J. Peters, Party name of Sandor Goldberger, a Hungarian-Czech representative of the Comintern in the U.S. who became a leader of the Party’s Organization Department, explains the whys and wherefores of ‘concentration’.
‘Concentration—A Means of Winning the Workers in the Key Industries’ by J.P. from Party Organizer. Vol. 6 No. 2. February, 1933.
THE Communist International in Jan. 1931 raised for our Party the need of concentrating on the most decisive industries (mine, steel, textile, auto, marine) in the five largest districts (2, 5, 6, 7,8). Since then the word “concentrate” has become one of the many terms of the Party. We “concentrate” feverishly. Party units were assigned to concentration points. Full-time organizers were appointed to certain factories. Special comrades were elected by the District Buros to supervise the concentration work of the Party. The comrades involved in this work tried their utmost to carry out the many instructions of the higher committees. But despite all the energy expended, the very formal and sectarian approach to this vital problem served as an obstacle to penetrating the concentration factories. The Fourteenth Plenum had to again emphasize that we “must take steps to carry thru the directives of January, 1931, on concentration.”
Only after the Fourteenth Plenum did the necessity of concentration begin to permeate the Party. At the conferences on shop work held in New York and Chicago, the comrades in relating their experiences showed that while our work in the shops in still of an elementary character, there is a beginning to understand how to work in the factories. As a result of a better approach to the problems in the factories and improved methods of work, some noticeable results have been attained. At the same time, however, there is still confusion on many important questions in connection with our concentration work.
Our Past Methods of Concentration
What were our past methods of concentration? The concrete experiences brought out by the comrades ai the shop conferences showed in general the following weakness in our concentration work:
1) Hunting contacts; 2) hunting grievances; 3) stereotyped shop papers, leaflets, issued primarily before the major campaigns of the Party; 4) parasitic form of concentration; 5) lack of leadership from the higher committees; 6) lack of under- standing of the role and work of the shop nuclei; 7) insufficient understanding of how to safeguard the Party and organizations inside the factories; 8) neglect in developing struggles against espionage in the factories.
We cannot deal in detail with every point enumerated above. The basic weakness was the formal mechanical approach to the work. We were satisfied if we could show that we secured a number of contacts. We did not really study and know the conditions inside the factories, raising the most burning problems facing the workers and developing struggles around these issues. As a result all these contacts remained on paper without any organizational advancement.
We did not consult the workers with whom we had contact, discussing with them the grievances in the shop, formulating together with them concrete demands on the basis of these grievances, and activizing them in developing the work in the shop. We were merely satisfied with issuing a shop paper or a leaflet on the grievances which were dug up from the outside.
We had a conception in the past that by assigning a full time comrade to take care of the concentration on the selected factory, we solved the problem. The result was that this comrade tried to do everything alone—edited the shop paper, mimeographed and distributed it, ran after contacts, and if he succeeded in finding out certain grievances in the factory from one of the contacts, without consulting anybody, proposed an action against this grievance in the shop paper or shop leaflet issued by himself. With this method of work we could not get any results.
In most of the concentration points the street nucleus or the individual comrades assigned to the work were left entirely alone. The higher committees, section and district, very seldom took the trouble to sit with them and discuss the problems which they face in their work. The higher committees assumed that the circular instructions sent to these concentration points were sufficient to develop the work. We have instances where the shop nucleus was entirely wiped out because of our lack of understanding of how to develop and lead the struggle inside the factory. In other cases, the shop nucleus did not do anything inside the factory for years because of the lack of leadership from the higher committees. In some of the concentration districts, the district committees solved this problem by assigning one member of the District Committee to take care of the shop work. He was made responsible for this work. He faced exactly the same situation as the comrades assigned to the selected factory. He did not get any help from the district committee and settled the problem singlehanded.
We have cases where members of shop units were used for general street agitation among the unemployed, with the result that the members of the shop nucleus were soon exposed and fired. In one city we “safeguarded” the members of the shop unit by having them meet in the headquarters of the unemployed council just opposite the factory in which the members were working. Most of the members of the shop nucleus were naturally fired from the plant.
For years we have been speaking about fighting the espionage system, yet we have a case where a whole shop nucleus was wiped out because we had a spy in the shop nucleus. The spy was not fired from the factory. That happened 8 months ago. But the spy is still in the Party and has been allowed to be active in the union. The excuse of the district leadership for not exposing this spy, is that there is insufficient evidence against him.
Wrong Conceptions of Concentration
In our concentration work in the past we faced a number of wrong conceptions and tendencies. Some comrades developed the theory that in order to make inroads into the big factories we have to first penetrate the small factories. The conception expressed was that since it is easier to build up organizations in the small factories, these organizations will supply the necessary forces and money for penetrating the big factories. While it is true that sometimes in one industry or town an effective strike struggle will have repercussions in the larger plants (Detroit), generally such a theory is justification for following the path of least resistance.
This conception of concentration negates the Leninist understanding of developing organization and mass struggles in the key factories of the decisive industry which will influence not only the workers in the small factories of the same industry, but all the workers in the city and often influence the development of struggles in other parts of the country.
The Warren strike influenced favorably the development of struggles in many other steel plants. In the factories where we succeeded to popularize the struggle of the Warren steel workers, we succeeded in creating enthusiasm among the workers and in some places gained organizational results.
We had a theory developed in one place (Binghamton) that concentration does not mean to select one factory and develop struggle and organize inside of it, but to carry on general agitation in all the factories in the same industry in the town, and wherever a struggle develops as a result of our general agitation—that factory will be our concentration point for future work.
There is a further wrong conception that has manifested itself in some of the districts that shop papers cannot be issued in factories where we have only one or two party members, or a few reliable non-Party contacts, because the information that these comrades will give us for the shop paper can’t be properly checked up. This was theorized in order to delay the issuance of papers in the shop until a strong group was established. This had more basic causes—the fear to conduct agitation which would “interfere” with the narrow organizational routine work.
Ali these weaknesses and bad tendencies enumerated above were sharply exposed and fought at the two shop conferences. The conferences showed that we were making the first beginnings in our work in the shops.
Beginnings in Improving Our Work
What is of special importance is the fact that our comrades have learning the need of exposing even the most elementary grievances in the shop and developing partial struggles around these demands.
Existing groups and even individual members were able through proper methods of work in the shop to set in motion the whole department around a certain grievance. The action of the Stick-Together-Club in winning the 15-minute rest period; the movements in the steel plants against the welfare schemes; the defeating of wage cuts in a given department or section of workers (steel, miners), the gaining of certain demands as free shoes, sanitary conditions, etc.; are all evidence of the fact that the comrades understand more clearly the necessity of rallying the workers around their immediate issues. These small actions in most instances resulted in organizational gains. However, these struggles are still isolated to small groups of workers and were not utilized to broaden the struggle and develop it to a struggle directed against the state apparatus, etc.
In many places we developed a system of getting and organizing contacts, using all possible forms of approaching the workers in the factory. In one place we succeeded to get splendid connections in a big factory thru a checker club. Another place we organized our forces in the factory for struggle through a sport club. And at a third place a small house party helped us to build up a fighting group inside of the factory.
The comrades are beginning to understand that personal friendship with the workers inside the factory is an important factor in building up organizations; that these organizations will disappear if we do not develop struggles even on the smallest grievances.
We have some experiences where the district leadership as a whole was drawn into the work, meeting with 3 or 4 workers of the factory, discussing with them their problems, and how to organize the workers inside of the factory (Detroit). This proper method of leadership resulted in a rapid development of the movement inside of the factories. At the same time the leadership became acquainted with the detailed problems of the workers and were able to lead them (the resulting strikes in Detroit).
We saw from our experiences that the foreign born comrades could become the leaders and organizers of the native born workers (Paterson, Warren, Detroit, Gary, etc.)
In certain places we did not only talk abstractly about the problem of connecting up the struggle of the unemployed with the employed in the factories, but actually developed such struggles and used in many cases the unemployed struggles to gain organizational results and develop struggles inside of the factories (in many steel factories).
The experiences proved that a mere issuing of a shop paper or a leaflet even without any organization inside of the factory could develop struggles and win demands and as a result of this create organizations inside of the factory.
Thus we began to understand that “the first essential condition for successful work in the factories is daily contact with the masses of workers in it and a thorough knowledge of the position of the workers in the factory and of the concrete conditions for struggle.” (Fourteenth Plenum Resolution)
Concentration a Political Responsibility
The small successes cannot satisfy us in our work. The fact remains that the number of shop nuclei did not increase in the basic industries, that the membership of the existing shop nuclei is growing very slowly. In the November-December issue of the Party Organizer we wrote about our factory work, especially about systematic attention of the leadership to factory work and how to adopt conspiratorial methods in this work.
It is necessary to emphasize a few more points:
That District and Section Committees must consider their first political responsibility to those units which are concentrating on the important plants. This means that all the problems, in the concentration work, must be thoroughly taken up in the respective committee, a clear line of policy developed. There must also be the strictest check-up on the decisions made and on the forces assigned to carry through the work. While comrades should be assigned to help the units to carry on the work, the main problem is to develop the initiative of the units and to train the members in the concentration points.
Concentration means to utilize all available forces and organizations to penetrate the selected factory. The I.L.D., W.I.R., F.S.U., Labor Sports Union, should very consciously be drawn into the concentration work. The Unemployed Councils, trade unions, Y.C.L., must coordinate their plans with the Party organizations. The fractions in the various mass organizations led by reactionary and social-fascists should be made conscious of the concentration plan of the Party.
The language papers should be used more extensively in our concentration work. There was a very good suggestion in the Chicago shop conference which should be considered very seriously, i.e., that all the shop papers and even shop leaflets should be sent to the language papers which have influence among the foreign born workers in the given factory.
The leading committees should investigate very carefully the causes of the many failures in their efforts to penetrate the factory and to continue the work with renewed energy on the basis of carefully considered measures to overcome the previous shortcomings.
We have to put an end to the deadly organizational daily routine in our factory work. We must develop the struggle against the capitalist offensive and against the policy of the reformists.
“Precisely because little time remains before the revolutionary crisis matures is it necessary without losing a moment to intensify and accelerate our Bolshevik mass work to win over the majority of the working class, to increase the revolutionary activity of the working class…The main link which the Communist Parties must seize upon in solving this problem is the struggle for the every- day economic and political interests of the broad masses against the increasing poverty, against oppression, violence and terror.” (Thesis of the Twelfth Plenum of the E.C.C.I) —J.P.
The Party Organizer was the internal bulletin of the Communist Party published by its Central Committee beginning in 1927. First published irregularly, than bi-monthly, and then monthly, the Organizer was primarily meant for the Party’s unit, district, and shop organizers. The Organizer offers a much different view of the CP than the Daily Worker, including a much higher proportion of women writers than almost any other CP publication. Its pages are often full of the mundane problems of Party organizing, complaints about resources, debates over policy and personalities, as well as official numbers and information on Party campaigns, locals, organizations, and periodicals making the Party Organizer an important resource for the study and understanding of the Party in its most important years.
PDF of issue: https://www.marxists.org/history/usa/pubs/party-organizer/v06n02-feb-1933-Party%20Organizer.pdf
