Kjai Semin, Darsono, chair of the Partai Komunis Indonesia from 1920-1925, gives a valuable history of the movement, detailed and concise, in this co-report to the Comintern’s Sixth World Congress. The PKI was among the most vital and influential of the early Communist Parties in a colonial country, or any country. As the first Asian Communist Party to join the Comintern it was, in the first half of the 1920s, also the largest Comintern section in Asia. Working in, and partially leading, the popular Islamic party Sarekat Rakyat, the PKI played a central role in the mass rebellion that broke out against Dutch imperialism in 1926. In the aftermath of the insurrection, a mass wave of terror hit the Indonesian workers’ and anti-imperialist movement. The Communist International’s most substantial discussion of anti-imperialist colonial revolutions was held at the Sixth World Congress in 1928. The main report was presented by Kuusinen with supplementary reports from Ercoli (Social Democracy and Imperialism), Samin (Indonesia, who was exiled in Moscow at the time), Sinkander Sur (India), Strakhov (China), Jules-Humbert-Droz (Latin America) and discussed by dozens of international comrades over a many days.

‘The Situation in Indonesia’ by Samin from International Press Correspondence. Vol. 8 No. 68. October 4, 1928.

Co-Report of Comrade SAMIN:

Comrades, the Communist Party in Indonesia succeeded up to the rebellion in November 1926 to win the leadership in the national movement and to diminish very considerably the influence of the various national parties. The first mass proletarian attack upon Dutch imperialism in Indonesia, the general railway strike in May 1923, was led by Communists. The uprising in November as well as the uprising in West Sumatra in January 1927 were also led by the Communists. No other Party had such authority and influence among the broad masses of the people as the Communist Party.

This was by no means an accident and was not of a merely transitional character, as the reformists and Indonesian nationalists declare. I am sure that the good revolutionary traditions that prevail among the masses about our Party will be revived, notwithstanding the defeats we have suffered, and that our Party will once again be able to lead the masses against Dutch imperialism and next time to lead the struggle to a victorious conclusion.

Comrades, I think it will be difficult to find another country in which there is such a large number of various stages of development as will be found in Indonesia. Each one of the islands comprising what is known as Indonesia is on a separate stage of development. In New Guinea, where about 3000 comrades are in banishment, the ordinary population still lead a nomadic life and among them cannibalism is a common practice.

For imperialism and for the Communist movement the following islands represent the most important: Java, Sumatra, Celebes and Borneo. Of these Java is the smallest island and the most densely populated. In area Java represents only one-thirteenth part of Indonesia, but in 1920 the population was 35 millions out of a total population of 50 millions for the whole of Indonesia. According to present estimates the population of Java has risen to 40 millions. This density of population renders a rapid economic development of Java possible. The shortage of labour which hinders the rapid development of the “outer territories” as Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes and the other islands are called does not exist in Java. Another reason why Java has forged ahead of the other islands in her economic development is that, for example, in the year 1924 the exports of produce from the large agricultural enterprises in Java was three times as much as the combined exports of those of the other islands. The enormous rise in the price of rubber in the years 1925, 1926 and even in 1927 has  changed the situation somewhat in favour of the outer territories.

In Java a tendency is observed for the exports of produce of native enterprises to diminish, whereas in the outer territories a tendency is for the time being observed towards an increase. In Java it is the big capitalist enterprises that predominate whereas in the outer territories, for example in Sumatra, peasant economy has still a future before it. Nevertheless, there are symptoms showing that even in Sumatra the position of the native farmers will be seriously menaced by the rapid increase in the development of foreign capital.

In 1925 the total exports of the outer territories exceeded that of Java. This was due to the heavy exports of rubber. In that year the price of rubber was extraordinarily high. This year, however, the price of rubber has fallen considerably, and it must be expected that Java will again occupy first place in the economics of Indonesia.

The disintegrating influence of the rapidly increasing investments of foreign capital in Java is affecting the system of the communal ownership of land.

From 1882 to 1922 the number of villages declined from 29,518 to 21,539 as a result of the merging of small villages with larger villages. Notwithstanding this merging of villages, the diminution in the number of the villages with purely communal land ownership and the increase in the number of villages with purely individual landownership can be taken as a clear expression of the great change that is taking place in the rural districts. This change is naturally accompanied by a process of differentiation among the peasantry, which means the impoverishment of the majority and the enrichment of a small minority of the peasantry. Between 1892 and 1902 the number of villages with purely communal landownership declined from 11,136 to 7885. This period marked the entry of the period of imperialism, of export of capital.

The development of foreign capital in Java has caused widespread impoverishment. Writing in “Handelsberichten”, H.L. Haigton, a representative of the Dutch importers in Indonesia, says the following about the impoverishment of the Indonesian population:

“In order to have a clear idea of the unfavourable conditions that prevail for imports account must be taken of the low purchasing capacity of the natives employed on the plantations, whose daily wage is about equal to the hourly wage of a Dutch worker. With a few exceptions there are hardly any native capitalists. The conditions of life of the Javanese might be described as an hand to mouth existence!”

After the uprising “De Courant”, a liberal Dutch newspaper, in an article entitled “Unrest and Prosperity” had to admit that the so-called poll-tax, which the population regarded as very unjust, would now be repealed. But even the other taxes that the Javanese peasants had to pay were very heavy burden upon them. The paper wrote:

“A section of the rural population of Java (we hope that it is only a small section) is so overburdened with taxes and is therefore compelled to live on such a small income that, in the event of a revolt against the State, it has nothing to lose, except the life of poverty, care and deprivation, a life that the majority of us would attach little or no value to. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Communist leaders have won thousands of adherents, particularly in the rural districts, who were prepared to conduct armed warfare against the representatives of the State.”

This means that the masses of the Javanese people live under conditions that the European comrades could hardly conceive of. An official report of an investigation into the burden of taxation of the population of Java showed that the taxation per head in Java represented 42.86 gulden, or 71 marks per annum. Although the cost of living is not very high in Java, nevertheless, the amount left to the peasants after this sum has been paid is not sufficient to cover the barest needs. And yet the above figures rather understate the case than otherwise.

It is quite impossible to expect that the conditions of life of the masses of the Javanese people can be improved under the capitalist system. On the contrary, we must expect that their conditions will become worse, because the government is placing the overwhelmingly greater part of the taxes upon the impoverished population. This is shown from the following figures. In 1927 private export amounted to 809,234,745 guldens and private import amounted to 563,016,432 guldens, so that exports are about half as much again as imports. The import duties in that year, however, amounted to 28 times as much as the duties on exports. This means that an extraordinarily heavy burden of indirect taxation is imposed upon the masses of the people, for the taxes are imposed almost exclusively upon goods consumed by the people whereas no duties are imposed on imported machinery, etc. The exports of the produce of big capitalist enterprises are duty free.

This ruthless taxation policy inevitably leads to the impoverishment of the people in Java and compels them to migrate to the other islands like Sumatra and Borneo where, owing to the shortage of labour power, the development of big capitalist plantations is not so rapid. About 60,000 Javanese peasants emigrate yearly in this way.

The process of class differentiation set in only after the outbreak of the war. This differentiation proceeds in one direction towards the creation of a growing landless and, therefore, radically minded peasantry, and in the other direction towards the creation of a thin stratum of prosperous peasants, who, however, are not sufficiently strong ideologically to influence the other sections of the population.

The process of mass impoverishment is, in the final analysis, the result of the policy of Dutch imperialism which is commonly known as the policy of the “Open Door”. This policy means that foreign capital is allowed to enter Indonesia as freely as Dutch capital, i.e., no protection is given to Dutch capital. The object of this policy is to play off the big powers against each other and in this way to make Holland’s possession of Indonesia more secure. But the effect of it is that Indonesia is becoming industrialised with exceptional rapidity, particularly in the case of Java, which in its turn results in the rapid rise of a proletariat which literally has nothing to lose but its chains and is therefore very revolutionary.

Sumatra. This island has an area 3.6 times that of Java, and has a population barely amounting to 6 millions. Sumatra is the land of the future for capital in Indonesia. Peasant farming and small industry predominates here. The “Open Door” policy will have the same effect here as it had in Java. In 1925, owing to the high price of rubber, a small section of the population in Southern Sumatra rapidly became rich. The rubber plantation industry has excellent chances for expansion because there is plenty of free land, but labour power is insufficient. But capital attracts labour power from Java, China, and partly also from India. On the plantations about 300,000 indentured labourers are employed, working under most horrible conditions. For years already the politicians have been striving to introduce a law prohibiting indentured labour, because the conditions of these plantation coolies are no better than that of slavery. So far, however, these efforts have not met with success.

In addition to plantations there are coal and gold mines in Sumatra as well as modern industries for the winning of oil. Railways and roads are being laid down in order to accelerate the economic development.

In Sumatra the Communist Party has considerable influence among the peasantry, because the peasants are discontented with the government’s taxation policy. Owing to the shortage of labour power, the peasants, in addition to their heavy burden of taxation, are compelled also to put in a period of enforced labour on road building.

In Indonesia political power is in the hands of big capital. Consequently, everything that is unsuitable for big capital can be removed in à “legal” way. The exports of the outer territories, i.e., Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, etc. were smaller than that of Java. This applies to the exports of the produce of the big plantations. The exports of the produce of the peasant plantations are still very considerable on this island. In 1927 import duties on imports in the outer territories amounted to 26,490,759 guldens, and export duties to 12,779,434 guldens. Thus, in that year import duties in the outer territories were only twice as much as the export duties, whereas in Java import duties amounted to 28 times as much as export duties. This shows the enormous burden that is borne by the peasants in the so-called outer-territories.

As is the case in Java, it will be impossible under these conditions for a strong native peasantry to arise in the outer territories. The policy of the “Open Door” will have the same effect on these islands as it did in Java, namely, the oppression of the overwhelming majority of the peasantry and their transformation into proletarians (coolies) which are so necessary for the development of big capitalist plantations.

The export duty on the produce of the native producers is all the more brutal for the reason that no such duties are imposed on the exports of the produce of the big plantations with the result that the latter can far more successfully compete on the foreign markets with the native producers.

The development of Indonesia is proceeding very rapidly, and the peasantry know from the impoverishment that goes on in Java whither capitalist development is leading. Hence, the discontent of the peasantry with the Dutch Government and its sympathy for the Communist Party; for they know that the Communist Party is the only Party that takes up a consistent struggle against the government. In Java the process of class differentiation has gone the farthest. But this does not mean that the other Indonesian islands are of less significance; the peasant movement in the outer territories is of extreme importance for the movement in Java. In order to weaken the power of Dutch imperialism, we must mobilise the peasants against foreign domination in the outer territories, i.e., in Borneo, Celebes and the other islands also.

In Java there are large modern enterprises owned by a few banks, and for that reason the Communist ideas can be far better understood in Java than in those districts were no such large enterprises exist. In Java we not only have large agricultural enterprises, but also other branches of industry, such as the oil industry, printing, modern docks, metal works, railways, etc., which employ wage workers. The class enemy stands out in a much more palpable farm in Java than in the other islands.

Many comrades are not well informed about the Communist movement in Indonesia, and moreover, Indonesia does not play the same role in world politics as is played by China and India, so that it does not attract so much attention as these countries do. The role that Indonesia can play is that of a meaty bone for which the dogs of imperialism will struggle.

The Communist Party is young. It was formed in 1915 under the name of the Indian Social Democratic League by Dutch Social Democrats of the Right and Left wings, for the purpose of studying the political and economic problems of Indonesia. It was not the intention then to carry on agitation among the broad masses of the Indonesian population, but merely to carry on propaganda for Socialist ideas. The existence of a proletariat in Indonesia that could serve as a vehicle for the Socialist ideas, as was the case in Europe, was denied. Subsequently, this Socialist study circle grew up into a mass Party. The outbreak of the war suddenly caused a rise in the cost of living of 400%. In the cities strikes for increases of wages broke out. The industrial boom that prevailed in Indonesia at the time enabled the workers to win these strikes, with the result that the strike became a popular method of struggle. These strikes were led by our comrades, and so they came to the forefront when the class struggle, broke out in Indonesia for the first time.

The native comrades, at that time, worked in the Sarekat-Islam, which was very strong then. This League was founded in 1913 by native small shopkeepers and originally pursued the aim of combating Chinese competition. In its further development the Sarekat-Islam became transformed into a political organisation and during its most prosperous period had a membership of two millions.

The growing influence of our comrades in the Sarekat-Islam and the spread of Socialist ideas among its members led to the expulsion of the Communists in 1923. It should be mentioned here that the Indian Social Democratic League in 1920 was reorganised into the Communist Party. The expulsion of the Communists resulted in a considerable weakening of the Sarekat-Islam, for the majority of the members went with us. On the initiative of our Party, the Sarekat-Rajat Peoples League was founded in the same year, which was opened for membership of all Indonesians irrespective of nationality or religion. The defeat suffered by the Sarekat Islam in 1923 must be attributed to the acute economic crisis that prevailed from 1921 up to about 1925. This crisis resulted in the ruin of numerous independent petty bourgeois. In the same period the government carried out a very stern taxation policy for the purpose of preventing the hoarding of gold which also resulted in the ruin of a large number of the petty bourgeoisie. Not only were these petty bourgeois discontented, but so also were the workers and employees in government and private offices and the intellectuals, who, as a result of the economies introduced by the government, lost their jobs. The discontent of the masses found its outlet in May 1923 in the general raliwaymen’s strike and the attempted assassination of the Governor-General. This general strike was the first important mass attack of the workers against imperialism. The general strike was suppressed, an Anti-Strike law was passed and freedom of assembly was annulled.

This railway strike was the first experience of the masses proving the correctness of the Communist view that the State was nothing more than an instrument of coercion in the hands of the capitalists, and in Indonesia in the hands of the imperialists. The strike, therefore, had a revolutionising effect upon the further development of the popular movement in Indonesia.

The Government shut down our schools because the teachers whom we elected were Communists. Further proof of the hostility of a capitalist government towards the masses of the people was given in the persecution of the Communists and the suppression of the strikes in 1925 and the beginning of 1926. These proofs of the accuracy of the Communist views. greatly increased the authority of our Party among the masses. In 1923 not only was the Sarekat-Islam eclipsed by our Party, but so also was the National Indian Party which up to that time was to some extent the vehicle of national revolutionary ideas. Owing to its considerable loss of membership, this Party was dissolved in 1923 and the revolutionary elements either joined our Party or the Sarekat-Rajat which was influenced by our Party.

The decline of the Sarekat-Islam and the dissolution of the National Indian Party, in my opinion, marked the conclusion of the period of the petty-bourgeois leadership of the national movement. The victory of the Communist Party signified that from 1923 onwards, the proletariat took the hegemony of the Indian revolutionary national movement and that from this time onwards it became the mission of the proletariat to lead the liberation movement of Indonesia to victory.

In 1923 the leadership of our Party passed into the hands of the native comrades because the Dutch comrades were deported one after another by the Government. The Government believed that by deporting the Dutch comrades, the Communist Movement would automatically disappear. But it had the very contrary effect. The very fact that the leadership of the Party was in the hands of native comrades still further raised the prestige of the Party in the eyes of the masses, for we must not forget that in a colonial country like Indonesia, the masses are somewhat prejudiced against the Dutch comrades.

In June 1924 the first Congress of the Party, since the capture of the leadership of the national movement, was held. At this Congress the slogan was advanced: enough of agitation; organise and strengthen Party discipline. This slogan was called forth by the fact that as a result of our increased agitation, the masses streamed into the Party in large numbers, and it was necessary to consolidate these masses organisationally.

After this Congress our Party grew very rapidly. New trade unions were formed and the existing unions were strengthened. Our numbers increased so rapidly that six months later, in December 1924, a special conference was called in order to discuss the situation and to take the necessary measures. At this conference we discussed the possibility of capturing power. At the same time the Central Committee made a proposal which bore a distinctly ultra-Left character. This proposal was to the effect that the Sarekat-Rajat, which was affiliated as a body to our Party, be dissolved on the ground that it was a petty-bourgeois organisation and that our members could not carry on a consistent Communist line of tactics in that organisation. This proposal, however, was defeated by the overwhelming majority of the Conference on the ground that the petty bourgeoisie in Indonesia was a revolutionary force with which our Party must co-operate.

The unrestrained growth of our Party eventually compelled the government to take action against us. The Communist Party had the leadership of the most important trade unions, likely the Railwaymen’s Union, the Dock and Transport Workers’ Union, the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Employees’ Union, Printers Union, the Metal Workers’ Union and the Plantation Workers’ Union. Every strike that broke out was regarded by the police as a Communist strike and as such suppressed. The strike leaders were arrested and imprisoned. The measures taken by the Government against the strikers served only to stimulate the hatred against foreign domination still more.

In January 1925 the government tried to introduce a sort of Fascist regime by hiring criminals to intimidate the members of our Party and to remove the leaders. But this led absolutely to nothing. Our comrades organised defence corps and within a few weeks this pseudo-Fascism was dissolved.

After this setback the government was compelled to come out openly itself as the suppressor. The measures taken against our Party became more and more brutal. Again freedom of assembly was annulled and our Party was compelled to carry on propaganda illegally.

The intensified terror finally led to an armed uprising against the Government. We believed that it would be better to die fighting than to die without fighting. The uprising in Java spread to other parts, but in the meantime our leading comrades in Java were arrested and many of our members were discovered by the soldiers and the police and killed.

The rising broke out in Java on November 13th, 1926. The plan was to organise a general railway strike which was to serve as the signal for an uprising in Java and Sumatra. This plan was not carried out, however, because all the capable and experienced comrades were arrested. The rising in West Java lasted for about 3 weeks. In other parts of Java, however, no big movements took place. Only here and there’ conflicts took place with the police and acts of sabotage were committed.

The Government was completely taken by surprise, and ‘feared that the rising would spread over the whole of Indonesia. This is shown by the fact that only 600 soldiers were sent to West Java to suppress the rising there, and that is why it lasted so long there. In the capital, Batavia, the rebels tried to storm the prison, but were driven back. For several hours they occupied the Central Telephone Station. In Batavia the rising did not last for more than one week.

The rising in West Sumatra broke out two months later, in the beginning of January. It lasted four weeks, and was finally suppressed by the military.

The constant changes in the leadership of the Party due to the arrest and banishment of our leading comrades, resulted in many mistakes being committed by the leadership. One of these mistakes was that the rising in West Sumatra broke out two months after it broke out in West Java, which enabled the government easily to suppress it. Before the uprising all the native population were friendly or at all events not hostile to our Party. During the uprising in West Java in some places the members of the Sarekat-Islam, which was hostile to us, prayed for the victory of the uprising. The overwhelming majority of the Chinese population, and their newspapers which in Indonesia exercise considerable influence, adopted an attitude, if not friendly, then. at all events not hostile, towards our Party, before, during and even after the uprising.

Another serious mistake we made was that we failed to draw the masses of the workers into the struggle. The masses of the workers in the cities, as well as on the plantations, adopted an attitude of indifference towards the rebel movement.

The local character and the weakness of the uprising at the outset made no impression upon the native police and soldiers, and therefore they were not inspired by it. Only a huge insurrectionary movement in which the great masses take part will make the soldiers and the police unreliable for the governing class. It has been stated here that the army and police consist largely of State employees and that 97% of them were natives. In Indonesia as a whole there are 32,000 soldiers and 28,000 police.

Still another mistake made was that inadequate organisational and political preparations were made for the uprising. The slogans were not sufficiently clear to enable the masses to understand them.

Our Party had only very loose contacts with the Comintern and with our brother Parties. We were very badly informed about the movement in other countries. The few books we had on Communism were confiscated by the police. We had not the opportunity to obtain sufficient theoretical knowledge. Our Party to a large extent developed independently, and under these circumstances mistakes were inevitable. On the eve of the outbreak of the rebellion our Party had a membership of 9000, while the Sarekat-Rajat had a membership of 100,000. Our Party could have many more members, had we not made the conditions of entry more stringent. Only those who thoroughly understood the principles of Communism were eligible for membership, and before he was made a full member he had to pass through a period of probation.

The Party programme adopted at the Party Congress in 1924 revealed extreme ultra-Left tendencies. It contained the demand for the immediate establishment of a Soviet Republic in Indonesia. In my opinion, the demand for nationalisation in itself is a correct one. In Indonesia we have 2100 large plantations owned by a few banks. In addition we have modern railways, coal and gold mines, oil enterprises, and other modern undertakings.

After the Communist Party had won a leading position we were confronted by the difficulty that, bearing in mind the isolated geographical position of Indonesia, it was tactically foolish to put forward demands like that. Indonesia is surrounded by imperialist colonies and a successful Communist movement would be suppressed by the international imperialists who have invested their capital in Indonesia.

Let us now examine the prospects of the Communist movement in Indonesia and whether the Communist Party will be in a position again to lead the Indonesian national movement. The Dutch Social-Democrats in Indonesia regarded the leading position occupied by the Communist Party on the outbreak of the rebellion as a passing episode, and that was the attitude also of the nationalists. I personally do not think that our Party’s success over the nationalist parties was a mere accident. I think, on the contrary, that it proves that the period of petty-bourgeois leadership of the liberation movement has now come to an end in Indonesia. The victory of our Party cannot be ascribed to the energy of any particular Party leader or leaders, for in Indonesia there is no other Party that has so constantly changed its leaders as our Party has done. If in spite of this, our Party has won the confidence of the broad masses it can only be due to the fact that it points out the straight road to the struggle against Dutch imperialism and because the programme of our Party, although it reveals certain ultra-Left tendencies, nevertheless clearly and distinctly expresses what we want and how we propose to get it.

It is true, comrades, that the proletariat in Indonesia is not the same kind of proletariat that you have in Europe. It is a proletariat with a peasant ideology. But because this proletariat works on the plantations under the dictatorship of the big capital, this agricultural proletariat can easily appreciate Communist ideas. On the plantations they work collectively and are collectively exploited.

To my mind it is not an accident that the Communist Party alone succeeded in spreading its influence over the whole of Indonesia. No other Party managed to do this.

In April this year, a nationalist writing in the nationalist organ “Ssoloch Indonesia Moeda” tried to contrast nationalism to Communism. Like the reformists, he regarded the Communist movement as an intrusion in the national movement. The Communist movement was merely an intermezzo according to this writer. He wrote:

“Communism during the past few years is the cause of the setback of nationalism in our country. It has not only penetrated the cities and the villages, but also the workshops and the factories. In accordance with their principles, the Communists made their base in the trade union movement, which compelled Dr. Fock (the Governor-General) to introduce Par. 161 (the Anti-Strike Law). The severity of the laws, however, achieved the very opposite to what was intended.

At the same time we saw that as Communism grew in influence in the cities and villages, in the workshops and in the factories, nationalism was compelled to remain quiet and refrain from carrying on nationalist propaganda. Everywhere Communism was discussed and even at the risk of losing popularity nationalism had to be content with the role of onlooker. It dared not undertake any activity…”

What does this statement imply? It implies nothing more nor less than that the nationalists were incapable of leading the masses and had to leave this leadership to our Party. It proves that the nationalists in Indonesia are incapable of leading the struggle for liberation to its victorious end.

After the rebellion was suppressed, the nationalist organisations, partly because of the government indulgence towards them, and partly because of the fact that our leading comrades were either in prison or in banishment, began to revive. The Sarekat-Islam has once again achieved a certain amount of influence, and the Party “National Indonesia”, which was formed in 1927 has won a certain amount of popularity. It is usually the case that reaction sets in among the masses after a defeat, and that they come under bourgeois or petty-bourgeois influence. But it must be expected that as soon as the masses have recovered from their defeat and again enter into the arena of battle, they will throw off the leaders of the nationalist organisations in the same way as they did in 1923.

In Indonesia the Governing class, that is Dutch imperialism, is weak because it exercises little or no ideological influence upon the broad masses. The masses are illiterate and therefore the Government cannot influence them intellectually. The hatred of the broad masses towards the Government is not only a class hatred; this hatred becomes more intensified by the policy of the “Open Door” by which they hope to another religion. All these circumstances taken together make the domination of imperialism in Indonesia very unstable. The Dutch imperialists try to secure their possession of Indonesia by the policy of the “Open Door” by which they hope to obtain the support of the other imperialists. The development of this policy, however, leads to the growth of the “internal enemy” the proletariat.

Our primary task now is to restore our broken Party apparatus. We must restore also the trade unions, because without the trade unions the Party can never play a leading role. This is all the more important for the reason that, in our opinion, the nationalist parties will be incapable of leading the masses when the latter once again take up the offensive. This work is important also from another point of view. We must prevent the traditions of the other parties becoming deep-rooted among the masses. We must do all in our power to foster the well-deserved traditions of the Communist Party among the masses and to develop them in order that the Party may set the masses into action at the decisive moment.

These are very difficult tasks, comrades, because owing to the geographical isolation of Indonesia, we can only with difficulty maintain contacts with our other brother Parties. We must, however establish permanent contacts with our brother Parties in order to be able to make use of their experiences and in order to avoid making mistake after mistake for which we have to pay very dearly.

As I have already said, we lack well-trained active members. We must do all in our power to give our members a good Marxian-Leninist training. Lenin said that a revolutionary movement without a revolutionary theory is impossible. The agricultural industry is the principal industry in Indonesia. This facilitates the development of anarchistic tendencies. The poor city petty-bourgeoisie are also inclined towards anarchism. There was a time when the propaganda of our theories was mocked at. We were told it is not theories, but deeds that change the world. On the basis of these ideas, bomb-throwing and other acts of individual terror were engaged in, as was the case in Russia at the end of the last century. A Communist Party with a theoretically trained leadership will be able to overcome this anarchistic ideology.

The Communists must now work in the various nationalist organisations. They must compel the leaders of these organisations to carry out a revolutionary policy or else expose them.

Particularly important is it to carry on work among the peasantry. The peasants must be organised in peasant leagues or peasant committees in order to prevent the imperialists from utilising them. The struggles in West Java and Western Sumatra showed that the peasants are ready to join a struggle against the foreign domination.

The Government is continually striving to create confusion in the national movement by promising political reforms which, however, the masses cannot understand and which will certainly not improve their economic conditions.

In our draft theses we have put in the following slogans as a means for rallying the masses: Right of combination; freedom of assembly and free press; general amnesty for political prisoners; abolition of death penalty; improvement of the conditions of life of the broad masses. These demands of course are to be achieved through the principal demand: Indonesia free from Holland.

Comrades, our Party has made many serious mistakes. I hope, however, that through our closer contact with our brother Parties, we shall obtain their advice and the benefit of their fighting experience. We have not the slightest doubt that with the support of the Comintern and of our brother Parties our Indonesian Section will fulfil its revolutionary duties.

International Press Correspondence, widely known as”Inprecorr” was published by the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) regularly in German and English, occasionally in many other languages, beginning in 1921 and lasting in English until 1938. Inprecorr’s role was to supply translated articles to the English-speaking press of the International from the Comintern’s different sections, as well as news and statements from the ECCI. Many ‘Daily Worker’ and ‘Communist’ articles originated in Inprecorr, and it also published articles by American comrades for use in other countries. It was published at least weekly, and often thrice weekly.

PDF of full issue: https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/inprecor/1928/v08n68-oct-04-1928-inprecor-op.pdf