The colonial revolution was a main theme at the Comintern’s Sixth World Congress held in 1928, with five co-reports on the main document: ‘The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies.’ China loomed large as the First United Front devolved into civil war between the Communists and Kuomintang. The extensive report below was given at a defining moment in the Chinese Revolution as the center of struggle decisively shifted from mass working-class strikes in the cities to peasant uprisings and guerilla war in the countryside. The reporter, Qu Qiubai (Strakhov), worked as a journalist and translator in Moscow, closely associated with Chinese Communist circles. In Russia, he attended the 3rd and 4th Comintern Congresses, teaching at the University of the East before returning to China. There he would soon rise to the C.C.P.’s Politburo in 1925. Escaping China following December, 1927’s failed Guangzhou Uprising, he arrived in Moscow in early 1928 where he served as head of China’s Comintern delegation until losing power to Wang Ming’s faction in 1930. Returning to China, he was among those held responsible for the ‘adventurous’ Li-san line of urban rebellions and lost much of his authority. Suffering from ill-health Qu Qiubai focused on education and propaganda for the Party to which he remained committed and centrally active. Forced by his health to stay behind as the Great March retreated from the Central Soviet District, Qu Qiubai was captured by Kuomintang forces and executed on June 18, 1935 at age 36.

‘The Lessons of the Chinese Revolution: Report to the 6th Comintern Congress’ by Strakhov (Qu Qiubai 瞿秋白) from International Press Correspondence. Vol. 8 No. 68. October 4, 1928.

The national and colonial problems were clearly and unambiguously formulated under Lenin’s leadership at the very beginning of the foundation of the Communist International. But sometimes we get an idea about China that everything happens there in a peculiar way, in a purely Chinese fashion, and that China is a real Chinese puzzle. Doubts begin to arise even among Chinese comrades themselves, and they wonder whether it is not perhaps necessary somehow to adopt the Marxian theory to the peculiar conditions prevailing in China.

Our young Chinese Party must first of all find the points of contact of this “Chinese Puzzle”, of a country with an ancient culture, a country which Marxians have never seriously studied, with other countries. It is first of all necessary to prove that China is not an exception when regarded from the Marxian viewpoint.

I. FEUDALISM AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION.

Is There Feudalism in China?

We have heard arguments that there is no feudalism in China, that there is no bourgeoisie and that there is even no proletariat. But the Chinese revolution has been going on in a zig-zag fashion in the course of 18 years. Not only are generals fighting among each other, but there are mass uprisings, the homes of landlords are set on fire in short, there are pure revolutionary phenomena to be observed in the country. But we have not as yet properly understood the significance of these events.

When we joined the Kuomintang in the summer of 1923, that organisation was in power in Canton. The Canton gövernment was maintained by the military forces of several generals who, under the banner of Sun Yat-senism, fought against the so-called Peyan militarists of the north. Then we said that a war was going on between Sun Yat-sen and the north and that that war was of a revolutionary character. Was that correct? I think it was correct. What is it that constituted the revolutionary character of that war? To clear up this point, I must touch upon the question of feudalism in China.

Attempts have been made to deny the existence of feudalism in China. It has been said that there is no feudalism there. But this is wrong.

Of course, generally speaking, we had no landlords in the west European sense, or such as existed in Russia, in China. But we do have big landlords, or landowners, in the country. We have landowners who possess as much as 500,000 moos of land, who exploit the peasants as tenants.

It is on this basis, i.e., on the basis of the fact that big landlords have existed in China for quite a long time, that the political institution known as the Mandarin system has arisen in China. It is true the Mandarins were not typical landlords and did not rule directly as feudal lords over their territories. They represented a class of aristocratic officials of the emperor. They possessed also a certain amount of power in their territories. The custom still prevails that the Mandarin or landlord has the right of being the judge over his peasants.

Even in the province of Kiangsu, the most capitalistically developed province, there are still certain survivals of mediaeval feudal methods of exploitation. These methods cannot be simply called “Asiatic” methods. Their class content must be analysed. With the penetration of imperialism in China the Mandarins as a ruling class gradually became compradores in the broad sense of the term. We would call them state compradores because they, together with the Manchurian dynasty, had concentrated in their hands everything the “nationalised” railways, mines, banks, big factories, heavy industry and large landed estates, especially in the northern provinces of Shantung and Chili. It is these compradore. Mandarins who constituted the Peking government.

Why do we call them Peyan militarists? Because there was a military school in Peyan similar to that of the Chang Kai-shek

school in Wampu. In that school and in the militarist schools of Japan all former aristocrats, i.e., the former state officials who now became military officers, received their military education. The Peyan militarists beginning with Yuan Shi-kai and ending with Wu Pei-fu and Feng Yu-Hsiang were blood relatives and had a common schooling. During the rule of this class consisting of the compradores of imperialism, a revolutionary struggle began in China directed against its domination.

Who Conducted the Struggle in China?

Who took up the struggle? This question must be answered as follows: Apart from the fact that the workers, artisans, coolies and peasants took part in the struggle, there were also such forces pushed into the struggle by the force of development of trade and money relations which relied chiefly on the usurers, merchants and small landlords. These comparatively new forces. that had risen as a result of the changed economic conditions were objectively directed against the Peking Government, against the government which monopolised, so to speak, the right to sell out the country. The Peking government received all surplus revenue from the customs tariffs and the salt tax of all provinces. A struggle began on this basis because the new local governors, beginning to feel a certain economic basis behind them, did not want to give up this surplus to the Peking Government. The former feudals began to become militarists. Basing themselves on more or less developed local markets which were independent of Peking, these feudal lords entered upon a struggle against the national government the government of the Madarins and national compradores. Sun Yat-sen was not accidentally supported by the southern provinces where money relations were most highly developed and where the militarists, who were also big landowners, engaged in commerce, and created their capitalist enterprises while preserving at the same time the mediaeval methods of exploitation. It is these forces the gentry, the landlords and bourgeois landowners who fought against the north at the outset. This struggle could not but give rise to a mass movement, inasmuch as it took place in the period of world social revolution, i.e., in the epoch when not only the proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R. was a fact but also a whole series of great revolutionary movements were in progress in the west.

II. THE PROLETARIAT AND THE BOURGEOISIE IN THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION.

Some Historical Data.

Thus new forces, namely the proletariat, began to rise in the Chinese Revolution. Sun Yat-sen at first relied exclusively on the military forces. Having the opportunity to organise the ruined peasantry into a mercenary army the bourgeoisie tried to avoid the necessity of resorting to the aid of the mass popular movement. But when the revolutionary students movement arose in China during the period of 1919-25 all social forces of the country became active factors. It is precisely in that period that the Chinese proletariat, which was still very young and numerically weak, found itself compelled to enter upon the political scene. The first strike of the Shanghai proletariat took place in 1919. That strike was directed against Japan as a protest against the annexation of Tsintou. It is true the strike was organised by the overseers under the leadership of the Chamber of Commerce and the Students’ League. But it was a great factor considering that all foreign factories in Shanghai were closed in the course of 7 days.

There was a big seamen’s strike in 1921 or 1922 which compelled the British to sign a collective agreement affecting all steamers sailing on the Pacific. The same year there was a railway strike on the Peking-Hankow line which laid the beginning of a strike movement in China under the leadership of the Communist Party.

Although the Peking-Hankow railway workers suffered big defeats in 1923, the strike movement since then began to develop and brought into the revolutionary struggle entirely new forces such as had been unknown in the history of China before.

How the Question of Agreement with the Bourgeoisie was Solved.

From this brief historical sketch we can see that the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie were involved in the revolution in China. There is no need to go into a discussion here as to whether it was necessary to establish a united front with the bourgeoisie or not. Life itself has shown that under Chinese conditions close relations between the proletarian movement and the nationalist bourgeois movement inevitable, but it was just as inevitable for these relations to be short-lived. It was only a question as to what the strategical line should be. I think that the conditions for an alliance and an agreement with the national bourgeoisie were clearly and unambiguously laid down by Lenin, who pointed out that we can compromise with the national bourgeoisie for a struggle against imperialism on condition 1) that we retain our independence, 2) that we have an opportunity to organise and mobilise the masses of workers and peasants, 3) that the bourgeoisie really conducts an anti-imperialist and a revolutionary anti-militarist struggle.

These conditions existed in the first period of the Chinese revolution, there is no sense in denying this now. It is superfluous to try to prove here the fallacy of Trotzky’s theory that it was in general inadmissible to conclude compromises with the bourgeoisie on the ground that capitalist economic relations prevailed in China and that the revolution should have adopted the forms of the proletarian dictatorship at the very start. This is absolutely contrary to the facts. Had the national bourgeoisie in China been in power at the time it would have been an entirely different matter and the history of the Chinese Revolution would have been entirely different now.

But it is not at all a question as to whether or not an agreement with the national bourgeoisie was admissible, but rather a question as to how the proletariat should have carried on the struggle so that it might have been directed against imperialism and retained it class character. The fact is that the national bourgeoisie is not a reliable ally in the national revolution and, therefore, our chief attention should have been directed towards the peasantry.

Lenin said that in the colonies and the backward capitalist countries the peasantry constitute the basic mass and that it is a pure Utopia to think that the proletarian party can pursue a real Communist policy there without a definite attitude towards the peasantry. Form this we can draw only one conclusion, namely, that while entering into an agreement with the national bourgeoisie, the proletariat of the colonial countries must rely chiefly on the peasantry so as to lead the masses of peasants forward and to paralyse the national bourgeoisie from the very beginning of the struggle. From our experience in China we know that the first revolutionary wave which began with the movement of May 30, 1925, showed at the very beginning that the national bourgeoisie will betray the revolution, that the national bourgeoisie is fighting for leadership and the capture of the masses against the proletariat. The national bourgeoisie wanted and wants to utilise the masses for its own purposes.

The Chinese “9th of January”.

What was the situation at that time in Shanghai? Prior to May 30, 1925, a strike had taken place in the Japanese textile mills. The Japanese manufacturers, after signing an agreement with the workers, declined to keep to that agreement, as a result of which clashes took place between a workers’ demonstration and the administration during which the Japanese shot one worker.

The firing of that shot caused a still greater protest demonstration and roused the entire mass of workers in Shanghai and later all over China. A joint committee of labour organisations, small business men and student organisations was set up in Shanghai, which led the strikes in the factories, universities and shops. The committee drew up 17 demands which were submitted to the British authorities in Shanghai.

At that moment the Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai, which represented the Shanghai bourgeoisie, kept silent. It did not come out against the movement at the beginning, and under the pressure of the masses even declared a trade strike. The traders kept silent for not more than a week and when they began to speak they immediately betrayed themselves. They started to negotiate with the foreigners, declaring that the workers advanced too radical demands and that they, the businessmen, stood for moderation. They said: We only want representation in the municipality, i.e., in the municipal government of the foreign concessions of Shanghai. We only want the convocation of a conference to discuss the question of customs tariffs. We only want that a conference be called to discuss the question of extra-territorial rights of the foreigners in China. But as far as the question of evacuation of the foreign troops from Shanghai, the question of the right to strike, freedom of speech, press and assembly, etc., are concerned, these demands were rejected by the Shanghai trading bourgeoisie.

A representative of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce openly declared before one of our comrades, a representative of the Shanghai Trade Union Council, that they cannot demand the right to strike because if we had that right “then you will strike also in the Chinese factories”.

Immediately after this, several conflicts broke out between the Trades Council and the Chamber of Commerce. The national bourgeoisie tried to regulate and to control the labour movement for the time being on a local scale. They began to close the revolutionary organisations, not only the trade unions but also the student leagues and the organisations of small businessmen, in Shanghai.

The events of May 30 in Shanghai were of tremendous significance for the Chinese revolution. That was our 9th of January, 1905. Notwithstanding the efforts of the national bourgeoisie to restrain the masses from further action, the movement developed throughout the country. You know about the strike in Hong Kong which lasted almost 2 years. You know that during that strike a strike committee was set up in Canton which served as a basis for the nationalist government in Canton, the government of Wan Tin-wei, Chang Kai-shek, etc. Parallel with this a wave of the peasant movement swept the province of Kwantung. A great realignment of forces within the army of the nationalist government began precisely at that moment. There were fairly strong Left organisations in the Wampu school and there were many Communists among the lower officers at the time.

All these forces combined with the Hong Kong strike and the peasant movement and comprised the basis of the first Canton government. In a word, beginning with May 30, to the end of 1925, we experienced the honeymoon of the united national front, although a fairly open struggle, fairly sharp relations between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and also between the Communists and Lefts on one hand and the Rights on the other, existed within the Kuomintang. That honeymoon ended with the Chang Kai-shek putsch of March 20, 1926.

Prerequisites for the Putsch of March 20, 1926.

Before then, already in the autumn of 1925, a conference took place in Sisian. That Sisian conference was an expression of protest and a beginning of the concentration of the extreme rights against the united national front, against the Canton national government, against the struggle of the workers and peasants. The gentry and the landlords began to organise their resistance. They insisted from the very beginning on the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang. A new Right wing began to shape itself within the Kuomintang headed by Tai Tsi-tao who advised the Communists to leave the Kuomintang voluntarily, promising that if they did so good and friendly relations would be maintained between the Kuomintang and the Communists.

We replied that we do not want to withdraw from the Kuomintang, but that we intend to fight for leadership within it.

At the same time, however, we adopted another decision, namely, to follow the strategical line of fighting together with the national bourgeoisie against the bad gentry and against the Siansi group, even if for this it were necessary to restrain the strike and the peasant movements, and to invite the new Right wing to the II. Congress of the Kuomintang. That was a very big mistake under the circumstances which then existed in Canton. Wan Tsin-wei and Chiang Kai-shek, under the pressure of the masses, conducted an energetic struggle against the British imperialists and partly against the local gentry and landowners. Their policy was to satisfy the Communists as much as possible so as to secure a firm footing. They saw that the strike committee and the tens of thousands of workers are entirely under the leadership of the Communists. They saw the peasants rise and the beginning of an armed struggle against the landlords under the leadership of the Communists. But on hearing that we were willing to make concessions to the national bourgeoisie they changed their tactics. They intensified their political and military preparations and together with the generals started an attack on the peasants. Chiang Kai-shek decided to act and began to rally his forces for action.

We overlooked the fact that in going together with the bourgeoisie as an ally we must never forget that this ally may at any moment become our enemy. Only our own strength, our independent class policy on the basis of mass work and mass action, can force the national bourgeoisie to be on our side for a certain length of time and to fight together with us against the imperialists.

Even after March 20 we did our utmost to get along with the March 20 regime so as to keep up the united front with the bourgeoisie, with Chiang Kai-shek, with the nationalists. As far as the masses were concerned they could not be reconciled to the March 20 regime. After a short period of depression a new wave of big strikes broke out in Shanghai and the labour movement in Canton assumed still wider dimensions. The workers organised their delegate assembly which during the Canton uprising served as the basis of a Soviet. The peasants organised their provincial centres. The small businessmen all over China, particularly in Canton, organised separately from the Chamber of Commerce and established contact with the revolutionary movement. The Left wing of the Kuomintang launched an attack on Chiang Kai-shek from all sides. At a joint session of the C.C. and the provincial committees of the Kuomintang in October of the same year, a platform was adopted which later became the platform of the Wuhan Government. In that platform or programme, they spoke of rent, the agrarian problem, the 8-hour day, and declared that if the Northern Expedition will be victorious in one district or province, it will be necessary to call a national delegate assembly, and to hand over power to it. The government must not be in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek as the commander in chief.

III. THE SHANGHAI UPRISING AND WUHAN.

The Struggle Between the Proletariat and the Bourgeoisie for Hegemony.

Thus, after March 20 we had two tendencies in the Kuomintang. On the one side were the gentry and landlords, the so-called old and new Right wingers, the representatives of the national bourgeoisie headed by Chiang Kai-shek; on the other side were the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie. The struggle between these two forces continued up to the Shanghai coup d’etat. In some places democratic dictatorships of the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie were set up. In many districts of the provinces of Hunan, Hupeh and Chai-angsi, after the occupation of Shanghai, power was in the hands of the peasants leagues and local Kuomintang committees which were also under our leadership. These dictatorships were meant to spread all over the country and to subordinate the Wuhan government. Chiang Kai-shek perfectly understood what it was all about and he definitely refused to go to Hankow, insisting that the capital be transferred to Nanchang, He rallied his forces with the object of reaching Shanghai at top speed and unite with the Shanghai bourgeoisie who were on his side. But the workers, students and small businessmen of Shanghai had already established their own government. The Shanghai workers were better organised, they had more revolutionary experience, and did not wait for the arrival of our forces as the Hankow workers did. The Shanghai workers with 200 rifles rose against 8000 regular troops of the northern militarists, captured the arms and organised armed pickets of 2000 workers. Their detachments also had many machine guns which constituted a formidable power capable of resisting Chiang Kai-shek.

To disarm the workers Chiang Kai-shek had to do some stubborn preparatory work, and he decided to act only after he had received money from the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce which enabled him to buy the other generals of Nanking and Chekiang.

The Shanghai example shows that the struggle for hegemony between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie was very fierce and that it took the form of a struggle between two governments on the one hand the army of Chiang Kai-shek and on the other the national delegate assembly which relied on the armed workers. But the leaders wavered. The same thing happened in Wuhan.

Opportunism.

Wuhan was compelled to fight against Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Tso-lin at one and the same time. Wan Tin-wei and the other petty bourgeois politicians were scared by the blockade of the imperialists and the gentry who had contact with Chiang Kai-shek. At that moment, when it was so necessary for us to develop the agrarian revolution, when it became necessary to unfold a mass class struggle, we ourselves began to fall under the influence of the petty bourgeois politicians, we ourselves began to believe that perhaps it was really true that the workers and peasants went a bit too far.

When the peasants began to confiscate the landed estates and to arm themselves and take power wherever they could, we thought that the time had not yet come for that. The masses went forward but the leaders remained behind and wanted to pull them back for the sake of preserving the united front with the petty bourgeoisie. Although we were then already fighting against Chiang Kai-shek and the national bourgeoisie, we had not yet realised the inevitability of a disruption of the united front with the petty bourgeoisie for the sake of which we obstructed the development of the mass struggle.

In the beginning of the Wuhan period, when the movement of the Lefts started out against Chiang Kai-shek, the slogan “Down with the Tuhweis and the bad gentry” was advanced. The “bad gentry” only. When Wan Tin-wei came to Hankow he reminded us that we had agreed to fight against the bad gentry while now we wanted to fight against all gentry. This, he said, was no good. On the other hand, inasmuch as the industrial proletariat of Hankow fought almost exclusively against the imperialist employers, the imperialists closed up their enterprises and left Hankow. 120,000 workers were thrown out of work. From that moment the struggle in the towns was directed only against the shop-keepers and the question of the shop assistants became a serious question. Wan Tin-wei came to one of our sessions and rebuked us for continuing the strike from which the small business men suffered and for the confiscation of factories and works. We replied that we did not confiscate the factories and that the workers themselves did it. This happened because the employers closed up their enterprises and we had to undertake the organisation of production together with the trade unions. He said that we were deceiving him and that while we have a resolution of the Communist International saying that the revolution in China is a bourgeois-democratic revolution, we at the same time probably have a secret telegram to the effect that the revolution is already as socialist revolution.

We wanted to satisfy Wan Tin-wei somehow. We promised Wan Tin-wei to do something in the morning, but in evening he came to us and said that we promised to keep the workers from arresting people and only a few minutes ago a pioneer had arrested his employer. He said that when we promised things we did not mean to fulfil them. This put us in a predicament. We wanted to re-establish the former good relations with the Kuomintang and to restore the already broken united front by means of concessions. But this produced no results.

As far as the agrarian revolution is concerned, the most important fact to be remembered is that there are no big landed estates in China; the tenant system is widely developed, in which connection the small landlords living in towns or villages are state officials or teachers and receive very small salaries. They live chiefly on their income from land and are interested in squeezing the last drop of blood from the peasants. But for the peasant it does not make the slightest difference as to whether he has to pay rent and usurers’ interest to big or small landlords. When we realised the necessity for agrarian revolution in China, we, together with Tan In-kai, Tan Shan-chi and others, discussed the question together in a Commission as to how many moos of land make a small landlord. But none of us ever went to the villages to find out the true state of affairs, although a merciless struggle was already going on for land in the rural areas against both the small and big landowners.

At this moment, when the Party was so confused, and when the imperialist blockade and intervention, and the general objective situation, exerted their pressure on the Wuhan government which sympathised with Chiang Kai-shek, the gentry and the landlords ventured to organise their counter-revolutionary coup d’etat in Wuhan.

At the moment when we had already to do with a counter-revolution in Hunan (May 21, 1927) and when the masses of peasants had organised their own detachments for an attack on Changsha, the centre of counter-revolution, we told the peasants that the suppression of the counter-revolutionary forces must be left to the Wuhan government. The same thing happened after the Li Ti-sin coup d’etat in Canton (April 15, 1927). When the peasants rose in the districts of Wuhua and Heifin, and the railway workers and engineers of Canton revolted against Li Ti-sin, our C.C. had no part in the matter. It was simply afraid to take a hand, and we suffered defeat. On learning about the organisation of workers and peasants detachments in Kwantung, we invited them to Wuhan, without, however, giving them instructions as to how to fight against Li Ti-sin and how to consolidate their positions in the villages so as to gather their forces for a new attack on Li Ti-sin.

After it had become clear that a united front with Wan Tin-wei was no longer possible we decided to withdraw from the Wuhan government. But even then we still thought this to be a manoeuvre, as a move to improve our relations with Wan Tin-wei. The fact that the Communists are in the Wuhan Government, we thought, gives the reactionaries an opportunity to say that the Wuhan Government is Red, therefore, we argued, we must withdraw so as to make it clear that the Wuhan government is a national and not a Communist government.

All these were disastrous mistakes committed in the Chinese Revolution. We decided to announce our withdrawal from the government and called upon the masses of the Kuomintang to undertake a struggle against the C.C. of Wuhan and Nanking. This was a clear anti-opportunist move and under its influence we witnessed the Ho Lun and Ye Tin insurrection which was defeated near Swatow and which did not put a stop to our opportunist vacillations and errors.

IV. THE SOVIET CANTON UPRISING.

Differences Within the Kuomintang.

This marked the end of the Kuomintang period. That period may be defined as a period of the weakest Party leadership and gravest mistakes. Of course it cannot be said that were it not for these mistakes, the Chinese revolution would have invariably been victorious. We must take into consideration also the forces of the imperialists and especially the peculiar correlation of class forces within the Chinese revolution. But we certainly did not mobilise and utilise all the forces which we had at our disposal.

Now that the Revolution had suffered a heavy defeat and the reaction felt it had a free hand, it began to act. The extreme Right reactionary Sinsian clique took power in Nanking. It declared: “We were the first ones opposed to the Communists.

Even Chiang Kai-shek was against us, even Wan Tin-wei was against us then, but now, they have become convinced that a struggle against Communism is necessary in the interests of the nation and the Kuomintang.”

The fact of the matter is that Li Ti-sin, the so-called Kwantse clique, representing the most reactionary elements of the gentry and landowners, had his connections with the compradores in Canton and Shanghai. The British imperialists brought Li Ti-sin into power regardless of Chiang Kai-shek who was driven out, for the British thought him too Red and they could not forgive his promulgation of the so-called Customs autonomy demand. As to Wan Tin-wei he, having started a struggle against the Communists, had to urge also a fight against Chiang Kai-shek to save his radical appearance. Actually, he was already an instrument in the hands of Tan Shan-chi.

The Preparatory Period.

You know that after the rupture with the Communists very complicated internal differences arose within the Kuomintang. That period of “atomisation” of the Kuomintang militarists was a period preparatory for the Canton insurrection. In November 1927, following on the Chang Fa-Kwei putsch in Canton, there took place clashes between small generals in the various districts in the province of Kwantung. Peasants revolts became general. Even in Nanking they began to speak of a realisation. of the peasant demand for a 25% reduction of rent. The same thing happened in Wuhan. Immediately after the coup d’etat Wan Tin-wei issued a decree concerning a reduction in the amount of rent. By this he wanted to show that he meant to realise the agrarian revolution without the Communists. At the same time they were considering the labour and capital arbitration law in Nanking. Each one wanted to show that he is more radical than the other in relation to the workers, because the revolution was again getting on its feet. This became more obvious in Canton. Within a week after the defeat of Ho Nun and Ye-Tin a big seamen’s movement broke out in that city.

Beginning with that day, October 14, up to the very insurrection in Canton, strikes did not cease. In that period the workers themselves declared that the Kuomintang flag had become the standard of white terror, and that the only revolutionary flag is the Red banner with the hammer and sickle. That slogan was advanced by the workers even before the Party had officially decided to stop dilly dallying with the Left Kuomintangers. The masses advanced the slogan “Down with Wan Tin-wei” when the Party had not yet definitely decided its attitude towards him and Chang Fa-kwei.

The Revolutionary Situation in Canton.

The situation prior to the Canton insurrection shows that the insurrection had a social basis and was of a class character. I think that the Canton comrades will give you greater details as to what the circumstances were. I will merely say that after the Wuhan coup d’etat the Party leadership openly recognised its opportunist errors and started an energetic struggle against all remnants of opportunism. It was precisely in that period that the need for an agrarian revolution was recognised, and it was decided to organise a series of local uprisings in Hunan, Hupeh and Canton, wherever this might be possible and really necessary.

As to Canton, the C.C. of the Party adopted a decision on the 18th or 19th of November. That decision said that a direct revolutionary situation had arisen in Canton and that it was time for an insurrection. That insurrection was to be so organised that the workers and peasants would rise and that work would be carried on in demoralising the enemy forces. It was necessary to organise the masses in Canton, to organise at least delegate meetings of workers which would act as the organs of the insurrection, to organise the peasants in the neighbourhood of Canton which were in, revolt since the establishment of the Soviet Government in Hailifun (November 1st.)

Wan Tin-wei found out about our decision before the insurrection took place. It was easy for him to do so because revolution was imminent and everyone could feel it coming. We had information that an attack was being organised for the 10th or the 12th against the labour organisations and for the disarming of a regiment in which we had a strong nucleus. The day of the insurrection was, therefore shifted. After the suppression of the insurrection we witnessed a whole series of uprisings on the 13th and 14th of December in several districts of Kwantung and near Canton, uprisings in which workers and peasants took part. These uprisings were suppressed just as their centre, Canton, had already been crushed.

Our Greatest Mistake.

All these facts go to show that we were to a certain extent prepared for the Canton insurrection. Of course, there could be no question of a bone fide election of Soviets on the eve of fierce street battles. We had a more or less legal assembly of workers delegates at which about 70-80 people participated. That assembly elected the Executive Committee of the Soviet consisting of 6 comrades; the soldiers’ nuclei and the peasants of the Canton district held their separate elections. The Executive Committee of that Soviet did not accomplish much during its short period of existence, but it was a real organ of the insurrection. The conditions were there for the mobilisation of wider sections of the masses and for better organisation, but what we actually did gives us a picture of how courageously and bravely the workers fought.

It is now claimed that there were very few people at the mass meetings in Canton. This is true, but there were about 4-5 thousand workers constantly crowding about the general staff of the insurrection in the course of two days clamouring for arms. We told them to go to the mass meetings and to hail the new government, but they insisted that we give them arms first. In a situation when workers demand arms it is only a question as to how best to organise them and to move against the chief enemy. Our greatest mistake during the Canton insurrection, apart from the inadequate political preparation and inadequate general organisational preparation, was the fact that we did not chose the central position of the enemy as the chief point of our attack and that we wasted much time, almost 12 hours, in the attack.

Suppression of the Insurrection.

This gave Li Fu-lin time enough and an opportunity to cross the river and to put us on the defensive. That was our chief mistake. After the Canton insurrection the revolution suffered a crushing defeat. That defeat was much greater than in Wuhan. Why? Because the insurrection took place at a moment when the ruling classes could not by any means come to an agreement within the country while the imperialists had mobilised all their forces, Li-Fu-lin had to resort to the services of the British fleet in order to carry his troops through the river as all sailors were on the side of the revolutionaries. Of course the imperialist forces were much stronger than ours. They were strong not only because they had in their possession a fleet and guns, but also because they energetically and politically organised the Kuomintang counter-revolutionary forces. That is why Wan Tin-wei immediately disappeared after the Canton defeat as the spokesman of the intermediary group: The Wan Tin-wei group completely surrendered to Chiang Kai-shek.

Thus we were now confronted with a complete and clear polarisation; on the one hand, there was the united counter-revolutionary camp, while on the other the flag of the Soviet government had been raised, around which rallied all forces of the revolution the workers, peasants and even soldiers.

After the Canton insurrection, terror ensued throughout the country and the arbitration law and all agreements concluded between the employers and the trade unions were annulled by decree. All achievements of the working class were destroyed. Even the rent reduction law was cancelled. A situation arose such as existed only prior to the broad revolutionary movement.

After the suppression of the Canton rebellion, the reaction began to mobilise its forces for an attack on the workers, this time with the support of the imperialists. An organisation was set up in Shanghai consisting of British, Japanese and Chinese textile manufacturers for a joint attack on the workers.

A new northern expedition was undertaken. But this time the war was no longer a revolutionary, but a counter-revolutionary war as far as the masses of workers and peasants were concerned.

V. A REVIVAL AND THE COMPLETION OF THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION.

Chiang Kai-shek again in Power.

The only remnant of nationalism with Chiang Kai-shek in his new Northern expedition was his ambition to seize Peking as the capital of the National Government. All other Kuomintang slogans had been thrown overboard, not a single one had been realised. The petty bourgeois masses received nothing of the old promises. The great discontent among the petty bourgeoisie was caused by Li-Ti-sin’s attempt to destroy the monument to the victims of 1925 in Canton and also the Japanese provocations, against which the so-called National Government of Chiang Kai-shek did not dare to protest. A new wave of anti-imperialist movements and peasant uprisings broke out not only in Kwantung, Kiangsi and Hunan, but also in the North. Although these actions have no decisive importance for the victory of the revolution, they menaced the power of the gentry and the landlords. The latest reports tell us that the militarist armies are being demoralised and that the soldiers are deserting them.

Great indignation was caused by the Tsinan events. Instead of a struggle against the Japanese, Chiang Kai-shek on arrival in Tsinan, ordered the stoppage of the anti-imperialist mass movement throughout the country so as not give the Communists an opportunity to utilise it. To save the situation the Kuomintang had to raise the question of a National Assembly and to speak about the unequal treaties. But when the Japanese refused to recognise the annulment of the treaty, the term of which has expired, Chiang Kai-shek immediately agreed that the treaty remain in force for the period of diplomatic negotiations.

As to Customs autonomy, this question was not quite correctly elucidated in the press. It is not a question of Customs autonomy, but of the observance of a treaty signed by the powers at the end of 1925 granting China a rise in the tariffs, beginning with January 1, 1929.

America now magnanimously agrees to keep to that agreement of 1925 which Chiang Kai-shek calls Customs autonomy.

The Role of National Reformism.

Nationalism has now become a perverted nationalism. It cannot be said it plays exclusively a counter-revolutionary role, but at best, it is national reformism. This national reformism already ceases to play a revolutionary role; it is beginning to help the imperialists consolidate their power in China and in all colonies in general. The national bourgeoisie offers its assistance to the imperialists. It says: If you will rule over us in the colonies the workers and peasants will drive you out, give us, therefore, some power. Of course there is no need to destroy the unequal treaties immediately, but give us some improvements so as to show the people that Chiang Kai-shek is a hero; this will pacify them and imperialist domination will become more stable. A struggle against this national reformism, against the reformist illusions of the petty bourgeois parties, let alone the dominant national bourgeoisie, is becoming our main task. Without this no mass work will be successful. If we act under the slogans advanced by the so-called third party we merely help the petty bourgeois parties and repeat our own opportunist errors. First of all we must work energetically for the organisation of trade unions, drawing them into the anti-imperialist movement, and lead the petty bourgeois masses in their struggle.

Secondly, and this refers not only to the working class of China, but to the proletariat the world over, we must define our attitude to the Chinese peasantry which is fighting for land, against feudal survivals, against the militarists and against militarist wars. Only a real Bolshevik attitude will be able to liquidate the putschist ideas prevailing among us, the wrong notion that we must rise everywhere without any preliminary preparations. Correct tactics are necessary on the peasant question and on the partisan wars. Some members of our Party say that they stand for socialism, i.e. for an equal distribution of land, as socialism is understood among the peasantry. Other Party members stand for propagation of the agrarian revolution.

In order to prepare the forces for the coming revolutionary upheaval, it is necessary to take into account the regrouping of class forces which has taken place in the country. The regrouping was very rapidly, very complicated and very radical. But the object of the revolution and its content have remained the same; China has not been unified. In words we have a united Chinese republic, but every province is an independent State. At the head of these States there are five strong Kuomintang militarists. Apart from these five big rulers, there are also small feudals, small landowners, who vacillate between the big imperialist groups.

The Tasks of a Democratic Dictatorship.

As to the agrarian revolution, we must say that without an overthrow of the national bourgeoisie, which is closely bound up with the gentry and with feudal and semi-feudal agrarian relations, there can be no agrarian revolution or agrarian reform.

We know that even Wan Tin-wei, this petty bourgeois politician, said that part of the land of the big landlords can be confiscated, but that it is impossible to fight against all the gentry. The gentry are not kulaks as was once stated in the “Pravda”. Gentry is an English word which has acquired an entirely different meaning in the revolutionary literature of China. In the Chinese language we call them Shanshi. A gentry is a man who has actual power in his hands and certain privileges over a given territory. He has the power to put people in prison without trial, he has a right to have people whipped for the very reason that he belongs to a higher order (caste) and because he is a landlord. He has connections with the Yamin i.e., the head of the government and even drinks together with him. The gentry has a monopolist right to buy the right to collect taxes. If Wan Tin-wei does not want to put a stop to this, what is to be said of the national bourgeoisie, the economic roots of which lie in the villages?

As far as the tasks of the democratic dictatorship are concerned there is not much to be said about that.

We see in Turkey and China that the national bourgeoisie begins with a dictatorship and not with democracy. If it does take power it prefers the dictatorial method of government rather than democratic elections. Is it possible to have now elections in Turkey, or in China under the Kuomintang regime? Of course not. Why? Because for the development of home industry the national bourgeoisie of these countries must invariably resort to state capitalism. Only if organised by the state can industry hope to be able to withstand the competition of foreign capital. It is this that compels the national bourgeoisie in the colonial countries to strive for strong governments opposed to any form of class struggle. It cannot allow any class struggles. When the revolution in a colonial country reaches its decisive moment, the question arises either, or? either a dictatorship of the big bourgeoisie and the landlords or a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. If the revolution is defeated, i.e., the bourgeoisie takes the upper hand, democracy is out of the question. The national bourgeoisie “supplements” its national reformism by “national fascism”.

I think that the question of national reformism, which simultaneously means national fascism, must be taken up at this congress in all its acuteness and in its full scope, on the basis of the experiences of the Chinese revolution. (Applause.)

International Press Correspondence, widely known as”Inprecorr” was published by the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) regularly in German and English, occasionally in many other languages, beginning in 1921 and lasting in English until 1938. Inprecorr’s role was to supply translated articles to the English-speaking press of the International from the Comintern’s different sections, as well as news and statements from the ECCI. Many ‘Daily Worker’ and ‘Communist’ articles originated in Inprecorr, and it also published articles by American comrades for use in other countries. It was published at least weekly, and often thrice weekly.

PDF of full issue: https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/inprecor/1928/v08n68-oct-04-1928-inprecor-op.pdf