. But that we should leave voluntarily, precisely at the moment when all our opponents demand it, would indeed be wonderful tactics.

At the Suchow conference between Chiang Kai Shek and Feng something like the following platform was adopted: (1) Hankow admits its “mistakes”; (2) the Communists are excluded from the Kuomintang; (3) Borodin is discharged; (4) the “high contracting parties” organise a joint and united attack on Pekin.

Chiang Kai Shek’s “informers” are ready to accept this plan (not Wong Chin Wei, who is firmer than the others), and our “oppositionists” want to carry this “platform” into effect!

Instead of such naivety we must strengthen our positions in the Kuomintang.

Fight even if Weak

And what if this does not succeed? What if the enemy is at the present time too strong? This is possible. It is also possible that Hankow will be destroyed. It is possible that the government centre will be torn asunder through its own inner contradictions; it may be impossible to organise a real Jacobin “left” government, i.e., a kind of Hankow “revolutionary committee.” But we must fight all the same along these lines. We must fight all the more strongly to maintain and keep our positions in the Kuomintang as long as the basic mass of its membership is under Communist influence.

The Kuomintang is doomed if it does not follow the path of the developing agrarian revolution. The Communist Party has no interest in that happening; it is interested in strengthening its influence within the Kuomintang and transforming it into a powerful workers’ and peasants’ party, an organ of the democratic plebeian revolution. This possibility exists, and it would be absolute childishness not to utilise it.

Let the despondent sceptics caw about the victories of the traitors. The Marxist-Leninists know that the elemental forces of the revolutionary masses of China must hack a way to victory, no matter what barriers the bourgeois counter-revolution may put in its way, no matter how many executions are performed by the feudal reactionaries, no matter what guns the foreign forces use to destroy Chinese towns.

The ECCI published the magazine ‘Communist International’ edited by Zinoviev and Karl Radek from 1919 until 1926 irregularly in German, French, Russian, and English. Restarting in 1927 until 1934. Unlike, Inprecorr, CI contained long-form articles by the leading figures of the International as well as proceedings, statements, and notices of the Comintern. No complete run of Communist International is available in English. Both were largely published outside of Soviet territory, with Communist International printed in London, to facilitate distribution and both were major contributors to the Communist press in the U.S. Communist International and Inprecorr are an invaluable English-language source on the history of the Communist International and its sections.

PDF of full issue: https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/ci/vol-4/v04-n11-jul-30-1927-CI-grn-riaz.pdf