“L. Alfred” (Hans Kippenberger?) wrote a compelling, urgent series on proletarian military policy, mass protest, street combat, and working class defense organizing in an environment of rising fascism for the Communist press in the late 20s and early 30s. Here, he looks at the different (volunteer, obligatory, mass, professional) military ideas of the ruling class after the experiences of World War One and its resulting revolutions, and the Communist attitude.

‘The Problem of the Reliable Army’ by L. Alfred from Communist International. Vol. 5 No. 2. January 15, 1928.

THE problem of the reliable army has, since the world war of 1914-18, come more and more into the forefront in the military policy of the capitalist countries, and the question of reliability has become decisive in the solution of the army problem.

The last imperialist war led to powerful revolutionary uprisings within the armed forces of most of the imperialist Powers. The collapse of the Russian Tsarist army and of the German and Austrian forces, is still fresh in our memory. In the spring of 1917 there was also in the French army a broad movement of rebellion which extended throughout the whole army, and which the French army leaders could quell only with the greatest trouble and by extremely barbarous measures.

The history of the years since the war is the history of most intensely bitter class struggle, of armed uprisings–victorious or bloodily massacred–of great revolutionary movements in the colonies, of armed intervention and systematic preparation of a great war against the first Workers’ State, the Soviet Union. All these events completely justify the assumption that in a future war, particularly if it were concerned with an imperialist war against the Soviet Union, such revolutionary risings within the masses of the army will be more probable than formerly.

The capitalist governments have made a similar estimation of the position, and therefore in their military policy, which, because of their experiences in recent years, they seek to obscure by secrecy, they are all coming to the practical conclusion that it is more than ever before necessary to be armed against the “internal enemy,” and against other revolutionary factors; for that purpose it is before all necessary to create at any cost a reliable army.

In many countries an attempt to solve the question of a trustworthy army has been made by founding voluntary, armed fighting organisations of the bourgeoisie. The Fascist Militia in Italy, the “Protection Corps” in Finland, and the “Home Army” recently formed in Austria are types of such organisations. The German Fascist organisations also belong to this group (Steel Helmets, Weirwolves, etc.), although, at least officially, they are not armed.

The purpose of these organisations is in most cases quite openly announced to be the maintenance and protection of the existing, that is, the capitalist order of society. Because of that they are, directly or indirectly, in contact with the organs of the State power. Thus, for example, the Italian Fascist Militia and the Protection Corps in Finland are officially sections of the armed forces of those countries. They are financed and armed by the State, and their officers are in the pay of the Government.

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Besides these armed class forces of the bourgeoisie, the paid armies, the professional armies, are coming more and more into favour with the capitalist States in their efforts to secure reliable armies.

These are not new phenomena. On the contrary, they are much older than armies recruited by general conscription which took the place of the old mercenary armies of feudalism with the advent of capitalism. Before the world war there were mercenary armies in a few capitalist countries, a fact which can be explained by reference to the particular conditions of those countries (e.g., England). But after the world war some countries which previously had conscripted armies, began to form mercenary armies, and this tendency to changes from armies based on a general obligation to serve back to the professional army is becoming more and more apparent. Germany, Austria and a few other countries which before the war had purely conscripted armies, have now purely professional armies. France is about to create its professional army. In a few other countries measures have been taken which, more or less clearly, show the same tendency.

The Reichswehr and its Organisation

The origin of the German Reichswehr, that typical mercenary army, is sufficient to elucidate the meaning of this tendency towards the creation of mercenary armies. The Reichswehr came into existence in the revolutionary period of 1918-20, and arose from the immediate needs of the counter-revolution in the civil war against the revolutionary working class. It was formed originally from the revolutionary body which was created and led by the monarchist officers for the purpose of destroying the revolutionary movement, and which later was commissioned by the Ebert-Noske Government with the task of massacring the German revolution.

In this connection it is interesting to note that these counter-revolutionary officers, in organising their voluntary corps, were guided by the principle “Rather fewer but thoroughly reliable, men than many bad ones. (General Maerker in his book, “From the Imperial Army to the Reichswehr.”) In those circumstances such a principle is perfectly correct from the counter-revolutionary point of view. In suppressing a mass rebellion the counter-revolution always has weakly-organised fighting forces to combat, or else rebellious sections of the regular army which are in a state of disintegration, that is, they have, from the military point of view, an inferior enemy. If well organised troops can be placed in the field against such an opponent, they have, with a firm leadership, though relatively few in numbers, an incomparably better chance of suppressing the mass movement than a much greater army which is exposed to the danger of disintegration.

Although mercenary armies after the war arose first of all in the defeated countries, and were to some extent forced on them by the victors, it cannot be maintained that the introduction of the mercenary armies were in themselves a disadvantage to the possessing classes in those countries. On the contrary, the victors were themselves interested in protecting capitalism in the defeated countries from the “internal enemy,” the proletarian revolution. And such organisations as the German Reichswehr are admirably adapted to that purpose. The disadvantage, as far as the ruling bourgeoisie in the defeated countries is concerned, does not consist in the introduction of mercenary armies, but in the decisions of the Peace Treaty, according to which it is intended to make the establishment, formation and arming of large forces impossible for the defeated countries.

The French Army

The victorious countries, too, are pursuing the course of creating mercenary armies. The new French army reform affords a good example of this, showing at the same time the contradictions in which capitalist governments are involved in their military policy. On one hand the conduct of modern warfare demands the complete utilisation of all sources of help, even of the entire population of a country. Paul Boncour’s proposals for the “armed nation” satisfy this requirement, envisaging as they do the militarisation of the whole population, including women and children. On the other hand, however, the problem of the reliable army has in recent years become particularly acute in France. To solve that problem the French Government is proposing a thorough reorganisation of the army in its “Painlevé Bill.” According to this the character of the French army will be radically changed. It will be mainly mercenary, a professional army, while up to the present it has been an army based on the general obligation to serve. The effective strength of the army is to be about 600,000 or 700,000, of whom, however, only slightly more than 200,000 will be recruits called up annually; the remainder, that is, about two-thirds of the whole, will be a professional army.

A professional army is an expensive institution. That the reliability of the army has become the decisive factor for the French imperialists in their military policy is shown among other things by the fact that they intend creating this professional army partly at the expense of military preparation for the masses of the population. They find themselves compelled to shorten the period of service from eighteen months to twelve, and to reduce the number of the army units. These are measures which in themselves will deeply aggravate the difficulties of preparing and mobilising a large army, but they will effect savings which will reduce the cost of maintaining the expensive professional army, an army which it is thought will be reliable in any circumstances.

No doubt the capitalists of all countries would like their paid guards to be as strong as possible, but not all States can afford such an expensive affair as that planned by the French Government. But the same tendency to increase the number of paid professional soldiers within armies recruited by general conscription in order to create within those armies at least some strong cadres of reliable persons, can be observed in many countries.

Efforts are made to have the N.C.O. corps and particular sections of the troops (e.g. the flying squads) which are more deeply concerned by the question of reliability, composed exclusively if possible of professional soldiers.

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Even the Second International now finds itself compelled to discuss the problem of the professional army. In its business for the meeting of September, 1927, the Bureau dealt thoroughly with the question: “Popular or Professional Army.” Since the beginning of the last world war the social democrats of the different countries have justified and supported in every way the militarism of their own bourgeoisie. And of course they have supported them on this question also. The German and Austrian Social-Democrats–whose countries have mercenary forces–defended the professional army on the ground that it meant freedom for the broad masses of the population from the burden of compulsory service. The French, on the other hand, defended the law introduced by their Party comrade, Paul Boncour, a law which allows the French imperialists to militarise the entire population without respect to age or sex.

The Bureau of the Second International naturally came to no decision on the matter. It merely agreed to examine the question further. It is not necessary to be a prophet to be able to foresee that the Second International will not come to any other decision than that of defending and justifying the military systems of each capitalist “fatherland.” The agreement to “investigate” the question expresses the desire to lay aside, to hush up, and to forget the whole matter.

It does not occur to the imperialist lackeys of the Second International to put the question on a Marxist basis. Such a formulation of the problem would mean in the present situation that it would have to be considered not only from the standpoint of the class struggle within the capitalist countries, but also from the point of view of the struggle for freedom on the part of oppressed peoples and of defence of the first proletarian State. If the question is considered in such a manner a perfectly definite position with regard to it can and must be taken up. It is not difficult to see that in the creation of professional armies we are dealing with dangerous measures which are openly reactionary and directed against any and every revolutionary movement. In forming mercenary armies the world reaction hopes to be able to create a blind and flexible tool, estranged and isolated from the working-class masses and insured against the danger of “revolutionary infection.” The world reaction needs such mercenaries in its fight against the revolutionary working class, and for its expeditions against the colonial and other oppressed peoples. And finally the world reaction sees that in an imperialist war against the first Workers’ State, the armies recruited from conscripted working and peasant masses will not be sufficiently reliable, and that in such circumstances it will be more advantageous to make use of the mercenaries.

Selection of “Reliable” Personnel

In order to ensure the reliability of the professional army, great attention is devoted in most countries to the selection of persons. They are recruited from those consciously or unconsciously reactionary elements, which best correspond to the interests of reaction. A “fatherland,” that is, a reactionary cast of mind, is essential for acceptance in the German Reichswehr. Members are drawn mainly from the monarchist “front fighters” organisations. The percentage of workers in the Reichswehr is very small. In other countries the professional soldiers are to a large extent drawn from among declassed elements, even common criminals.

Since the tendency is to found mercenary armies and armed voluntary fighting organisations of the bourgeoisie, as well as all the other measures described above, which are taken by capitalist governments in their efforts to create a reliable army of an openly reactionary, counter-revolutionary and dangerous character, this tendency must be combatted by the class-conscious proletariat by every means at its disposal. It must try to prevent the carrying out of such reactionary “reforms.” If this is not successful, work must be carried on to make even these mercenary soldiers, however carefully they are chosen, and whatever desperate measures the capitalist governments may take to isolate them from the working masses, not so blind and obtuse, not so inimical to the working class and the revolutionary peoples, as their masters would wish them to be. Work in this direction is difficult, but possible, if one sets about it practically, concretely and energetically.

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The Communist Attitude

What is the position of the Communists with regard to the question put above, “Popular or Professional Army?” Are we, after a decisive rejection of the professional army, in favour of the popular or national army, as the army based on general conscription is also occasionally called?

If it is known that in a bourgeois State every army, whether professional or so-called popular, is a means of oppression in the hands of the ruling bourgeoisie, it is quite clear without further discussion that we cannot have as our slogan “an army based on general obligation to serve.” We are against any form of military organisation in capitalist States. But in spite of that it is in practice not unimportant to distinguish between the various forms, and to lay it down that, in comparison with a conscripted army, a professional army is much more dangerous for the working class.

In opposition to the thesis maintained above on the comparative danger of professional armies as an openly reactionary phenomenon, it may be brought forward that the example of the Austrian Confederate army disproves such a generalisation. It may be said that the Austrian army which is also a purely mercenary army is not at all reactionary in its composition; not a reactionary, but a republican outlook is required as a condition of acceptance in the army. The great majority of its members are Social-Democrats; the army is relatively little isolated from the working masses, has the political franchise, and can accordingly take part in political life; it is organised in trade unions, and even Communists can work in the army, etc.

It is true that the Austrian army in many respects is an original phenomenon, a fact which can be directly attributed to specific, purely Austrian conditions, an analysis of which would carry us too far here. Nor is that necessary. It is sufficient to state the fact that even for the Austrian bourgeoisie the problem of a reliable army has recently become a most acute one, particularly after the events of July; and that it is at present working feverishly in this direction. Besides the creation of the “Home Army,” that armed fighting organisation of the bourgeoisie, the Austrian bourgeoisie has begun a systematic struggle to make the army non-political, that is, to isolate the soldiers from the working class and from political life, and to cleanse the army from its undesirable elements. The German “Military Weekly” (11-11-27) announces with great satisfaction that the policy of making the army non-political has recently made great progress in Austria. In the army elections of 1927, the Government so managed it that the great majority of the elected persons came from the consciously reactionary and bourgeois elements, while formerly the majority were Social-Democrats. The government achieved this result by a special election strategy, by peculiar vanishing tricks, and at the same time by all sorts of terroristic and bribery measures. Such a measure was the transference of large numbers of superannuated soldiers to civilian positions, while the prospect of unemployment by dismissal was placed before the less reliable ones. All that shows that on this question Austria is no exception to the general rule.

In his works Marx constantly developed that thought of genius which Lenin formulated with extraordinary clarity in his article, “The Lessons of the Moscow Rebellion,” as follows: “The revolution progresses as it creates a firm and united counter-revolution, i.e., as it compels the enemy to use even more extreme methods of defence, and in this manner develops more powerful means of attack.”

The correctness of this statement in relation to the efforts of the capitalist governments to obtain a reliable army is indeed striking. For what are such measures as the arming of the bourgeoisie in the form of separate, purely class armies, the creation of mercenary armies, wherever possible from reactionary and apathetic “lumpen” proletarian elements; what are these but the desperate measures to create a “firm and united counter- revolution”? Such a concentration of the forces of the counter-revolution is, historically speaking, an expression of the weakness, a characteristic phenomenon of capitalism in its period of decline. For the same reason it gives no cause for pessimism. But in the present phase of the practical struggle it is a serious and a dangerous phenomenon which must be considered and combatted. The practical methods of fighting it must be sought and found.

There is a counter-maneuver for every maneuver.

The ECCI published the magazine ‘Communist International’ edited by Zinoviev and Karl Radek from 1919 until 1926 irregularly in German, French, Russian, and English. Restarting in 1927 until 1934. Unlike, Inprecorr, CI contained long-form articles by the leading figures of the International as well as proceedings, statements, and notices of the Comintern. No complete run of Communist International is available in English. Both were largely published outside of Soviet territory, with Communist International printed in London, to facilitate distribution and both were major contributors to the Communist press in the U.S. Communist International and Inprecorr are an invaluable English-language source on the history of the Communist International and its sections.

PDF of full issue: https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/ci/vol-5/v05-n02-jan-15-1928-CI-grn-riaz.pdf